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ABSTRACT
A m odified versio n  o f th e  per se ru le  has been employed by Canada 
fo r  several decades to  enforce r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  le g i s la t io n .  One 
freq u en t c r i t ic is m  of t h i s  method of enforcement i s  i t s  lack  of f le x ­
i b i l i t y .  R eliance on judges and law yers w ith l i t t l e  o r  no form al t r a i n ­
ing  in  economics to  decide m a tte rs  which a re  e s s e n t ia l ly  economic in  
natu re  has caused t o  evolve an enforcement procedure In  many re sp e c ts  
excessive ly  l e g a l i s t i c .  In  good p a r t ,  t h i s  has re su lte d  from th e  
Federal Government1s necessary re lia n c e  on i t s  powers to  enact c rim in al 
le g is la t io n  ( ' p roperty  and c i v i l  r ig h t s ' being ex c lu siv e ly  p ro v in c ia l 
under th e  B.N.A. A ct) in  order to  c o n tro l combines and r e s t r i c t iv e  prac­
t i c e s ,  and th e  in e v ita b le  d a s h  between standards o f p ro o f, e tc .  normally 
expected in  c rim in a l proceedings and those ap p ro p ria te  to  economic is s u e s .
An a ttem pt has been made in  th e  United Kingdom to  avoid  t h i s  to e  
l e g a l i s t i c  approach to  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  by th e  estab lishm ent o f  a 
sp ec ia l co u rt t o  pronounce upon r e s t r i c t iv e  agreem ents. P ro v is io n  has 
been made fo r  appointment to  the  court of la y  members, q u a l if ie d  by 
v ir tu e  o f t h e i r  experienee in  in d u s try , commerce o r public  a f f a i r s ,  to  
s i t  w ith le g a l ly  q u a lif ie d  judges in  the  ad ju d ica tio n  of r e s t r i c t iv e  
agreements. In  a r r iv in g  a t  i t s  d ec is io n  th e  court must consider a l l  
re le v a n t economic f a c to rs .  Such an econom ically-orien ted  approach might 
be expected, on a p r io r i  grounds, to  have economic r e s u l t s  su p e rio r to  
those  emerging from cu rren t Canadian p ra c t ic e ,  under which (d e sp ite  app­
aren t deference t o  'undueness' and public  in te r e s t  in  th e  l e g is la t io n )  
in te rp re ta t io n  has become s tra in e d , l e g a l i s t i c  and even somewhat in -
i i
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c o n s is te n t, w ith v i r tu a l ly  no reference  to  economic causes o r e f f e c ts .
A nalysis o f cases r e la t in g  to  th e  public i n t e r e s t  which have 
appeared before t h i s  court to  th e  p resen t time f a i l s  to  uphold such 
ex p ec ta tio n s  and i t  i s  concluded th a t  on th e  b a s is  o f B r i t is h  experience, 
th e re  i s  in s u f f ic ie n t  proof to  e s ta b lis h  th e  a p r io r i  b e l ie f  th a t  th e  
economic r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  econom ically-orien ted  approach a re  su p e rio r to  
those  r e s u l t in g  from p er se ru le s .
i i i
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PREFACE
The purpose of t h i s  study i s  to  examine th e  re c e n t developments 
in  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  le g is la t io n  in  th e  United Kingdom, alm ost ex­
c lu s iv e ly  r e la te d  t o  p ric e  agreem ents, to  determ ine w hether th e  newer 
B r i t is h  procedure con ta ins worthwhile 'le s s o n s ' ap p licab le  t o  th e  Can­
adian method o f enforcem ent. The United Kingdom le g is la t io n  e s ta b lis h e s  
an econom ically-orien ted  approach t o  th e  sub jec t o f r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  
enforcement. This d i f f e r s  considerably  from th e  lo n g e r-e s tab lish e d  
Canadian method of enforcement wherein eoonomie co n s id e ra tio n s  p lay  a t  
most a minor p a r t a s  evidence which w i l l  be considered by th e  c o u rt.
In  making acknowledgements, my forem ost g ra titu d s  i s  to  th e  members 
of my committee; P ro fesso r W. G. P h i l l ip s ,  Ph.D ., Head of Department o f 
Economics and P o l i t i c a l  Science and Chairman o f my committee, P ro fesso r
A. E. Kovacs o f the  Department of Economics and P o l i t i c a l  Science and 
P ro fesso r J .  M. Brownlie o f th e  School o f Business A dm inistration , 1 am 
deeply indeb ted  to  th e  e n t i r e  Department o f Economies and P o l i t i c a l  Science 
fo r  th e i r  many h e lp fu l suggestions and ccements but e s p e c ia lly  to  Dr. W.
G. P h i l l ip s  who aroused my I n i t i a l  i n te r e s t  in  th e  su b jec t and succeeded 
in  m ain tain ing  i t  even beyond completion o f th e  study.
I  a lso  wish to  extend ray thanks to  th e  s ta f f  o f th e  U n iv ersity  o f 
Windsor L ibrary  fo r  th e  a s s is ta n c e  given me, no tab ly  t o  Mr. A lbert V.
Mate, M.A., A.M.L.S., Reference L ib ra rian , and Mrs. E lisab e th  McGaffey, 
a lso  o f th e  re fe ren ce  departm ent, in  lo c a tin g  many o f th e  sources o f in ­
form ation used in  t h i s  s tudy . Miss Mary Dalton was a lso  both ch eerfu l 
and h e lp fu l,  providing va luab le  a s s is ta n c e  on innumerable occasions.
iv
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I  would be fo rev er In  e r ro r  I f  I  d id  not express g ra titu d e  t o  my 
w ife fo r  her con tinual encouragement and forbearance in  th e  face of what( 
a t  the  tim e , appeared to  be m ajor d i f f i c u l t i e s .  F in a lly , 1 wish t o  thank 
those  who have taken  th e  tim e to  a s s i s t  in  th e  typ ing  o f t h i s  th e s i s .
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract 11
P reface I t
In tro d u c tio n  1
I  Legal A ttitu d e  Towards R e s tr ic tiv e  P ra c tic e s  3
in  Canada
A. The Modified Per Se Rule 4
B. C o n e titu tio n a l Problems 5
I I  The United Kingdoms Economic Background 12
A. Post World War I  12
B. Post World War I I  15
I I I  The Monopolies and R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Act, 1948 17
A, D e fin itio n  o f Monopoly C onditions 17
A D igression on Conscious P a ra lle lism  18
B. Some C ritic !m ss  o f th e  Act 21
Double Function o f th e  Commission 21
P o l i t i c a l  Expediency 22
Few R eports 27
IV The R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  A ct, 1956 29
A. Main P rov isions o f  th e  Act 29
The R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court 31
The Seven "Gateways* and th e  "Tailp iece*  32
B. Seme Weaknesses in  the  1956 Act 33
Inform ation Agreements 34
R e g is tra tio n  35
No Crim inal Sanctions 36
R esale P rice  Maintenance 36
B ila te r a l  Agreements 38
S erv ices 40
V The 1956 Act a t  Work 41
A. Sane Standard Agreements 42
P ric e  S ta b i l i ty  43
Q u ality  44
Surplus C apacity 44
Investm ent and Research 47
P revention  of Monopoly 48
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6. S uccessfu l Arguments under Seotion 
(21) (1 ) (b )
49
Black B o lts  and Nuts 50
Cement 53
Magnets 56
Metal Windows 59
Net Bodes 61
E valuation  of th e  1956 Act 67
A. E ffe c ts  o f th e  Act 67
B. A Middle Way 70
G. Conclusions 73
Appendix 78
Bibliography 115
V ita  A uctoris
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f t h i s  study i s  to  d esc rib e  and analyse  th e  B r i t is h  
method of en fo rc ing  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  le g is la t io n  to  determ ine 
whether t h i s  newer approach whereby r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements a re  Judged 
by th e i r  eoonomic e f f e c ts  i s  su p erio r to  Canadian enforcement pro­
cedure whereby r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements which involve a preponderance 
of th e  in d u s try  o r  a  su b s ta n tia l  p a r t  of th e  market a re  per se i l l e g a l .
The Canadian procedure has avoided any re fin e d  economic a n a ly s is  by th e  
co u rts  and has been content to  r e ly  on th e  t e s t  th a t  c o llu s iv e  behaviour 
has reduced com petition to  a  p o in t which i s ,  i n  toe  court* s  opin ion , 
undue. Once th i s  p o in t has been read ied  th e  agreement i s  p er se i l l e g a l  
with no regard  f o r  to e  economic consequences which m ight fo llow  removal 
o f the  r e s t r i c t io n s .
I f  th e  p ro p o sitio n  i s  accepted th a t  a  com petitive economy i s  more 
productive than  i t s  noncom petitive c o u n te rp a rt, to e  need f o r  l e g is la t io n  
p ro h ib itin g  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  i s  obvious. I t  i s  only i n  more re c e n t 
y ea rs , however, th a t  t h i s  p ro p o sitio n  has found wide acceptance ou tsid e  
of North America and even then  i t  has only  been accepted w ith  q u a lif ic a ­
t io n s .  The recen t United Kingdom le g is la t io n  e s ta b lis h e s  a  presumption 
in  favour o f com petition bu t provides f o r  exceptions to  th e  com petitive 
p r in c ip le  when i t  can be demonstrated th a t  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  a re  
no t con trary  to  th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t .  This exem plifies th e  w idely held  
b e l ie f  in  England th a t  no t a l l  r e s t r i c t io n s  a re  harmful and th a t  some 
even may be b e n e f ic ia l .
In  North America the  b e n e f its  o f com petition have long been e x to lle d .
1
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2Even the businessman who would pursue a r e s t r i c t iv e  p o licy  in  th e  fu r th e r ­
ance of h is  own in t e r e s t s ,  would p re fe r  to  see o th e r  businessmen sub­
jec ted  to  th e  r ig o u rs  o f com petition . Competition i s  e g a l i ta r ia n  in  
nature  and i t  i s  upon such p o l i t i c a l  p r in c ip le s  th a t  th e  North American 
democracies o f th e  United S ta te s  and Canada were founded. The d e s ire  
fo r  p o l i t i c a l  e q u a li ty  and th e  f e a r  o f concen tra tion  of eoonomic power 
were tra n s la te d  in to  an economic p o licy  where g rea t f a i th  has been 
placed upon th e  le v e l l in g  powers o f com petition . There i s  l i t t l e  wonder 
then  th a t  p er se ru le s  were adopted in  North American a s  a guaran to r o f 
a com petitive economy.
I t  i s  only in  North America th a t  the  per se approach to  r e s t r i c t iv e  
p ra c tic e s  i s  found. C ountries which have become concerned w ith  th e  a n t i ­
t r u s t  problem in  recen t y ea rs  have adopted an em pirica l approach t o  th e  
problem. T his r a is e s  th e  questio n  whether th e  per se approach has become 
somewhat d a ted . Why have o th e r  co u n trie s  n o t seen f i t  to  adopt t h i s  
method of enforcement which has th e  b e n e f it  o f such leng thy  experience?
The procedure follow ed in  answering th e se  and o th e r q u es tio n s  which 
a r is e  w il l  be to  d esc rib e  th e  economic background and th en  move on to  th e  
le g a l framework on which th e  system of enforcement r e s t s .  An a n a ly s is  
follow s of eases con tested  before th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court to  
determine whether agreements were co n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t .  The 
f in a l  sec tio n  of the  th e s is  w i l l  eva lua te  th e  e f f e c ts  o f th e  B r i t is h  
le g is la t io n  on com petition w ith in  the  country in  an attem pt to  determ ine 
whether th e  econom ically o rien te d  approach used in  th e  United Kingdom 
has shown economic r e s u l ts  su p erio r to  per se ru le s .
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3CHAPTER I
LEGAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES IN CANADA
R e s tr ic tiv e  p ra c tic e s  le g is la t io n  developed alm ost sim ultaneously  
Ln Canada (1889) and the  Unitad S ta te s  (1890) a s  a ra a o tio n  to  th e  oon- 
e e n tra tio n  of economic power evidenced by th e  merger movement o f th e  
period . I t  has been s ta te d  th a t  l e g is la t io n  was enacted i n  both  co u n tr ie s  
"p ro h ib itin g  comprehensively and i n  p r in c ip le  a l l  fo ra s  o f r e s t r i c t iv e  
agreements tend ing  to  e lim in a te  competition."^" Some q u a l i f ic a t io n  i s  
requ ired  fo r  t h i s  statem ent bu t i t  does express th e  manner l n  vhieh  th e  
" ru le  o f law" o p era tes .
The Sherman Act in  th e  United S ta te s  d id  p ro h ib it  a l l  r e s t r a in t s
2of tra d e j th e  Canadian le g is la t io n ,  however, condemned only those  
r e s t r a in ts  which "unduly*1 lim ited  c o m p e ti t io n .A ro u n d  th e  tu rn  of th e
1 W. Friedmann, "A Comparative A n aly sis ,"  in  W. Friedmann, 
e d i to r ,  Anti T ru st Laws, (Toronto: The Carsw ell Co. L td .,  1956),
2 S ection  1 outlaws "Every c o n tra c t, combination in  th e  fo ra  of 
t r u s t  o r o therw ise , o r  conspiracy , i n  r e s t r a in t  o f tra d e  o r  commerce 
among th e  se v e ra l S ta te s ,  o r  w ith  fo re ig n  n a tio n s” j and se c tio n  2 
makes g u il ty  of a misdemeanour "Every person who s h a ll  m onopolise, o r 
combine o r  consp ire  w ith  any o th e r person o r persons, to  monopolise 
any p a r t o f th e  tra d e  o r cam erce  among th e  sev era l S ta te s  o r  w ith  
fo re ig n  n a tio n s ."  Baphasis supp lied . 26 St& t. 209 (1890), a s  amended, 
15 U.S.C. (1956).
3 S ection  32 (1 ) (c )  has emerged a s  th e  most im portant para­
graph and s ta te s  "Every one who co n sp ires , combines, ag rees o r  a rranges 
w ith  ano ther person to  p rev en t, o r  le e se n , unduly, com petition in  th e  
p roduction , m anufacture, purchase, b a r te r ,  su m ,  s to ra g e , r e n ta l ,  
t ra n sp o r ta tio n  o r supply o f an a r t i c l e ,  o r  i n  th e  p r ic e  o f insurance 
upon persons o r p ro p erty  i s  g u il ty  o f  an in d ic ta b le  offence and i s  
l ia b le  to  imprisonment f o r  two y e a rs ."  Emphasis supp lied . Combines 
In v e s tig a tio n  A ct, R .S .C ., 1952, C314 as  amended by I960, C45.
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4cen tu ry , th e  American co u rts  in te rp re te d  th e  q u a l i ta t iv e  t e s t  o f un­
reasonableness in to  th e  Act and Friedmann, in  a 195$ a r t i c l e ,  con­
cluded " th a t  th e  d iffe ren ces  between Canadian and American law have a t  
le a s t  th e o r e t ic a l ly  been reduced to  in s ig n if ic a n c e ." ^
I t  i s  convenient a t  t h i s  p o in t to  c la r i f y  th e  p re sen t Canadian le g a l  
p o s itio n  on r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  as  th e  o b jec t of th i s  study i s  to  judge, 
in  the  l ig h t  o f recen t B r it is h  experience, whether th e  Canadian approach 
to  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  enforcement might he outdated o r  in f e r io r  to  th e  
more recen t B r it is h  approach which w i l l  be described  below.
A. The Modified Per Se Rule
Friedmann*s statem ent th a t  in  Canada " a l l  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements 
tend ing  to  e lim in a te  com petition"^are p ro h ib ited  has been c r i t i c i s e d  and 
he has been accused of a ttem pting  to  cus up th e  Canadian ju risp rudence 
in  th e  statem ent th a t  "any r e s t r i c t io n  o f com petition must be presumed 
to  be per se an offence a g a in s t th e  law ."^  T his i s  an im portan t p o in t 
to  c le a r  up as th e  opinion i s  widespread i n  Canada th a t  any and a l l  re ­
s t r a in t s  upon com petition a re  p e r  se i l l e g a l .  This b e l ie f  i s  "as  i n -
7
c o rre c t a s  i t  i s  in f lu e n t ia l ."
4 W. Friedmann, "Monopoly, Reasonableness and. P u b lic  I n te r e s t " ,  
Canadian Bar Review, m i l l  (1955), 145} see a ls o  1 /  C. Reynolds, The 
Control o f Com petition in  Canada. (Cambridge, Mass. i Harvard U n iv ersity  
P ress , 1946), pp. 169-7$”where Se s ta te s  "The process of ju d ic ia l  in ­
te rp re ta t io n  h a s ...b ro u g h t th e  two s ta tu te s  in to  m u#  c lo se r  agreement 
than one would suspect from th e  wording."
5 In  D. C. K ilgour, "Cases and Consents", Canadian Bar Review.
XXXV (1957), 1088.
6 Ib id .
7 Ib id .
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5Two noted a u th o r i t ie s  lend t h e i r  weight to  th e  opinion th a t  a l l  
r e s t r a in t*  upon com petition a re  no t per se i l l e g a l  in  Canada. P ro fesso r
Skeoch has s ta te d :
each and every degree of in te rfe re n c e  w ith f re e  com petition 
i s  no t condemned, bu t only th a t  degree which r e s u l t s  from 
e f fe c t iv e  co n tro l of a s u b s ta n tia l  p a r t  o f the market 
concerned.®
Maxwell Cohen, appearing a s  a w itness  before  th e  House of Ccraaons
Committee on Banking and Commerce, sa id :
When <me ta lk s  about the ex is ten ce  in  Canada o f an a t t i tu d e  
by th e  co u rts , which i s  very  tough and simple and over­
s im p lif ie d , one must remember th a t  t h i s  over s im p lif ic a tio n , 
on th e  whole, i s  confined to  s i tu a t io n s  where th e  preponder­
ance o f the in d u s try  i s  involved in  such co -opera tive  o r 
co llu s iv e  behaviour.^
The co n stru c tio n  most l ik e ly  to  be placed by the  c o u rts  today upon 
th e  wording of the  Act appears to  be th a t  those r e s t r a in t s  upon com- 
!p e titio n  which involve "a su b s ta n tia l  p a r t  o f the  market" o r "preponder­
ance of th e  in d u stry 1'w i l l  be judged per se i l l e g a l .  T h is i s  th e  mod­
i f i c a t io n  to  the  s t r i c t  per se ru le  which appears in  th e  Canadian 
le g is la t io n .
B. C o n s titu tio n a l Problems 
Even th e  b r ie f e s t  o u tlin e  o f th e  p resen t Canadian le g a l  a t t i tu d e  
towards r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  would be se r io u s ly  d e f ic ie n t  w ithout seme 
mention o f th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l  problems p e c u lia r  to  Canada, which have 
played an im portan t ro le  in  th e  framing of th e  anti-com bines l e g is la t io n .
8 L. A. Skeoch, "The Combines In v e s tig a tio n  Act: I t s  In te n t
and A pp lica tion", Canadian Jou rnal o f Economics and P o l i t i c a l  Science. 
m i  (1956), 30-31.
9 M. Cohen, to  House o f Commons Committee on Banking and Commerce, 
Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence. Combines In v e s tig a tio n  A ct. I960.
PP. 536-37.
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6S ection  91 of th e  B r i t is h  North America Act e n tru s ts  to  th e
fe d e ra l government exc lusive  a u th o r ity  over " the  re g u la tio n  of tra d e
and commerce" and "the crim inal la v ,"  Section  92 g ives a u th o r ity  to
th e  provinces over "p roperty  and c iv i l  r i g h t s  in  th e  P ro v in ces.n
There i s  an apparent c o n f l ic t  h e re . Almost any eoonomic re g u la tio n s
w il l  a f f e c t  both " trad e  and cortaaerce" and "p roperty  and c i v i l  r ig h ts ."
The c la s s ic a l  d e f in it io n  of the  " trad e  and commerce" c lause  was
la id  down in  C itiz e n s * Insurance Company v s . Parsons (1881) where i t  was
s ta ted  th a t  th e  a u th o r ity  o f th e  fe d e ra l government
to  l e g i s l a t e  f o r  th e  re g u la tio n  of tra d e  and commerce does no t 
comprehend the  power to  re g u la te  by le g is la t io n  th e  c o n tra c ts  
o f a p a r t ic u la r  business o r t ra d e , such a s  the  business  o f 
f i r e  insu rance  in  a  s in g le  province.
As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  courts* in te rp r e ta t io n  o f th e  " tra d e  and comm­
erce" c la u se , th e  fe d e ra l government has been forced  to  r e s o r t  to  th e  
crim inal code to  enforce i t s  anti-com bines p o lic ie s .  The p ro p rie ty  o f 
t h i s  was a lso  questioned bu t upheld in  1931 on the  ground th a t  th e  
primary o b jec t o f the  Combines In v e s tig a tio n  Act was " to  make th e  
fo ra a tio n  o f a combine a c rim inal o ffen ce , and th a t  th e  in v e s tig a to ry  
powers o f th e  R e g is tra r  a re  reasonably  a n c i l la ry  to  t i l l s  o b jec t.* ^*
As re c e n tly  as  1952, th e  HaoQuarrie Report s ta te d t
The c o n s ti tu tio n a l  case fo r  monopoly le g is la t io n  i s  narrow er 
in  Canada than in  c i th e r  th e  United Kingdom, which i s  a 
u n ita ry  s ta t e ,  o r  th e  United S ta te s ,  where th e  commerce 
c lause  has received  a wide in te rp r e ta t io n .12
10 See L. C. Reynolds, oj>. d t . .  pp. 247-48.
11 Ib id . .  p . 258.
12 Report o f th e  Committee to  Study Combines L e g is la tio n .
(Ottawa: Queen*s P r in te r ,  1952), p . 7 .
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7Because of re l ia n c e  on th e  crim inal law , p u b lic i ty  and crim inal 
p rosecu tion  have been th e  p r in c ip a l means of enforcement used a g a in s t 
r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  in  Canada. C iv il  remedies a re  very  d i f f i c u l t  
due to  th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l  problems. T his has re su lte d  in  an unhappy 
s ta te  o f a f f a i r s  as  c rim in a l san c tio n s  a re  in ap p ro p ria te  in  a l l  cases.
The s u b s ti tu tio n  of c i v i l  o r ad m in is tra tiv e  remedies in  p lace  of c rim inal 
p rosecu tion  would make i t  p o ss ib le  to  m itig a te  the  harshness o f th e  
l a t t e r  where d e s ire a b le . In  th e  Ifriited S ta te s  both c i v i l  and crim inal 
p rosecu tions may be brought (co n cu rren tly  i f  d e s ire d )  by th e  Department 
o f J u s tic e  under th e  Sherman Act and th e  Federal Trade Commission may 
upply ad m in is tra tiv e  rem edies; in  B r ita in  both c i v i l  and ad m in is tra tiv e  
c o n tro ls  a re  employed. In  Canada th e  only a l te rn a t iv e  to  th e  crim in al 
law i s  a d ec is io n  by th e  M in is te r o f J u s t ic e  no t to  proceed any fu r th e r  
w ith  a case . T his i s  hard ly  s a t is f a c to ry  a s  i t  does n o t comprehend "the  
many in term ed ia te  s itu a t io n s  w h e re ...a c tio n  i e  req u ired  b u t c rim inal 
p rosecu tion  may appear too  severe.
I t  would no t be d i f f i c u l t  to  argue th e  s u p e r io r i ty  of l e g i s la t io n  
con ta in ing  a f u l l  a rse n a l o f weapons, i . e . ,  c r im in a l, e i v i l  and admin- 
1s tr a t iv e  rem edies, to  th a t  con ta in ing  a s in g le  b lunder buss, c rim in a l 
san ctio n s. The au th o rs  o f th e  HacQ uarrle Report obviously  thought l ik e -  
w ise.
We a re  no t u n a w a re ...th a t th e re  a re  s e c to rs  o f th e  economy in  
which e f fe c t iv e  com petition i s  no t m ain tained , leav in g  problems 
which in  a u n ita ry  s ta te  m ight be met by c i v i l  r e s t r a in t  o r  
o th e r rem edies. I t  may be th a t  a t  some fu tu re  tim e i t  s ig h t  
be p o ss ib le  to  extend th e  scope o f th e  le g is la t io n .* *
13 W. Friedmann in  A nti-T rust law s, p . 544*
14 Report o f to e  Committee to  Study Combines L e g is la tio n , p . 28 
f t  passim.
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The answer to  whether o r no t c i v i l  c o n tro ls  could bo m ooted  
1 9 contingent upon th e  a t t i tu d e  o f th e  Supreme Court o f Canada to  th e  
" trad e  and commerce" c lause  of th e  B r i t is h  North America Act. Gosse and 
Friedmann hare expressed optimism th a t  t h i s  c lause  may rece iv e  a  more 
favourable  in te rp re ta t io n  than  in  th e  p as t i f  i t  becomes sub jec ted  again  
to  cou rt in te rp re ta t io n .  U n til such tim e we must consider anti-com bine 
le g is la t io n  to  be bound w ith in  th e  confines o f th e  c rim inal code.
Due to  th e  crim inal n a tu re  o f proceed ings, th e  standard  o f proof 
normally aocepted by th e  court d i f f e r s  from th a t  req u ired  in  c i v i l  pro­
secu tio n s . The standard  of proof requ ired  in  a crim inal case i s  "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" w hile th e  le s s e r  standard  which must be met in  a 
c i v i l  case i s  " th e  balance o f p r o b a b i l i t i e s ." The l a t t e r  i s  obviously  
b e t te r  adapted to  eases where th e  l ik e ly  eeonoralc consequences, which 
a re  them selves something le s s  than  p re c ise  and a b so lu te , must be ev a lu a t­
ed. A "reasonable doubt" could be invoked in  th e  m a jo rity  of s i tu a t io n s  
where o ften  c o n f lic tin g  economic f a c to rs  must be balanced, e s p e c ia lly  
when judged by p a r t ie s  w ith  no form al t ra in in g  in  economics. Canadian 
co u rts  have attem pted , w ith  some success, to  avoid problems o f t h i s  
n a tu re . Maxwell Cohen s ta te s :
The co u rts  came to  th e  conclusion e a r ly  th a t  th e  purpose o f 
the  l e g is la t io n  was not to  impose upon them the  re f in e d  
economic ta sk  of th e  measurement o f  many c a lc u la tio n s  and 
fa c to rs  o f what was ag a in s t th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t ,  but to  con­
f in e  to  them th e  main ta sk  of saying: has com petition , a s  we 
understand th a t  conception, been reduced, and reduced to  such 
an e x ten t th a t  i t  becomes worrisome to  u s , a s  a  c o u rt, 
looking a t  i t* ..T h e  h is to ry  o f Canadian a n t i - t r u s t  in te r ­
p re ta tio n . . .h as  been a h is to ry  of avoiding refinem ents o f 
economic a n a ly s is  by th e  c o u r ts , and they  have re s te d  upon 
th e  simple f a c t  th a t  c o llu s iv e  behaviour was s u f f ic ie n t .15
15 M. Cohen, lo o . c i t . ,  pp. 536^37.
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9.M le  th e  Canadian co u rt a have bean a ttem pting  to  s k i r t  tho  
economic is s u e s  involved In  r e s t r i c t i r s  p ra c tic e s  ea ses , th e  B r i t is h  
have s e t  up a sp e c ia l court o f  law , th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  C ourt, 
and s p e c if ic a l ly  req u ire  t h i s  body to  examine each r e s t r i c t iv e  agree­
ment in  th e  l i g h t  of th e  l ik e ly  economic c cm sequences r e s u l t in g  from i t  
so th a t  i t  can be pronounced e i th e r  w ith in  o r w ithout th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t .  
C iv il rem edies a re  employed by t h i s  cou rt in  th e  enforcement o f i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s .  The lower standard  o f proof req u ired  when c iv i l  remed ies  
are  used no doubt f a c i l i t a t e s  th e  reaching  of d ec is io n s  by th e  c o u rt.
This i s  a p tly  pu t by R, L. S ieh , R e g is tra r  o f R e s tr ic t iv e  Trading Agree­
ments in  th e  United Kingdom i
I t  i s ,  o f course, t ru e  th a t  th e  kind of m a tte rs  which have to  be 
considered do no t lend them selves to  p rec ise  and ab so lu te  
dem onstra tion .. • But th e se  a re  c iv i l  and n e t c rim in a l proceed­
in g s , and hence, to  d ischarge th e  onus o f p ro o f, a  f a c t  does 
no t have to  be e s ta b lish e d  beyond reasonable  doubt; i t  i s  
enough th a t  an th e  balance o f p ro b a b i l i t ie s  i t  i s  more l ik e ly  
to  be so than  n o t . «
An example o f th e  h igher standard  of proof requ ired  in  a c rim inal 
case can be found in  th e  Canadian Breweries d ec is io n  where McRuer, C. J .  
s ta teda
I f  I  am c o rre c t in  app ly ing , by analogy, the language o f C art­
w rig h t, J .  l n  th e  Howard Smith case to  th e  Combines A ct, i t  
must be in te rp re te d  a s  d if f e r in g  from th e  Clayton Act i n  t h i s  
im portan t re sp e c tt under th e  Combines Act i t  must be dem onstrat­
ed beyond a  reasonable doubt th a t  th e  merging o f com petitive 
co rp o ra tio n s  i s  l ik e ly  to  pu t i t  w ith in  th e  power o f th e  merger 
to  so ex tin g u ish  com petition a s  to  a f f e c t  p r ic e s  by m onopolistic  
c o n tro l. As long  a s  the  evidence shows th a t  th e re  i s  s tro n g  
v i r i l e  com petition in  th e  m arket, no tw ithstanding  th s  m erger,
I  do no t th in k  th e  merging o f competing companies comes w ith in
16 R. L. S ieh , "Progress Under th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  Trade P ra c tic e s  
A ct, 1956", Y orkshire B u lle tin  o f Economic and S o c ia l Research.
( 1956) ,  p.
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the  standard of proof requ ired  in  a c rim inal e a s e . .
In  Canada, th e  n a tu re  o f proof req u ired  in  crim inal o a ses , th e  
predominant ro le s  played by law yers and Judges and th e i r  avoidance of 
economic co n s id e ra tio n s , th e  l e g a l i s t i c  requirem ents fo r  su ccessfu l 
p ro secu tio n , th e se  f a c to rs  have in fluenced  th e  work of o th e r a u th o r i t ie s  
re sp o n sib le  fo r  p reparing  cases f o r  p rosecu tion  and have re su lte d  in  a 
l e g a l i s t i c  approach. Rosenbluth and Thorburn claim  th a t  combines in  
Canada a re  viewed as c o n s ti tu tin g  a p o lice  problem and a  le g a l  problem 
ra th e r  than  economic problem and have accused th e  enforcement au thor­
i t i e s  of employing a "cops and robbers” approach to  anti-ccm bines
Idenforcement p o lic y .
I t  would appear d e s ire ab le  to  b ring  th e  economic co n sid e ra tio n s  
involved in  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  oases in to  sharper focus than  has been 
th e  p ra c tic e  in  th e  p a s t.  Under th e  per se d o c tr in e , a s  i t  e x is t s  in  
Canada, any agreement which " in  e f f e c t  r e s t r i c t s  tra d e  and in v o lv es  a 
predominant sec tio n  of th e  i n d u s t r i a l s  i l l e g a l  w ithout any in q u iry  a s  to
"whether th e se  agreements have been good fo r  p r ic e s ,  o r have been bad fo r
20p r ic e s ."  Bladen and S ty k o it have argued th a t  a l l  p r ic e  agr eements do
17 McCruer, C. J . ' s  statem ent in  Regina v . Canadian B rew eries.
L td . .  126 CCC 133, P. 161, quoted i n  R e s tr ic t iv e  Trade P ra c tic e s  dcmm-
ia s io n , Report Concerning th e  M anufacture. D is tr ib u tio n  and S a le  of
F ap erb o araS h ip p in s C ontainers and R elated  P roducts. (Ottawa: Queens
---------------------------------------------------
18 C. Rosenbluth and H. G. Thorburn, "Canadian Anti-Combines
A dm inistration , 1952-1960," in  M. H. W atkins and D. F . F o r s te r ,  e d i to r s ,
Economics; Canada. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 93, re p rin te d  from
The Canadian jo u rn a l of Economic and P o l i t i c a l  Science. XXVII. (Nov. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
19 M. Cohen, ©£. c l t . . p . 556.
20 Ib id .
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not c rea te  an "undue" degree of p r ic e  r ig id i ty  and th a t  acme r ig id i ty  
may even be necessary  in  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .^ -  I f  such be th e  case , 
we may enquire whether le g is la t io n  of th e  type  now found i n  th e  United 
Kingdom, whereby i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  r e ta in  in  fo rce  r e s t r i c t iv e  agree­
ments which a re  considered to  be in  th e  pub lic  I n te r e s t ,  i s  l i k e ly  to  
r e s u l t  in  b e t te r  in d u s t r ia l  performance and more b e n e f its  f o r  th e  people 
than our m odified p er se ru le s  by which th e  good ( i f  th e re  be any good 
r e s t r i c t iv e  agreem ents) a re  au to m atica lly  swept out w ith  th e  bad.
Since th e  United Kingdom le g is la t io n  has been in  e f f e c t  f o r  such 
a sh o rt p erio d , i t  i s  ap p ro p ria te  to  d esc rib e  even ts preceding th e  194® 
and 1956 A cts to  ensure th a t  th e  need fo r  such le g is la t io n  in  B r i ta in  i s  
ap p rec ia ted .
21 V. W. Bladen and S . S ty k o lt ln  A n t i- t ru s t  Lews, p. 5&J see a lso  
J .  A. Schumpeter, C ap ita lism . Socialism  and Democracy ( th i r d  e d i t io n , 
New York and Bvanstoni Harper and How, l$ fi2 ),< Jhap ier 7111, 
"M onopolistic P ra c tic e s ."
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CHAPTER I I  
THE UNITED KINGDOM! ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
At the  beginning of the  Tw entieth Century th e  United Kingdom was 
r'an econom y la rg e ly  reg u la ted  by th e  fu n c tio n in g  of th e  market in  th e  
c la s s ic a l  economic t r a d i t i o n . P r o f e s s o r  G. C. A llen s ta te s  th a t  on 
th e  ere  o f World War I  B r i t is h  in d u s try , on th e  whole, could claim  to  be 
more com petitive than  German o r American in d u s try  and th a t  com petition
2
vas considered to  be the  general r u le  governing in d u s t r ia l  e n te rp r is e .  
Im portant f a c to r s  which in fluenced  th i s  a t t i tu d e  were th e  la rg e  i n te r e s t s  
which th e  m ajor B r i t is h  in d u s tr ie s  had in  th e  export m arkets o f th e  world 
and the adherence o f Great B r ita in  to  a f re e  tra d e  p o lic y .
A. Post World War I
O pposition to  monopolies in creased  a f t e r  World War I  due to  an i n ­
crease  in  the  co st of l iv in g  which was a t t r ib u te d  in  p a r t  to  m onopolistic  
p ra c tic e s  which had been an outgrowth of the  war p erio d . In  1918 the  
B r i t is h  Government appointed the  Committee on T ru st to  consider a c tio n s  
to  safeguard th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t  " in  view of th e  probable ex tension  of 
tra d e  o rg an isa tio n s  and combinations a f t e r  th e  war."-* The committee 
re p o rt  recommended su rv e illan ce  and th e  c o lle c tio n  of in fo n sa tio n  on
1 G. C. A llen , "Monopoly and Competition in  th e  U.K." in  E. H. 
Chamberin, e d . ,  Monopoly and Com petition and T h e ir R egulation . I n te r ­
n a tio n a l Economic A ssocia tion , (London* MacMillan, 1954), p . SS.
2 A llen , o£. c i t . .  p . 100;
3 R. Gosse, "The Enforcement o f Competition in  th e  U .K .",
Canadian Bar Review. XXXVIII, ( I9 6 0 ), 165.
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combination a c t iv i ty  in  in d u stry .
No le g i s la t iv e  a c t iv i ty  vac taken on t h i s  re p o rt a# o pposition  
to  monopolies began to  abate  w ith  th e  onset o f th e  post-w ar d ep ress io n . 
The chronic s ta te  o f depression  experienced by many B r i t is h  In d u s tr ie s  
during th e  1920* s provided a s trong  inducement fo r  buslnesmeen to  en­
g a g e  in  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s .^  The m ajor problem fac in g  depressed 
in d u s tr ie s  was the  presence o f excess cap ac ity  which gave no in d ic a tio n  
of being removed by th e  com petitive p rocess .
R a tio n a lis a tio n  of in d u s try  began to  f in d  favour a s  an a l te rn a t iv e  
to th e  com petitive process f o r  th e  removal o f excess cap ac ity  and schemes 
were in troduced  to  implement i t  in  sev e ra l o f th e  lead in g  in d u s tr ie s  
(e .g .  sh ip -b u ild in g , coal-m ining, wool-combing, co tton  and t in - p la t e  
p roduction).^  The Bank of England was a lso  in stru m en ta l in  th e  attem pt 
to  r a t io n a lis e  in d u s try ; th e  Lancashire Cotton C orporation l im ite d  was 
formed w ith  th e  f in a n c ia l  backing of th e  Bank in  1929.^
4 " In  p eriods o f p ro sp e rity  com petition seemed to  posaese th e  
v ir tu e s  a t t r ib u te d  to  i t .  When, however, co n d itio n s  changed f o r  th e  
w orse.. . co -opera tion  ra th e r  than  com petition, was th e  l i f e  o f tra d e  
and even th e  law of s e lf -p re s e rv a t io n .* in  H. Heaton, Economic H isto ry  
of Europe, ( re v ise d  e d it io n ;  New York: Harper and B ro s ., 1^44},
pp. 6Q3-&.
5 "The term * ra tio n a lis a tio n *  was invented  l a t e  in  th e  1920* s  to  
express th e  id ea  o f semi-compulsory re o rg a n is a tio n .” S . A. C. Robinson, 
The S tru c tu re  o f Com petitive In d u s try , ( re v ise d  e d it io n ;  U n iv ersity  o f 
Chio i y  j f r £ i t . ,  P. 154. " 4 la rg e
proportion  of th e  so -ca lled  'r a t io n a l i s a t io n  schemes' o f th e  1930*s 
represen ted  a misguided attem pt t o  ex o rc ise  depression  by a d ju s tin g  
capacity  to  th e  low le v e l of requirem ents o f th e  bottom o f th e  de­
p ress io n . Compulsory and s ta te -su b s id ise d  d e s tru c tio n  o f valuab le  
equipment in  p o te n t ia l ly  growing in d u s tr ie s  i s  th e  l e a s t  ap p ro p ria te  
measure y e t d iscovered  f o r  cu ring  a d ep ress io n "; a ls o  G. C. A llen ,
SB* JS&*f ?• ®9.
6 W. M ennell, Takeover: The Growth of Monopoly in  B r ita in  
1951-61, (London; Lawrence and t& sh arl, ls& 3), P* 151 G. C. A lien , 
op. c i t . ,  p . 102.
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uBy 1929 th e  B alfour Committee rapo rted  th a t  th a ra  was no urgen t
need f o r  le g is la t io n  d ea lin g  w ith  th a  abuses o f monopoly and, f u r th e r ,
th a t  England was fo rtu n a te  in  no t being hampered by such a n t i - t r u s t
7
le g is la t io n  a s  p rev a iled  in  th e  United S ta te s .
During th e  1930* s in te rn a tio n a l  trad e  declined  as  the  m ajor in ­
d u s t r ia l  co u n trie s  attem pted to  export t h e i r  depression  hy reduaing 
im ports and imposing o th e r restri.e td .ons. In  th e  United S ta te s  pro­
t e c t io n is t  fo ro e s  succeeded in  having th e  Smoot-Hawley Aet (1930) passed. 
This a e t ra ise d  t a r i f f s  to  an a ll- t im e  high and le d  to  r e ta l ia to r y  a c tio n  
by many o th e r co u n tr ie s . S teep t a r i f f  b a r r ie r s  were ra ise d  by one country  
a f t e r  ano ther, quotas were s e t ,  ex p o rts  subsid ised  and d isc rim in a tio n
p racticed . M ercan tilist p o lic ie s  were so c lo se ly  emulated a s to  evoke
&the  d a sc r ip tio n  "neo-mer c a n t i l i s t ."
In  England r a t io n a lis a t io n  and c a r te l i s a t io n  continued to  enjoy 
pub lic  and gove rnme n ta l  favour. P ro fesso r A llen s ta t e s ,  "From 1932 on­
wards government p o licy  became w holeheartedly cc an itte d  to  hasten ing
a
the r e t r e a t  from com petition . " 7 The B r it ish  Iro n  and S te e l F ederation  
was formed w ith  government u rg ing , f o r  th e  purpose o f e n te r in g  in to  
agreements w ith  the  European S te e l  C a rte l to  f i x  im port quotas and de­
term ine p r ic e s . The government a lso  I n i t i a t e d  p ro te c t io n is t  measures 
w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  c o a l, t e x t i l e  and s h ip b u ild in g  In d u s tr ie s  f o r  th e
7 F in a l Report o f th e  Committee on In d u stry  and Trade. (London: 
ft.M.s.0 . , ”1959), p. 1957
8 D. A. S n id e r, In tro d u c tio n  to  In te rn a tio n a l Economics. (Homewood, 
I l l i n o i s :  Richard D. Irw in , rev ised  e d it io n , 195$)» p . W 2.
9 G. C. A llen , og>. c l t . . p . 90; f o r  a  very  good contemporary 
account o f th e  p erio d , see A. F . Luoas, "The B r i t is h  Movement f o r  
In d u s tr ia l  R econstruction  and C ontrol o f Com petitive A c tiv ity " ,
Q u arte rly  Jo u rn a l o f Economics. 1935, re p rin te d  in  Readings ln  th e  
Soolal C ontro l o f  In d u s try . The American Economic A ssocia tion , 
(P h ilad e lp h ia , The B lak is tin  C o., 1949).
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purpose of l im it in g  o u tp u t, e lim in a tin g  su rp lu s eapac ity  and f ix in g
10l e g a l  minimum p r ic e s .
R a tio n a lis a tio n  schemes were favoured a lso  by the  no tab le  in ­
crease in  th e  s tren g th  of tra d e  a s so c ia tio n s  which occurred du ring  World 
War 1 1 . ^  Firms which had p rev iously  been independent and com petitive 
became lin k ed  through tra d e  a s so c ia tio n s , th e  r e s u l t  being a fu r th e r  
co n so lida tion  of in te r e s t s  and increased  f a c i l i t y  fo r  th e  ex tension  of 
combinations*
B. Post World War I I  
Towards th e  end o f th e  war a change was noted ln  government  and 
pub lic  opinion a s  unfavourable comparisons were being drawn between 
B r i t is h  and American in d u s t r ia l  e f f i c i e n c y .^  The r e s t r i c t io n ! a t  
p o lic ie s ,  which had been adhered to  by B r i t is h  in d u s try , were c r i t i c i s e d
a s  a  co n trib u tin g  f a c to r  to  th e  I n f e r io r i ty  and s tag n a tio n  o f th e  i n t e r -
 t . 13war period*
The B r i t is h  Labour government subsequently took s te p s  to  e f f e c t  a 
n a tio n a lis a tio n  program. From 1946 to  1946, pub lic  co n tro l was extended
10 The Bow Group, Monopolies and M ergers. (C onservative P o l i t i c a l
C entre, No. 270, Sussex: P* 59.
11 G. C. A llen , og. c i t . . p . 107j see a lso  Bow Group, op. d t .  
p . 35* The n e c e ss ity  to  co -o rd in a te  and expand production du ring  both 
World Wars re su lte d  in  government encouragement of th e  form ation of 
tra d e  a s so c ia tio n s . A s im ila r  developaent occurred In  Canada.
12 G. C. A llen , og. c i t . .  p . 107} G. C. A llen , "Economic P ro g ress, 
R etrospect and P rospect”, Economic Jo u rn a l. IX, (S ep t. 1950), 466, where 
he c i t e s  h igher c a p i ta l iz a t io n  a s  one reason  f o r  h ig h er American product­
iv ity }  he c i t e s  th e  main reason f o r  low er B r i t is h  p ro d u c tiv ity  a s  poorer 
techniques and organization} see a ls o  E. R othbarth, "Causes o f th e  
Superior E ffic ien cy  of U.S.A. In d u stry  as  ft caps red w ith  B r i t is h  In d u s try ,"  
Economic Jo u rn a l. LVI, (S ep t. 1946).
13 Bow Group, og. c i t . ,  p . 37 and p. 41; see a ls o  G. C. A llen in
Monopoly. Com petition ami T heir R egulation , p . 103.
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to  many in d u s tr ie s  In  vhioh powerful monopolies had f e m s r iy  e x is te d .
Sen* o th e r in d u s tr ie s  which had long been engaged in  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  
were n a tio n a lis e d , no tab ly  finance  (The Bank of England), oommunioations, 
public u t i l i t i e s ,  coal and iro n  and s t e e l . ^
The acceptance by th e  B r it ish  government in  1944 of th e  p r in c ip le s  
of a full-em ploym ent p o lio y ^w as incom patible w ith m onopolistic  p ra c tic e s  
which r e s t r i c te d  output and employment, causing such p ra c tic e s  to  f a l l  
fu r th e r  in to  d is re p u te . The s tren g th  of m arket demand a t  t h i s  tim e a lso  
con tribu ted  to  rendering  in e f fe c t iv e  th e  time-worn p ro te c t io n is t  arguasn ts  
in  favour of r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c t ic e s .
The change in  pub lic  opinion which occurred was a  change in  degree 
r a th e r  than  a complete tu rn in g  away from th e  t a c i t  acceptance o f th e  
m onopolistic and r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  which had long p rev a iled  in  Eng­
land to  the d e s ire  fo r  com petition in  th e  North American sense . S tevens 
expresses t h i s  change in  th e se  wordst
The p u b lic  i s  undoubtedly more s e n s itiv e  to  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  
than i t  used to  b e ...B u t a s  a whole i t  i s  s t i l l  n o t very  h eav ily  
committed to  c u ttin g  bade r e s t r i c t iv e  p r a c t i c e s .
14 C. W ilcox, Public P o lic ie s  Toward B usiness. (Homewood, 
I l l i n o i s :  1955), Chapter 27 "P o licy  in  O ther C o u n tries" .
15 W. H. Beveridge, F u ll  Employment in  a  Free S o c ie ty . (New York:
w . w .  Horton and C o., 1945), p . 266.
16 R. S tevens, “Experience and Experiment In  th e  Legal C ontrol
of Competition in  th e  U.K.", Tale Law Jo u rn a l, ULI, (May, 1961), p . 892.
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CHAPTER I I I
TUB XG8C&0L&Z A81- PSSTSXCTXWt PRACTICED ACT, 1948
The White Paper on Ssployaent P o licy  (1944), observed!
There has in  re se n t p ea rs  been a  growing tendency tow ards com­
bines and towards agreem ents, both n a tio n a l and in te rn a t io n a l ,  
by which m anufacturer* have so e fh t to  eo n tro l p r is e s  and out­
p u t, to  d iv id e  m arkets snd f i x  co n d itio n s  o f sale.*-
This re p o rt p 'ved the  way fo r  the 1948 Act which received  th e  un­
animous support of s l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a rtie s*
The Act e s ta b lish ed  an independent t r ib u n a l ,  th e  Monopolies and 
R e s tr ic tiv e  P ra c tis e s  Commission,^ whieh was empower ed to  enqu ire  in to  
a o n o p o ly  co n d itio n s  upon re fe ren ce  t r m  th e  Board of Trade*^ P ro v isio n s 
were made f o r  two c a te g o rie s  of in v e s tig a tio n ; (1 ) in v e s tig a tio n s  in to  
monopoly cond itions and p ra c tic e s  in  p a r t ic u la r  in d u s tr ie s} ^  (2 )  in ­
v e s tig a tio n s  in to  p a r t ic u la r  p ra c tic e s  in  in d u s try  and tra d e  g e n e ra lly .^
A. D efin itio n  o f Monopoly O cnditiens 
Monopoly cond itions were given a wide d e f in i t io n  in  th e  1948 Act. 
Broadly, such cond itions were considered t o  p re v a il  when a t  l e a s t  one-
1 C. Grunfeld and 6. 3* Taney, "United Kingdom" in  
A n ti-T rast Laws, p . 361 .
2 R eferred to  h e re a f te r  as  the  Monopolies Commission o r  the  
Commission*
3 Monopoly cond itions a re  s e t  out in  se c tio n s  3 , 4 and 5 o f th e  
1948 Act. The Report on C o llec tiv e  D iscrim ination . (London, H.M.S.O*, 
1955), Cmnd. $$& , p. 5 7  d esc rib es  monopoly cond itions a s  g en e ra lly  
e x is t in g  where "s s in g le  concern o r  group of concerns which a re  p a r t ie s  
to  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements su p p lies  o r a p p lie s  a prooess to  a t  l e a s t  
o n e-th ird  o f th e  market fo r  t h e i r  goods."
4 S (2 )
5 S (15)
17
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th i rd  o f a l l  th e  goods o f the  d e sc rip tio n  a re  supplied  o r  p rocessed , 
by o r  to  any one person , o r two o r more persons being in te r-co n n ec ted  
bodies corporate  o r who hare an o v ert o r  covert agreement to  l im i t  
com petition in  th e  p a r t ic u la r  tra d e . This d e f in it io n  covers th e  a c t­
i v i t i e s  of one-firm  m onopolies, dominant firm s and a lso  tra d e  assoc­
ia t io n s  on both th e  buying and s e l l in g  s id es  o f the  m arket. I t  appears 
to  have been a l l - in c lu s iv e  a s  any firm  o r  group of firm s which could 
m a te r ia lly  in flu en c e  th e  market was l ik e ly  to  handle a t  l e a s t  o n e -th ird  
o f th e  goods in  q u es tio n . P ro fesso r B. S. Taaey, an a u th o r ity  am th e  
B r i t is h  l e g is la t io n ,  s ta te s :
The .phraseology employed i n  th e  d e f in it io n  semes to  be wide 
enough to  cover so -ca lled  o ligopo ly  co nd itions in  which each 
o f  a  email nmaber o f firm s may, i n  i t s  own i n t e r e s t s ,  eschew 
th e  more severe methods o f com petition ( e .g .  p r ic e  ecm petition) 
w ithout th e re  being any o v ert o r covert agreement o r  arrange­
ment among th e  f irm s. The term inology o f th e  Act seams to  
avoid th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in  American a n t i - t r u s t  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f having to  e s ta b lis h  co llu s io n  between the  
o l ig o p o lis ts  o r  to  in f e r  c o llu s io n  from non-eo llu s iv e  p a r a l l e l  
o r  co -o rd inated  behaviour. In  any ev en t, most o ligopo ly  s i t ­
u a tio n s  would q u a lify  fo r  in v e s tig a tio n  under th e  Aet because 
norm ally a t  l e a s t  one of th e  o l ig o p o lis ts  su p p lie s  o n e -th ird  
o f th e  m arket.”
A D igression  on Conscious P a ra lle lism  
The type of o ligopo ly  s i tu a t io n  re fe r re d  to  by Taney has c rea ted  
many problems in  th e  United S ta te s  in  eases where, although th e re  a re  no 
agreem ents, the  firm s do not consider i t  in  th e i r  own in te r e s t s  to  com­
p e te .
Under the  United S ta te s  law i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  proceed a g a in s t 
such s i tu a t io n s  un less i t  can be shown th a t  th e  companies a re  
engaged i n ,  f o r  example, a conspiracy  to  monopolise o r  a  con­
sp iracy  in  r e s t r a in t  o f t ra d e . I t  i s  o fte n  very  d i f f i c u l t  to  
f in d  any in d ic ia  o f agreement o r conspiracy . There has been 
some tendency to  apply th e  theo ry  o f what i s  c a lle d  conscious
6 C. Grunfeld and B. S . Tamey, op. c i t . ,  p . 366
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pa ra i le lla m , bu t t h i s  re q u ire s  proof o f c o n tin u ity  of 
id e n t ic a l  a c tio n  to  a  p o in t th a t  agreement n ig h t be
in fe r r e d .7
In  1946 in  th e  second American Tobacco ease , th e  c o u rt, re ly in g
e n t i r e ly  upon c ircu m stan tia l evidence, in fe r re d  unlaw ful conspiracy
cm the  p a r t  of th e  respondents. Evidence o f id e n t i ty  o f  behaviour by
th e  th re e  defendant dominant firm s was p le n t i fu l  w ith  regard  to  p r ic e
l i s t s ,  p r ic e  changes, purchases and general busin ess  p ra c t ic e s .  William
N icho lls  s ta te s  " th e  ease was probably unique in  th a t  th e re  was no t a
whit of evidence th a t  a ocmmon plan had even been contem plated o r p ro -
posed." T his d ec is io n  brought t h i s  type of o ligopoly  situ m tlo h  whereby
"a few dominant f i r m s . . .independently  and purely  as  a m a tte r  o f s e l f -
9in te r e s t ,  evolve non-agressive p a tte rn s  o f behaviour* w ith in  th e  reach 
o f th e  conspiracy p rov isions o f th e  Sherman Aot and i t  was f e l t  th a t  
a so lu tio n  had been found f o r  d ea lin g  w ith  such s i tu a t io n s .
In  more recen t y ears  th e re  has been some evidence o f a  r e t r e a t
7 Dean w. A llen W allis , e d i to r ,  P roceedings. In te rn a t io n a l  Con­
ference on th e  C ontrol o f R e s tr ic t iv e  Business P ra c tic e s . ( t tn lv c rs ity  
o f Chicago, f  He f  ree  iPress o? ddenooe, r n in o T s ,  1966) ,  pp. 130-39} 
conscious p a ra l le l !a n  " re p re se n ts  a  s i tu a tio n  where a nmaber o f firm s 
a re  co n tin u a lly  and re g u la r ly  each a c tin g  in  a  manner in d ic a tin g  a 
knowledge of what th e  o th e rs  would do, and i n  th e  absence o f d i r e c t  
agreement, th e  a c tio n s  are  such a s  to  support an in fe ren ce  o f agreem ent." 
op. c i t . ,  p . 145J 1 . Cr> Reynolds in  Secnamlos. A General In tro d u c tio n . 
XHomewood, I l l i n o i s ,  Irw in , 1963, a t  p . 2^9 s ta te s  " " s  imple p r ic e  
lead ersh ip  w i l l  no t norm ally be held  unlaw ful. But, i f  th e  companies 
a lso  m aintain  an e lab o ra te  s im ila r i ty  o f p o licy  on o th e r  term s o f s a le  
such as q u a n tity  d isco u n ts , p r ic e  d i f f e r e n t ia l s  between v a rio u s  q u a l i t ie s  
and ty p es  o f produce, and fM ig h t charges o r  d e liv e red  p r ic e  a rran g e­
ments, th e  c o u rts  may fin d  a breach o f law . I t  i s  u n lik e ly  th a t  ‘a l l  
th a t  much p a ra lle lism ' could occur w ithout in tim a te  co -opera tion  among 
th e  companies."
8 W. N ich o lls , "The Tobacco Case o f 1946," American Economic 
Review. XXXII (1949), 285} Me a lso  C. Wilcox, P ub lic  P o lic ie s  Toward 
Business, pp. 119-21 and C. w. Stocking, Workable Com petition and A nti- 
T rust P o licy , ( lfa sh v ille t V anderb ilt U n iversity  P re ss , 1961), p .
9 W. K ioho lls , l e e .  c i t .
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from the  d o c trin e  o f oonsoioua p a r a l le l i s e .  J u s t ic e  C lark , in  1954, 
s ta te d !
This Court has never held th a t  proof of p a r a l le l  business 
behaviour conclusive ly  e s ta b lis h e s  agreement, o r phrased 
d i f f e r e n t ly ,  th a t  such behaviour i t s e l f  c o n s ti tu te s  a Sherman 
Act o ffence. C ircum stan tia l evidence of consciously  p a r a l le l  
behaviour may have made heavy in ro ad s  in to  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  
ju d ic ia l  a t t i tu d e  toward consp iracy ; bu t 1 conscious p a r a l le l -  
ism* has n o t y e t  read  conspiracy out o f  the  Sherman Act 
e n t i r e ly .1®
T his has le d  Wilcox to  remark th a t  th e  d o c trin e  o f conscious
p& rails11 sb, although n o t rep u d ia ted , i s  l ik e ly  to  be used "more sp a rin g -
11
ly  in  th e  n ear fu tu re  than  in  th e  recen t p a s t."
C lea rly  i f  th e  1948 Act succeeded in  avoiding problems o f t h i s
natu re  i t  would be a s ig n if ic a n t  improvement upon t h i s  a sp ec t o f American
le g is la t io n  and would have "brought th e  basic  assumption o f modem 
12o ligopo ly  theory" in to  the  p u b lic  s p o tl ig h t.
U nfortunate ly , the  1948 Act on ly  supplied  th e  Monopolies Commission 
w ith  in v e s tig a to ry  powers which were to  be incorporated  in to  recommenda­
t io n s .  This proved to  be an in v i ta t io n  to  non-enforcement and c e r ta in ly  
o ffe red  no so lu tio n  to  th e  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  problem. The R eports 
of the  Ccraaiscion were w ell w r i t te n ,  d e ta ile d  s tu d ie s  o f th e  in d u s tr ie s  
concerned; th e  reeoamendations contained th e re in ,  however, were f o r  th e  
most p a r t  ignored  by th e  Board o f Trade. This g re a tly  reduced th e  in ­
fluence of th e  Commission. w ithout s t r u c tu r a l  changes in  th e  organ­
i s a t io n  o f o l ig o p o l is t ic  in d u s tr ie s ,  p a r a l le l  behaviour could be ex-
10 in  Theatre E n te rp r ise s . In c . v . Paramount Film D is tr ib u tin g  
C orp., 346 U.S. $^7, 546, q u o te d in  C. Wilcox, o£. c i t . .  p . 141.
11 I b id .
12 W. N ich o lls , lo c . c i t .
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pected to  con tinue. T rue, most o ligopoly  s itu a t io n s  d id  q u a lify  fo r  
in v e s tig a tio n  under th e  Act bu t no so lu tio n  m is found to  th s  problem 
of p a r a l le l  behaviour.
B. Sobs C ritic ism s  of th e  1940 Aet 
I t  was expeeted th a t  the  1948 Act, being the  f i r s t  B r i t i s h  le g is ­
la t io n  in  over 300 y ea rs  d ea lin g  w ith  monopoly and r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c t ic e s ,  
would eone in  f o r  i t s  share of abuse. The c r i t ic is m s  to  which i t  was 
sub jec ted , however, a lso  a s s is te d  in  making c e r ta in  weaknesses apparen t.
Double Function o f th e  C(amission 
One c r i t ic is m  o f th e  Act was th a t  the  double fu n c tio n  o f th e  Comm­
is s io n , o f fa c t- f in d in g  and a p p ra is a l ,  should be separated  o r th a t  th e
13Commission should be changed in to  sose s o r t  o f ju d ic ia l  t r ib u n a l .
This p o in t has been made p a r t ic u la r ly  by in d u s try  and r e s t s  to  same ex­
te n t  on a m isc o n ce p tio n .^  As poin ted  out in  Monopolies. Mergers and 
R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c t ic e s t
The Cosmiaslon i s  no t a ju d ic ia l  t r ib u n a l  concerned w ith  th e  
a p p lic a tio n  of a body o f law  in  which th e  le g is la tu r e  has l a id
13 C. Grunfeld and B. S. Yamey, eg. c i t . .  p . 388. T his c r i t -  
i c i s a  was e f fe c t iv e ly  handled in  so f a r  a s  r e s t r i c t iv e  a g r e a u n ts  were 
concerned by th e  enactment o f th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  Trade P ra c t is e s  A ct.
1956 by which a R e g is tra r  was a p p o in te d to  conduct th e  'in v e s tig a tio n  
and a  sp e c ia l co u rt was e s ta b lish e d  to  apprA iie th s  e f f e c t s  o f th e  
agreem ents; v ide i n f r a ,  p. 31-32.
14 Monopolies. Mergers and R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s . (London: 
H.M.S.O., bmnd. 22$$), p . 2; see a lso  P. Hutber. Wanted -  A Monopoly 
P o licy . The Fabian S o c ie ty , Research S e r ie s  219, (Dartmouth S i . ,
S .w .j D ec., I9 6 0 ), pp. 4*5.
In  i t s  White P aper, Monopolies. Mergers and R e s tr ic t iv e  
P ra c tic e s , th s  Goverm ent s ta te s  th e  o b je c tiv e  o f l i e  economic "policy  
i s  " to  achieve su sta in ed  expansion and steady  growth combined w ith  f u l l  
employment, s ta b le  p r ic e s  and a sound balance o f payments. • .The Gov­
ernment b e liev e  th a t  i n  t h i s  re sp e c t coape t i t  ion  has an e s s e n t ia l  ro le  
to  p lay  both in  s tim u la tin g  innovation  and e f f ic ie n c y  and i s  enabling  
some of th e  b e n e f its  o f th e  reduced c o s ts  o f production and d is t r ib u t io n  
to  be passed on to  consumers." p . 1 , paragraph 1.
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down r u le 8 f o r  determ ining whether th e  p a r t ic u la r  p ra c tic e s  
a re  o r a re  n e t a g a in s t th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .  The Commission 
i s  an in v e s tig a tin g  body, and a s  such i t s  task  i s  to  e l i c i t  
and examine im p a rtia lly  th e  re le v a n t fa c ts .™
In d u stry  h a s , through tra d e  a s so c ia tio n s , questioned  th e  f in d in g s
of the  Commission and a lso  a lleg ed  th a t  i t s  re p o r ts  were b i a s e d .^  The
government re c e n tly  gave n o tic e  of i t s  in te n tio n  to  remove th e  grounds
f o r  fu r th e r  c o n f l ic t  on t h i s  is su e  by drawing
a c le a re r  d is t in c t io n  between th e  two s tag es  o f an in q u iry  
in to  a  monopoly -  th e  in v e s tig a tio n  in to  th e  f a c t s ,  i . e .  
in to  what i s  done by th e  monopoly, and th e  assesm sent o f 
th e i r  consequences in  r e la t io n  to  th e  pub lic  I n te r e s t .
I t  has proposed th a t  a R e g is tra r  o f  Monopolies be appointed to  con­
duct the  in v e s tig a tio n  in to  th e  f a c t s  and to  a s s i s t  th e  Coosaission
i n  i t s  ta sk  of a sse ss in g  where th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t  la y  by making 
such fu r th e r  in v e s tig a tio n  and e lu c id a tio n  a s  th e  Commission 
s ig h t  f in d  n e c e s s a r y .^
P o l i t i c a l  Expediency 
There has been some evidence of len iency  on th e  p a r t  of th e  Board 
of Trade in  th e  enforcement o f Gcmmission reocssaendations. In s tead  o f 
ex e rc is in g  th e  s ta tu to ry  in s tru m e n t^  o r th e  d e c la ra tio n  by a "competent
15 M onopolies. Mergers and R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s , p . 2 , paragraph
10.
16 P. H utber, ©g. c i t . ,  pp. 4-5? Bow Group, og. c i t . ,  pp. 46*7.
17 Monopolies. Mergers and R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s , p . 2 , paragraph
18 Ib id . . paragraph 12.
19 S (10) (7 ) s ta te s  "The power to  make o rders  under t h i s  sec tio n  
s h a ll  be ex e rc isab le  by s ta tu to ry  in s t r m e n t ,  and no o rd e r s h a l l  be 
made under t h i s  sec tio n  u n le ss  a  d r a f t  th e re o f  has been la id  before  
each House of Parliam ent and approved by re so lu tio n  of each House."
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au th o rity "  th a t  a  p ra c tic e  i s  i l l e g a l ,  ^ t h e  p ra c tic e  was adopted of 
n eg o tia tin g  w ith  th e  p a r t ic u la r  in d u s tr ie s  in  regard  to  th e  p ra c tic e s  
which th e  Commission found to  be con trary  to  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t  and 
the acceptance from in d u s try  o f vo lun tary  undertak ings to  r e f r a in  from
ac tio n s  in  th e  fu tu re . This re su lte d  in  an u n s a tis fa c to ry  s ta te  o f
21a f f a i r s  i n  a t  l e a s t  two in s ta n c e s . The Commission*s recommendations 
on th e  supply of d en ta l goods had no t been complied w ith  even a y ea r 
a f te r  p u b lic a tio n  o f th e  r e p o r t .  In  the  second in s ta n c e , d ea lin g  w ith  
the  supply of im ported tim ber, th e  p a r t ie s  to  th s  o b jec tio n ab le  agree­
ment v o lu n ta r ily  agreed to  give up th e  u n desireab le  p ra c t ic e s .  F ire  
y ea rs  l a t e r  (S ep t. 1958), th e  C am ission  found th a t  th e  form er ag ree­
ments had been rep laced  by o th e r arrangem ents which were le s s  form al 
bu t which had s u b s ta n tia l ly  th e  same e f f e c t .  In  both  eases i t  was f in a l ly  
necessary  to  make an o rder under se c tio n  (10) of th e  Act, to  fo rc e  com­
pliance  w ith  th e  C am iss io n 1 s  recommendations.
The f lo u t in g  of th ese  recommendations both  by th e  Board o f  Trade 
and by in d u s try  d id  l i t t l e  to  enhance th e  p re s tig e  o f th e  C am iss io n .
One w r ite r  s ta te s )
f a r  from having a wide in flu en c e  in  in d u s try , th e  Commission was 
f in d in g  d i f f i c u l ty  in  gaining re sp e c t f o r  i t s  f in d in g s  even 
among those  d i r e c t ly  concerned. Compliance could in  th e  l a s t  
r e s o r t  be fo rced  -  th e  Act provided means fo r  t h i s  -  bu t th e re  
was no apparent means by which th e  Cenm dssica's in flu en ce  
could be extended , 22
20 5 (10) (2 ) .
21 Report on th e  Supply of D ental Goods. (London, H.W.S.O.
Dec. 1950). Report on th e  Supply o /  Paportcd Timber. (London,
H.M.S.O. Oct. 1953). See a lso  P. Hutbor. op. c i t . . p p .  10-11.
22 P. H utber, c£. c i t . .  p . 11
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There l a  some in d ic a tio n  a lso  th a t  the  len ience  extended by th e
board of Trade i n  th e  enforcement o f Commission re  jo—  im detloae may here
been in fluenced  to  scce unaeasureable ex ten t by p o l l t i e e l  a o n e id e rs tio n s  t
So doubt Governments should consider only sh a t i t  i s  r ig h t  to  
do re g a rd le s s  o f co n sid e ra tio n s  o f expediency; in  f a c t ,  con­
s id e ra tio n s  o f the repercussions o f a p a r t ic u la r  sco res  e f  
a c tio n  on i t s  own supporters  a re  bo—d t o  bulk  la rg e  in  any 
Cover —sa t 1 a th in k in g . Measures d i r e c t ly  a f fe c t in g  s in g le  
in d u s tr ie s  o r  f i r e s ,  a re  bound to  be p o l i t i e s  1 embarrassments.
In  these  s i r e —stan ces  th e  ta a p ta tio n  i s  t o  de lay  a d ea l s i  on 
a s  long a s  p o ssib le  and to  resell one th a t  w i l l  cause th e  l e a s t  
d istu rbance  p o ssib le .* *
I f  th i s  sta tem ent con ta ins scow element o f  t r u th ,  i t  becomes e a s ie r  
to  exp la in  th e  a c tio n s  o f th e  Board o f Trade in  th e  Tobaooo e a s e .2** The 
Commission found th a t  in  1959 th e  Im peria l Tobaceo Company c o n tro lle d  
63.5 peroent o f th e  market in  c ig a re t te s  end tobaooo and a ls o  owned 37 
percen t o f  th e  shares  o f G allah ers, i t s  c h ie f  com petito r. I t  fu r th e r  
found th a t :
th e  re te n t io n  by Im perial o f i t s  share holding i n  G allaher 
o p e ra te s  and may be expected to  opera te  a g a in s t the  p u b lic  
i n t e r e s t .  The Cemmissloa recommend th a t  Im peria l should 
d iv e s t i t s e l f  o f  any d i r e c t  o r  in d ir e c t  f in a n c ia l  in te r e s t  
in  G a lla h e r .25
The P resid en t o f  the  Board o f  T rade, however ,  accepted an under­
tak in g  by im p eria l no t t o  in te r f e r e  in  th s  o f  G allah er.
On a l l  th e  evidence th e  P resid en t i s  s a t i s f ie d  th a t  th e  p u b lic  
in te r e s t  w il l  be adequately  safeguarded by th i s  undertak ing  
and th a t  th e re  i s  th e re fo re  so  n e c e ss ity  in  p resen t e i r e — stan ces
23 Ib id . .  p . 15.
Tamey, "The Monopolies Commission Report on C ig a re tte s  and Tobaeeo",
Mode— law Review. Vol. 20, (Bov. 1961); w. M eunell, Takeovers, pp. lOg-10.
25 Angaal R eport. of». c i t . .  p . 6 .
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fo r  th e  Government to  ask thg^Xmperiel Tobacco Company to  
d ispose  o f th e  shareho ld ing. 26
Hutber s ta te s  th a t  th e  c le a re s t  in s ta n c e  o f th e  government attem pt­
in g  to  avoid p o l i t i c a l  embarrassment i s  to  be fstand in  th e  f a t e  o f  th e  
G o aa isa ien 's  Report on th e  Supply o f C erta in  In d u s tr ia l  and H edieal Gases.  ^  
The Commission found th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  Oxygen Company and i t s  su b s id ia r ie s  
supplied  98 p e rcen t o f the  oxygen and s e re  than  9® percen t o f  th e  ace ty len e
on the  B r i t i s h  m arket. In  o rd e r to  m ain tain  i t s  monopoly, 3.O.C. *de-
28l ib e r a te ly  sought to  co n tro l th e  p rov ision  o f oxygen p la n t to  others'*
and follow ed a  p o licy  of tak in g  ever o r  buying ou t o th e r  producers. Three
companies which competed o s te n s ib ly  w ith  th e  B.O.C. were a e tu s l ly  owned
by th e  group; one o f th e  th re e  was a ls o  used a s  a  " f ig h tin g  company.”
The exclusive  d ea lin g  c o n tra c ts  vhieh th e  B.O.C. m aintained w ith  th e
m ajority  o f i t s  la rg e  buyers were found o b jec tio n ab le  a s  was a ls o  the
p r ic e  scheme. The Commission s ta te d :
A fte r making f u l l  allowance f o r  th e  se lle r*  s  market which p re ­
v a ile d  du rin g  most o f  th e  post-w ar p e rio d , B .O .C .'s  p r o f i t s  
have been u n ju s t i f ia b ly  high fo r  an alm ost complete monopoly 
fee in g  a lim ite d  f in a n c ia l  r i s k . *
Two Ccamission members suggested th a t  "publio  ownership and manage­
ment o f th e  in d u s try . .  .be considered'* a s  an a l te rn a t iv e  to  th e  m a jo rity  
view th a t  an arrangement be made whereby th e  Beard o f  Trade o r  sees o th e r
26 Xbld. . p . 8,
27 Hutber* s  pamphlet Wanted -  A Monopoly P o lls r  was pub l i shed in  
Deo. 19^0, p r io r  t o  th e  p u b lic a tio n  o? th e  Tobeeeo re p o rt j see a le e
w. K em tell, eg. c i t . .  pp. 105- 08.
26 Annual Report og. e i t .  f o r  th e  y ea r ending Dec. 31, 1956,
p. 16
29 Ib id . .  p . 17.
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car.petent a u th o r ity  wruld be ab le  to  s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  by p e rio d ie  review 
th a t  Comaission recommendations were being complied with.^®
Over a y ear l a t e r  (March, 195*) th e  govem eent announced th a t  i t
d id  n o t:
propose t o  take any a c tio n  on the m a jo rity  reet—  sndatlon  th a t  
s te p s  should be taken to  re g u la te  th e  le v e l  o f  th e  B r i t is h  
Oxygen Company's p r ic e s  and p r o f i t s  on oxygen and d isso lv ed  
a ce ty le n e .3^
The B.O.C. however d id  give an undertaking "no t to  tak e  over any
o th e r  producers o f th e  gases w ith  th e  o b jec t o f  adding to  i t s  monopoly
32p o s itio n , to  r e f r a in  in  fu tu re  from making use o f  f ig h tin g  companies, 
to  amend th e  ex c lu siv e  d ea ling  c lause  in  i t s  c o n tra s ts ,  t o  in tro d u ce  and 
publish  non-d iscrim inato ry  p ric e  s c a le s , and to  make a  su b s ta n tia l  e f f o r t  
in  the f i e ld  of re search  and devslopaen t.
Hutber remarks th a t  th s  outcone rep resen ted  a v ic to ry  fo r  th e  B.O.C. 
but a ls o  threw l ig h t  on th e  weakness o f th e  Cemmissien s y s te m .^  P ub lic  
superv ision  which th e  Commission advocated would probably have req u ired  
s p e c ia l le g is la t io n  but a t  any r a te  a l l  C o n d ssicn  recommendations to  
become e f fe c t iv e  req u ired  government a p p r o v a l . ^  Remedies which th s  
Commission seeks to  have ap p lied  depend:
on th e  Government o f th e  day fo r  t h e i r  im plem entation and
30 Ib id . .  p . 18.
31 Annual Report f o r  the  y e a r  ending Dec. 31, 195*, P- IB*
32 Ib id . .  p . 8 } th i s  undertak ing  d id  n o t appear too  onerous in  
view of th s  company* s  alm ost complete monopoly.
33 P. H utber, og>. e i t . . pp. 16-17.
34 Annual Report f o r  th e  y ea r  ending Dec. 31, 195*, p . 1* .
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35au n t t&ke th e i r  chance e among the ex igencies o f p o li t ie s*
Few Reports
An e a r ly  c r i t i c i s a  o f th e  Commission was th e  len g th  o f t l a e  re ­
quired  to  complete a report*  Dy th e  end o f 1952 only f iv e  re p o r ts  tied 
been published . T his problem was r e c t i f ie d  by an amendment to  th e  Aet 
in  1953 by which th e  membership of th e  Commission was increased  from te n  
to  a maximum o f tw e n ty -fire  membars to  enable i t  to  function  a s  a "number 
o f groups'’ o f  members each resp o n sib le  fo r  making th e  in v e s tig a tio n  and 
re p o rt on a p a r t ic u la r  r e f e r e n c e .^
The output o f th e  CcssBission inereaaed  considerab ly  a f t e r  t h i s  w ith  
f iv e  re p o rts  being completed i n  1955 and seven in  1 9 5 6 .^  In  August o f 
1956, th e  R e s tr ic tiv e  Trade P ra c tic e s  Act was passed in to  l a w . T h i s  Aet 
tra n s fe rre d  th e  r e s p o n s ib il i ty  f o r  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreement s  from th e  Mon­
o p o lies  Commission to  a  new tr ib u n a l ,  th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court* 
S ince 1956 th e  Board o f  Trade has subm itted only a few re fe ren ces  to  th e
Ccassisslon fo r  in v e s tig a tio n  and report*  ifo new re fe re n ce s  were made
39" fo r  more than th re e  y ea rs  from A p ril, 1957. The narked d e c lin e  in  
th e  a c t iv i ty  o f  th s  Commission i s  even so re  s tr ik in g  in  te rn s  o f  th e
35 P. H utber, 0£ . c i t , ,  p . 17} see a ls o  A. H unter, "Com petition 
and th e  U w ", The Manometer J g w l  of SKMB&f jg g lg l  j j tu d le e ,
XJLVII, Jan . 19>9, 59, where he s ta te s  " . . • th e  c o n tro l ol smcwi lw i a 
purely  ad hoc a p p lic a tio n  a t  o f f i c i a l  d is c re t io n  and in  p ra c t ic e ,  was 
exorcised  only  ones in  tw enty eases. Inform al approaches t o  in d u s try  
M rs  preferred* In  sun, th e  b ia s  o f th e  Act was m ainly towards f a c t -  
finding*
36 Annual Report fo r  th e  y ear ending Dec. 31, 1954, p . 2.
37 See Appendix, Table 1 .
36 k St 5 E l is  2 Ch. 6i .  H ereafte r re fe r re d  to  a s  th e  1956 Act*
39 P. H utber, oj>. c i t . ,  p . 12; a ls o  see Appendix, Table 1 .
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c o s t of i t s  upkeep. 1'he annual co s t f o r  both 1954-55 and 1955-56 was 
in  the  o rder o f 106,000. This was reduced d r a s t ic a l ly  to  64,000 
in  1956-57 and from th a t  tim e u n t i l  1962-63, th e  average expenditure 
has been only 6 1 ,0 0 0 .^
40 See Appendix, Table I I
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CHAPTER I?
THS RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES ACT, 1956
T his Act was th s  d ire c t  r e s u l t  o f th e  f in d in g s  and reccnraendations 
of the Monopolies C a m is s io n  in  i t s  re p o rt on C o llec t i r e  D iscrim ination .^- 
The Commission'a recommendations a re  obvious in  th e  l e g is la t io n .  The 
1956 Act i s  in  fo u r  p a r ts  d ea lin g  w ith : (1 ) th e  r e g is t r a t io n  and ju d ic ia l  
in v e s tig a tio n  of r e s t r i c t iv e  tra d in g  agreem ents; (2 ) enforcement o f con­
d it io n s  a s  to  re s a le  p r ic e s ;  (3 )  amendments t o  th e  1948 and 1953 A cts;
(4 ) supplem ental.
A. Main P rov isions o f th s  Act 
P a r t I I I  o f the hot g re a tly  reduced both  th e  work and membership 
of the Monopolies Ccmmission. The maxima* nuober o f members was reduced 
from tw en ty -five  to  ten  and th e  p rov ision  f o r  working a s  sep a ra te  groups 
was re p e a led .2 The scope of re fe ren ce  to  th s  Monopolies Coramission was
1 on C o llec tiv e  D iscrim ination . Cmnd. 9504, (London: 
H.M.S.O., l9J>5). T h is was th e  f i r s t  re ie ren ee  received  by th e  Cana­
l s  s i  on (Dec. 1952) under sec tio n  15 o f th e  1948 Act. The re fe ren ce  
requ ired  th e  Commission to  submit to  th e  Board of Trade a re p o r t  on 
tho  general e f f e c t  on th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t  o f  exclusive  d e a lin g , c o l l ­
ec tiv e  b o y co tts , aggregated re b a te s  and o th er d isc rim in a to ry  p ra c tic e s . 
In  the  words of th e  Commission " th e  re fe ren ce  covers a l l  c o l le c t iv e  
agreements o r  agreem ents between tra d e rs  req u irin g  th e  p a r t ie s  ( o r  any 
of them) to  d isc rim in a te  in  t h e i r  d ea lin g s  w ith  o th er persons; a 
separate  c lau se  o f our re fe ren ce  re q u ire s  us to  consider c o l le c t iv e  
arrangem ents o r agreements between t ra d e rs  re q u irin g  th e  p a r t ie s  to  
g ran t aggregated re b a te s ."  p . 3 .
2 § (28) (3 ) & (4 )
29
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3likew ise  reduced -  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  now cams under th s  aeg is  of 
th e  new Act w hile monopolies and m ergers remained su b jec t to  in v e s t i ­
g a tio n  by th e  Commission upon re fe ren ce  from th e  Board of Trade. More 
im portan t, th e  procedure d iffe re d  in  each. R e s tr ic tiv e  p ra c tic e s  were 
to  be d e a l t  w ith by a co u rt of law ( th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court) 
w hile im plem entation of C om ission  reoom endatlons concerning m ergers 
and monopolies "must s t i l l  take th e i r  chance among th e  ex igencies  of 
p o l i t i c s ." ^
P a r t  I I  o f th e  Act p ro h ib its  c o l le c t iv e  enforcement o f r e s a le  p r ic e  
maintenance by su p p lie rs  o f goods bu t le g a l is e s  in d iv id u a l enforcement by 
su p p lie rs  i f  th e  goods a re  acquired  by th e  o th e r p a rty  w ith  n o tic e  o f th e  
cond itions a s  to  re s a le  price.®
P a r t I  o f th e  Act p e rta in in g  to  th e  r e g is t r a t io n  and in v e s tig a tio n  
o f r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements i s  the  most im portan t. The o f f ic e  o f R e g is tra r  
o f R e s tr ic t iv e  Trading Agreements was e s ta b lish e d  w ith  th e  re s p o n s ib il i ty  
o f overseeing th e  r e g is t r a t io n  of r e s t r i c t iv e  agreem ents.^ The R e g is tra r  
i s  empowered to  o b ta in  Inform ation from any party  o r tra d e  a s so c ia tio n  
i f  he has reasonable cause to  b e liev e  th a t  th ey  a re  p a r t ie s  to  a 
r e g is tr a b le  agreement. F in a lly  th e  R e g is tra r  must r e f e r  re g is te re d  
agreements fo r  th e  d e lib e ra tio n  o f the  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court.
3 The fu n c tio n s  o f th e  Commission were reduced to  in d u s tr ie s  
where one firm  c o n tro ls  o n e -th ird  o r more o f th e  supply o f th e  goods 
concerned and to  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements applying wholly to  fo re ig n  
tra d e .
^ supra, p. 27, n . 35»
5 S (24) & (25).
6 S (1 ) ( 1 ) ,  (2 )  and S (14) (1 ) .
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The R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court
The unique fe a tu re  o f  t h i s  court from th e  North American view point
i s  th a t  i t  i s  composed jo in t ly  o f la y  nsombara and le g a l ly  q u a lif ie d
judges. The Court c o n s is ts  o f f iv e  judges and not more than  ten  o th e r  
7
members. The la y  members a re  appointed on the  recarm endation o f th e  
Lord C hancellor and a re  presumably q u a lif ie d  by v ir tu e  o f  t h e i r  knowledge
g
or experience in  in d u s try , commerce, o r  pub lic  a f f a i r s .  In  o rder to  
f a c i l i t a t e  i t s  work th e  Court may s i t  a s  a  s in g le  body o r in  d iv is io n s  
but must c o n s is t  o f a  p re s id in g  judge and a t  le a s t  two o th e r  members.
The opinion o f th e  judge o r judges s i t t i n g  p re v a ils  on q u estio n s  o f law 
but m a jo rity  vo te  p re v a ils  on qu estio n s o f f a c t .  The former could be 
appealed to  a h ig h er c o u rt.  ^
P rov ision  was made fo r  in c rea s in g  the  number o f members o f the 
C o u r t . T h i s  was an improvement over th s  1948 Act which only  allow ed 
f o r  te n  members on th e  Monopolies Ccemiasion and re su lte d  in  th e  c r i t i ­
cism of few re p o rts  p r io r  to  enlargement o f th s  Ccssmlssion by a 1953 
iusendment.
Agreements which a re  r e g is t r a b le  a re  defined  in  se c tio n s  6 to  8
of th e  1956 Act.
Broadly, an agreement i s  r e g is t r a b le  i f  -
(1 ) There a re  two o r more p a r t ie s  to  i t  engaged in  b u sin ess  
in  th e  United Kingdom in  th e  p roduction , supply o r 
p rocessing  o f th s  goods;
7 6 ( 2) ( 2 )
8 S (4 ) (1 )
9 See th e  Schedule o f Supplaaentary P rov isions a s  to  th e  Proceed­
in g s  of the  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  C oari. s  (jl)', ( i j  an? XT), P. 33
o f this” 1955 A et. ... —“
10 S (5 ) (1 ) ( a )  & ( t )  o f  th e  1956 A et.
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( , i i )  more than  one p arty  to  i t  accep ts  r e s t r i c t io n s ,  th a t  i s  
sane l im ita tio n  on h is  freedom to  sake h is  own d ec is io n s ; 
and
( i i i )  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  concern such m atte rs  a s  p r ic e s  to  be
charged o r paid f o r  goods; cond itions of s a le ; persons to  
whom goods may be so ld : q u a n ti t ie s  o r k inds o f goods to  be 
made, so ld  o r bought.
A fte r r e g is t r a t io n  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements a re  su b jec t to  ju d ic ia l  
d ec is io n  by th e  Court to  decide whether o r no t they  c o n f l ic t  w ith  th e  
public i n t e r e s t .  The onus i s  placed upon th e  p a r t ie s  to  th e  agreement
to  show why i t  does no t v io la te  th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t .  I f  no evidence
12i s  produced t h e i r  case must f a i l .
The Seven '•Gateways" and th e  "T ailp iece"
R e s tr ic tio n s  accepted in  pursuance of any agreement s h a ll  be deemed
to  be co n tra ry  to  the  public  in te r e s t  u n less  th e  Court i s  s a t i s f i e d  of
one or more sp ec ified  circum stances. B r ie f ly , th ese  a re :
(a )  That th e  r e s t r i c t io n  i s  reasonably  necessary  to  p ro te c t th e  pub lic  
a g a in s t in ju ry ;
(b ) That i t  confers sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  on th e  p u b lic ;
(c )  That i t  i s  reasonably  necessary  to  coun teract th e  r e s t r i c t iv e
rasasures of o th er p a r t ie s ;
(d ) That i t  i s  reasonably  necessary  to  enable th e  p a r t ie s  to  n e g o tia te  
on f a i r  te rn s  w ith  strong  buyers o r s e l l e r s ;
(e )  That th e  removal of th e  r e s t r i c t io n  would l ik e ly  cause unemployment 
o f a se rio u s  and p e r s is te n t  n a tu re  in  an a re a ;
( f )  That th e  removal of the  r e s t r i c t io n  would be l ik e ly  to  cause a sub­
s ta n t i a l  red u ctio n  in  th e  volume of export ea rn in g s;
(g ) That i t  i s  reasonably necessary  to  m ain tain  ano ther agreement which
i s  found by th e  Court to  be no t con trary  to  th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t . ^
The circum stances sp e c ified  above have< ocme to  be known a s  th e
'seven gateways". Passage through one o r more of th e  gateways, however.
11 Report of the  R e g is tra r  o f R e s tr ic t iv e  Trading Agreements. Onnd. 
1273, (London: H.M.3.O., 19^1), p . 1 .
12 Ib id . .  p . 15.
13 For exact wording of th e  sp ec ifie d  circum stances see sec tio n
(21) (1 ) ( a ) ,  (b ) ,  ( c ) ,  (d ) ,  ( e ) ,  ( f )  & (g ) o f the  1956 Act.
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i s  not s u f f ic ie n t  to  srvo ;.n eg rets;en t. Once through th e  "gateway' 
sn agrooment must a lso  survive a balancing t e s t  in  which "the  d e t r i ­
ments re s u lt in g  or l ik e ly  to r e s u l t  f ru a  the operation  of the  re ­
sit r ic t io n s . . .~ .1*0 to  be weighed ag a in s t t h e i r  b e n e f ic ia l e f f e c t s .^ 1. This 
l a t t e r  requirem ent i s  re fe rre d  to  as  the  " ta i lp ie c e ."
The in c lu s io n  of the "seven gateways" in  the le g is la t io n  r e f l e c t s  
th e  w idely held  b e l ie f  in  England th a t :
The e f fe c t  of a r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e  on th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t  may 
be d i f f e r e n t  in  d if f e r e n t  in d u s tr ie s  and whet may be harmful 
in  one case may not be harm ful, o r might even be h e lp fu l in
another*15
Thus r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  a re  condemned in  p r in c ip le  b u t exemp­
tio n s  are allowed through th e  "gateways" and th e  " ta i lp ie c e "  and "by 
th e  c rea tio n  of a ju d ic ia l  process whose purpose i s  to  d iscover such 
excep tio n a l cases.
B. Some Weaknesses in  th e  1956 Aet 
I t  was n e t long before i t  was re a liz e d  th a t  ways had been found to  
circumvent th e  purpose of th e  Act. Some of th e  more obvious weaknesses 
in  th e  le g is la t io n  may be b r ie f ly  s ta te d . Vo attem pt i s  made to  c i t e  
every f a u l t  o r weakness in  th e  Act; such an a l l - in c lu s iv e  l i s t i n g  would 
prove extrem ely d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  no t im possib le , as i t  can be expected 
th a t  more so p h is tica ted  arrangem ents w i l l  be devised to  avoid r e g i s t r a ­
t io n  as  more experience i s  gained w ith  the  working of th e  le g is la t io n *
14 R e g is tra r1s R eport, Cmnd. 1273* P* 13* paragraph 62*
15 P. T horneycroft, P re s id en t, Board of Trade, House of Commons 
Debates, 23 Ju ly , 1952, c o l. 566.
16 J .  Wiseman, "Syraposium on R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  L e g is la tio n : 
Economic A nalysis and Public P o licy", Economic Jo u rnal, LXX (Sept*
1960), 461.
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Inform ation Agreements 
The 1956 Act oontalna no p ro v is io n s  f o r  examining in form ation  
agreem ents. J .  B. Heath s ta te s  the most s ig n if ic a n t ohange brought 
about fay th e  Act has been the  su b s ti tu tio n  o f non-reg istrafa le  agree­
ments to  exchange in fo rm ation , c h ie f ly  about p r i s e s . ^  Lloyd claim s 
th i s  i s  a consequence of fe u  agreements being d e fe n s ib le  under S ection  
21 o f th e  Aet; th e  emphasis has s h if te d  to  Section 6 which d e f in e s  a 
r e g is tra b le  agreem ent, w ith th e  aim o f fo rm ulating  n o n -re g is t rafale 
a g re e m e n ts .^
Inform ation  agreements a re  o ften  en tered  in to  on th e  ending of 
a p rioe  agreement. U sually p a r t ie s  to  such agr eement s  send t h e i r  p r ic e  
l i s t s  o r th e  p r ic e s  a t  which th ey  hare en tered  in to  co n tra c ts  to  t h e i r  
tra d e  a s so c ia tio n  o r some o th e r  c e n tra l  agency fo r  c irc u la t io n  among 
th e  p a r t ie s .  The p a r t ic u la r s  o f such agreements are  n e t re g is t r a b le  
under th e  Act. T his o f fe r s  a means whereby p a r t ie s  may e n te r  in to  
:Informal p r ic e  agreement s ^ w ith  th e  e f fe c t  of extending th e  a rea  o f
o lig o p o lis t ic  behaviour by in c rea s in g  th e  awareness amongst com petitors
20th a t  re a c tio n s  a rc  l ik e ly  to  occur to  p r ic in g  d e c is io n s . Heath 
suggests th e  harmful e f f e c ts  o f open-prlce agreements might be dim inished
17 J* B. Heath, "Symposium on R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  L e g is la tio n !
Some Economic Consequences o f th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  Trade P ra c tic e s  A ct,
1956", Booncnio Jo u rn a l LXX, (S ep t. I9 6 0 ), 474.
18 A. Lloyd, "Symposiua.. . :  The Lawyer's Poin t o f View", Economic 
Jo u rn a l. LXX, (I9 6 0 ), 472.
19 "People o f th e  same tra d e  seldom meet to g e th e r , even f o r  m erri­
m e n t and d iv e rs io n , bu t th e  conversation  ends in  a conspiracy a g a in s t 
th e  p u b lic , o r in  some contrivance to  r a i s e  p r ic e s" , in  Adam Smith,
Wealth o f n a tio n s . Book 1 , Chapter X, Cannan e d it io n , p . 130
20 H eath, og. c i t . ,  p . 477.
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i f  s e l l e r s '  p ric e  inform ation  were a ls o  made a v a ila b le  to  would-be new
y\
com petitors and buyers. i t  would be d e s ira b le  to  hare sueh agree­
ments su b jec t to  r e g is t r a t io n  as a re  o th e r  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreemen te  eo
22th a t  t h e i r  Impact on th e  economy might be gauged.
When re g is t r a b le  agreements a re  rep laced  o r converted in to  in ­
form ation agreem ents, th e  R e g is t r a r 's  o f f ic e  rece iv es  th e  new p a r t­
ic u la r s  because they  operate  a s  v a r ia t io n s  of th e  re g is te re d  agreement 
and as sueh remain on th e  r e g i s te r .  O therw ise, th e  R e g is tra r  s ta t e s ,
th e  agreement i s  no t u su a lly  re g is t r a b le  and though we may 
become aware of i t s  e x i s te n c e . . . !  have no s u f f ic ie n t  in ­
form ation to  enable me to  Judge how many o f sueh arrangements 
th e re  now a r e .23
R e g is tra tio n
Gosse p o in ts  ou t th a t  p a r t ie s  a re  no t req u ired  to  f i l e  r e g is t r a b le
agreements under th e  Acts
An offence i s  committed only when a person f a i l s  to  n o tify  th e  
r e g i s t r a r  whether he i s  a  p a r ty  to  a re g is t r a b le  agreement 
a f t e r  th e  r e g i s t r a r  has made a  req u est to  th e  person f o r  
sueh in fo rm atlo h .2^
This p laces  th e  emus on th e  R e g is tra r  to  uncover th e  ex is ten ce  o f 
re g is tra b le  agreem ents which a re  no t v o lu n ta r ily  reg is te red *
The p a r t ie s  to  a  r e g is tr a b le  agreement remain f re e  to  continue
21 Ib id . .  p . 4«1.
22 The government re c e n tly  gave n o tic e  of i t s  in te n t io n  to  b ring  
c e r ta in  types o f in fo rm ation  agreem ents w ith in  th e  scope of th e  1956 
Actj see M onopolies. Mergers sad R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tlc c c . pp. 5-6 .
23 R egistrar*  s R eport. Cmnd. 1603, f o r  period  ending June 30,
1961,  p . 6 .
24 R. Gosse, "The Enforcement o f Competition in  th e  U .K .", 
Canadian Bar Review XXXVIII ( i 960) ,  171} see a ls o  3 (14) (1 )  and 
3 (16) ( l j o f  th e  1956 Act.
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p ra c tic in g  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  u n t i l  th e  R e s tr ic tiv e  P ra c tic e s  Court 
d ec la re s  then  c o n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t .  This has allow ed th e  
p a r t ie s  t o  b e n e f it  from th e  tim e-lag  between r e g is t r a t io n  and hearing  
by th e  Court. As th e  Court reaches d ec is io n s  on th e  back-log o f agree­
ment s  which o r ig in a l ly  confronted i t ,  t h i s  tim e-lag  can be expected to  
a ssume le s s  im portance. The f i r s t  agreements to  come befo re  th e  Court 
were se le c te d  a s  re p re se n ta tiv e  o f a p a r t ic u la r  type o r  ca tegory  of 
agreement. P a r t ie s  to  l ik e  ag reement s  could then  a s se s s  t h e i r  chances 
of defending them in  l ig h t  o f th e  C o u rt 's  i n i t i a l  judgement.
No Crim inal Sanctions 
No penal consequences a re  a ttach ed  i f  th e  Court f in d s  th e  r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  con trary  to  th e  public  i n t e r e s t .  Crim inal san c tio n s  a r e ,  no doubt, 
not req u ired  in  th e  g re a t m a jo rity  o f oases bu t s i tu a t io n s  can w ell be 
imagined where th e  p a r t ie s  to  an agreement may w ill in g ly  and knowingly 
p e r s is t  in  a c tin g  in  a manner d e trim en ta l to  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .  For 
such excep tio n a l eases seme s tro n g er punishment would be more d e s ira b le  
than merely d ec la rin g  the  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreement v o id * ^  The tim e-lag  
between r e g is t r a t io n  and hearing  nay in  some eases p re sen t s u f f ic ie n t  
inducement to  unscrupulous p a r t ie s  to  a c t  in  sueh a manner.
R esale P rice  Maintenance 
Resale p r ic e  maintenance was ambiguously tre a te d  by th s  1956 A ct. 
C o llec tiv e  re sa le  p ric e  maintenance was p ro h ib ited  w hile th e  In d iv id u a l
25 See A. 0 . N eale, A nti-T rust Laws of  th e  U .S.A ., (Cambridge a t  
th e  U niversity  P re ss , I9 6 0 ), where he s ta te s  " . . . where a co u rt in ­
ju n c tio n  can do no more than  re p ea t tile  term s of th e  o r ig in a l  s ta tu ­
to ry  p ro h ib itio n , th e  c i v i l  proceedings appear out of p lace  and 
cumbersome compared t o  a c rim in a l charge." p . 499
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su p p lie r was l e f t  f re e  to  oontinue th e  p ra o tio e . T his could oosipouad 
th e  d i f f i e u l t i s s  of a monopolies p o l io / .
The l i t e r a t u r e  p e r ta in in g  to  re sa le  p ric e  maintenance i s  ex -
te n s ir e  and could not be adequately  t r e a te d  w ith in  space requirem ents.
I t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to  p resen t a strong  economic a rg m en t i n  favour
of th e  p ra c tic e  whether c o l le c t iv e ly  o r in d iv id u a lly  enforced ; n o s t
economists jo in  ranks t o  condemn th e  p ra c t ic e .  The usual argument
given in  support o f i t ,  though dressed  in  v ario u s  g u ise s , i s  th a t  o f
26p ro te c tin g  th e  sm all merchant o r r e t a i l e r .  Such an argument i s  more 
so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  than  economic. R e s tr ic t iv e  p ra c tic e s  le g is la t io n  
i s ,  however, an amalgam o f s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and eeoncsdo fo rc e s  w ith  
the  l a t t e r  being subordinated in  many in s ta n c e s  to  th e  s o c ia l and 
p o l i t i c a l  fac to rs*
The common economic argument a g a in s t r e s a le  p ric e  m aintenance 
i s  th a t  th e  consomer i s  fo rced  to  pay a h ig h er p ric e  a s  h ig h -co st 
o u tle ts  a re  m aintained in  th e  in d u s try . Both th e  p ric e  and d is t r ib u ­
t io n a l  s tru c tu re  beoomes r ig id i f ie d  and th e re  i s  l i t t l e  in ce n tiv e  to  
improve m arketing methods a s  p r ic e  i s  high enough to  provide even 
h igh -cost producers and d is t r ib u to r s  w ith  a p r o f i t .  The fo rc e s  o f com­
p e t i t io n  become b lun ted .
Hutber s ta te s  th a t  re s a le  p r ic e  maintenance should be d iscontinued  
" i f  only because i t  would be o f  g re a t a s s is ta n c e  in  promoting a g re a te r  
read iness  among m anufacturers to  engage in  v igorous e a a p e t i t io n ." ^
26 T h is argu&ent has acquired  a c e r ta in  degree of s u p e r f ic ia l  
so p h is tic a tio n  w ith  continued usage and i s  usuallyaeammpanied by 
claim s of b e t te r  s e rv ic e , h ig h er q u a li ty ,  g re a te r  v a r ie ty ,  etc*
27 P. H utber, eg. c i t . .  p . 24.
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The need to  change th e  ty p ic a l  E nglish  businessman* s complacent a t t i tu d e  
towards com petition i s  one of th e  m ajor problems fac in g  th e  B r i t is h  
le g i s la to r  to -d ay . T his l in e  of thought has became p a r t ic u la r ly  appar­
en t in  th e  E nglish  l i t e r a tu r e  in  recen t y e a r s * ^
Consistency in  th e  d isp o sa l of r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  would be 
m aintained i f  in d iv id u a l re sa le  p r ic e  maintenance were made su b jec t to  
th e  same p rov isions a s  o th e r r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c t ic e s ,  i . e . ,  " th e  pre­
sumption th a t  such p ra c t ic e s  a re  a g a in s t th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t  u n less  
29shown otherwise.**
B ila te r a l  Agreements 
I t  was d iscovered e a r ly  th a t  th e  Aet could be circumvented "by
means of a  s e r ie s  of b i l a t e r a l  agreements which a re  ap p aren tly  un-
30connected. S ection  3 (3 )  o f th e  1956 Act excepts agreem ents f o r  th e  
supply o f goods between two persons, n e ith e r  o f whom i s  a  tra d e  assoc­
ia t io n .  In  th e  A ustin Kotor Company l im ite d , Agreements, th e  company 
had a system o f m u lt ip a r t i te  agreements between i t s e l f  and i t s  d is ­
t r ib u to r s  and d e a le rs .  To avoid r e g is t r a t io n  under th e  Aet, th e  
company en te red  in to  b ip a r t i t e  agreements w ith  a d is t r ib u to r  and a 
d e a le r  and proposed to  e n te r  in to  s im ila r  agreements w ith  a l l  t h e i r
23 See J .  B. Heath, S t i l l  Hot Enough Com petition. Hobart Paper 
U ,  (Second e d itio n  re v ise d , I n s t i t u t e  o f 'Economic A ffa ir s ,  Louden: 
1963), pp. 42-43J see a ls o  th e  Bow Group, Monopolies and M ergers. 
p. 70 e t  passim.
29 Monopolies. Mergers and R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s . Cond. 2299
p. 5*
30 Ib id . .  p . 6 ; th e  re fe ren ce  i s  to  In  Re A ustin Motor Company 
L tds. Agreements, LRIRP 1 (The l e t t e r s  LR and RP in d ic a te  th a t  th e  
re fe ren ce  i s  t o t h e  R eports o f  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  eases published  
by th e  Incorporated  Council o f  Law R eporting fo r  England and W ales).
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d e a le rs ,  d is t r ib u to r s  and r e t a i l e r s .  The new agreement l i t t l e  a f fe c te d  
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  company and th e  d e a le r  and th e  eampany and 
th e  d is t r ib u to r  bu t " th e re  was no longer any le g a l  nexus between the  d is ­
t r ib u to r  and d e a l e r " t h e  d e a le r  was now th e  only p a rty  accep ting  
r e s t r i c t io n s  under th e  new agreement. The R eg is tra r
conceded th a t  prime fa c ie  the  new agreements were excepted from 
r e g is t r a t io n  by S ection  8 (3 ) o f  th e  A et, bu t contended th a t ,  
read in  th e  l ig h t  o f  t h e i r  h is to ry , and th e  company* s  u n a lte red  
genera l tra d in g  p a tte rn  throughout th e  country , th e  new agree­
ments depended f o r  th e i r  e ff ic a c y  upon and amounted to  mutual 
agreem ents o r  arrangem ents between company, d i s t r ib u to r  and 
d e a le r  and were th e re fo re  in  r e a l i ty  m u lt ip a r t i te  agreements 
and a s  sueh r e g is t r a b le  under th e  A ct.32
The Chancery D ir is lo n  o f th e  co u rt d id  n o t accep t th e  R e g is tra r1 s
conten tion  and s ta te d  " th e  surrounding circum stances could n o t be in -
33▼oked f o r  the purpose of t h e i r  c o n s tru c tio n ."  Thus th e  new agree­
ments were excepted by S ection  8 (3 ) end were n o t su b jec t to  r e g is t r a ­
t io n  under th e  Act.
To e lim inate  t h i s  method of eireum venting th e  Aet in  th e  fu tu re  
i t  would be d e s ira b le  t o  su b jec t to  r e g is t r a t io n  agreem ents i n  which 
only one p a r ty  accep ts  a  r e g is t r a b le  r e s t r i c t io n  as  defined  in  Section  
6 (1 ) o f th e  A e t .^
31 LR I  RP I
32 Ib id .
33 Ib id .
34 In  M onopolies. Mergers and R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c t ic e s , a t  p . 6 , 
paragraphs 35 and 36, th e  gorernmsnt has expressed in te n tio n  to  
make sueh agreements r e g is t r a b le .  I t  r e a l i s e s  a lso  th a t  " t  he 
present safeguards i n  th e  A ct, which prevent o rd inary  ccnm ereisl 
tra n sa c tio n s , i . e .  o rd in a ry  c o n tra c ts  f o r  s a le ,  so le  ag en c ies , e t c . ,  
being brought w ith in  th e  Aet, would hare to  be su ita b ly  ex tended ."
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S erv ices
N either the  1948 nor 1956 Acts apply to  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  
engaged in  by se rv ice  In d u s tr ie s .  Ymney remarks th a t  "a la rg e  area 
o f economic a c t iv i ty  ranging from entertainm ent to  in te rm e n t  i s  out­
s id e  th e  reach of p resen t arrangem ents"?^ fu r th e r  th e re  i s  no need to  
exempt a l l  se rv ic e s  in  order to  exempt th e  a c t i v i t i e s  of p ro fe ss io n a l 
bodies and tra d e  unions.
The Government has noted th e  In creasin g  im portance o f th e  se rv iee  
se c to r  in  th e  modem economy and has expressed th e  d e s i r a b i l i ty  o f in ­
creasing  i t s  knowledge
about th e  opera tion  of r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  in  th e  supply 
of s e rv ic e s  t o  make i t  p o ss ib le  to  say whether i t  would be
ap p ro p ria te  to  b rin g  se rv ices  w ith in  th e  scope of th e
r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  l e g i s l a t io n .36
I t  i s  ap p ro p ria te  th a t  t h i s  a rea  of in q u iry  should i n i t i a l l y  f a l l  
w ith in  the  ju r is d ic t io n  of tb s  Monopolies Commission u n t i l  s u f f ic ie n t  
inform ation i s  obtained to  perm it fo rm ulation  o f a more d e f in i te  p o lic y
towards th e  se rv ice  in d u s tr ie s .  I f  th e  seriousness o f r e s t r i c t iv e
V7p ra c tic e s  " in  th e  f ie ld  o f commercial s e rv ic e s '^  i s  o f a  magnitude
bo req u ire  s t r i c t e r  enforcement than  would l ik e ly  be p o ss ib le  under
the powers o f th e  Monopolies Commission, i t  might prove d e s ira b le  to  
t r a n s f e r  ju r is d ic t io n  to  th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  C ourt.
35 B. S . Yamey, "Some Issu es  In  Our Monopolies L e g is la tio n " , 
The Three Banks. No. 54, (June, 1962), p . 6.
36 M onopolies, Mergers and R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c t ic e s ,  p . 7 ,
jjaragraph 4 j .
37 Ib id . .  p . 7, paragraph 43.
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CHiUTjiJi V 
TW  1956 ACT AT WORK
A period  of g e s ta tio n  was req u ired  to  p repare th e  R eg is te r  and to
se le c t th e  f i r s t  agreements to  be heard by th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s
C ourt. I n i t i a l l y  " th e re  was a  fe e l in g  th a t  many agreements would g e t
through the  n e t ;  o r  e l s e . . . t h a t  eases would drag  on in term inab ly  w ith*
out conclusive r e s u l t . T h i s  i l lu s io n  was qu iek ly  d isp e lle d . In  i t s
f i r s t  m ajor p r ic e - f ix in g  ease the  Court s truck  q u ick ly  and fo rc ib ly  in
2f in d in g  the r e s t r i c t io n s  co n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t .
Ry June 30, 1963, seme 2430 agreements had been re g is te re d  of
which sobs 1610 had been abandoned, rev ised  t o  remove th e  r e s t r i c t io n s ,
3
o r ended by th e  passage of tim e. Tw enty-six agreements had been t r i e d  
by th e  C o u r t i n  f iv e  eases th e  Court found th a t  " sp e c if ic  and sub­
s ta n t ia l  b e n e f its "  had accrued to  th e  pub lic  and were n o t outweighed by 
any detrim en ts su b jec t to  co n s id e ra tio n  under th e  " ta i lp ie c e ."  A s ix th  
agreement (W atertube d o ile ra a k e rs )  passed through th e  export gateway 
and a  seventh (N ational Sulphuric Acid A ssociation) was aeeepted a s
1 In  J .  W. Grove, Government and In d u stry  in  B r i ta in . (G reat 
B r i ta in :  Longaan's, 1961), p . 195.
2 In  re  Tarn Spinners Agreement, LR1 RP 118) see a ls o  B. S. 
Yamey, "The Yam Spinners* Agreement: Economies in  C ourt", The Modem 
Law Review. X III ( lu ly ,  1959).
3 R eg is tra r* s  Report, f o r  th e  period ending June, 1963.
London: H.M.S.O., Jan . 1^64.
4 For a  b r ie f  a n a ly s is  o f eases con tested  before th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  
P ra c tic e s  Court decid ing  whether agreements were co n tra ry  t o  th e  pub lic  
i n t e r e s t ,  see "Appendix", i n f r a .pp. 80-114.
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or fo r  ten d erin g  purposes. I t  i s  u su a lly  claimed th a t  th e  p r ic e - f ix in g  
r e s t r i c t io n s  a re  necessary to  confer th e  " sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l
o en e fits"  on the  p u b lic .
P rice  S ta b i l i ty
S ta b i l i ty  of p r ic e s  was claimed a s  a b e n e f it  in  th e  Yam S p inners1 
Agreement, one of th e  e a r l i e r  eases to  face  th e  C ourt.^  There i s  m erit 
in  d iscussing  seme e a r l i e r  agreements befo re  the  Court a s  th e se  were 
chosen as  re p re se n ta tiv e  of o th e r types o f agreements on th e  R eg is te r 
and a s  such provided opportun ity  fo r  p a r t ie s  to  s im ila r  arrangem ents 
to  gauge how t h e i r  schemes would f a re  under th e  new Act.
In  th e  Spinners* case th e  respondents contended th a t  th e  main­
tenance of a  " flo o r"  p rice  preserved cap ac ity  in  th e  in d u s try  making i t
7
p o ssib le  to  "accumulate stocks to  meet rev ived  demand." Larger stocks 
would supposedly prevent p r ic e s  from r is in g  too  ra p id ly  in  a s e lle rs*  
m arket.
The Court recognised th a t  an element o f p ric e  s t a b i l i t y  in e v ita b ly  
accompanies a  p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n  and s ta te d  th a t  the  q u estio n  to  be con­
s idered  was "whether p r ic e  s ta b i l i s a t io n  a s  an a l te rn a t iv e  to  a f re e  
market i s  a b e n e f it  to  th e  purchasing p u b lic  in  th e  circum stances o f
g
th i s  p a r t ic u la r  ease ."  The Court found th a t  th e  lo s s  o f f re e  com­
p e ti t io n  and th e  concomitant d e n ia l of th e  opportun ity  o f low er p r ic e s  
outweighed th e  b e n e f i ts  o f p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y .
Although the  d ec is io n  o f th e  Court corresponds w ith  th e  general 
proswaption of th e  Act th a t  p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n s  a re  co n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic
6 UR 1 HP. pp. 188-89.
7 Ib id . .  p . 188.
8 Ib id . . p . 188.
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reasonably  necessary  to  enable th e  p a r t ie s  to  n eg o tia te  on f a i r  term s 
w ith  a strong  s e l l e r .  S ix ty -s ix  agreoaen ts were s a i le d  bu t n e t  de­
fended before  th e  C oart. This i s  in d ic a tiv e  o f  th e  apprehension w ith  
which businessmen now attem pt to  pass t h e i r  r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements 
through what th ey  consider t o  be t ig h t ly  drawn "gateways".
A. Sane Standard Arguments
At le a s t  f iv e  of th e  arguments put fo r th  in  a ttem pting  to  J u s t i fy  
r e s t r i c t io n s  "have been shown to  have much le s s  in  than  so f a r  a s  th e  
p u b lic  in te r e s t  i s  concerned than  th e i r  advocated b e liev ed ."^  These 
arguments have g en era lly  been used by tra d e  a s so c ia tio n s  when a ttem pting  
to  q u a lify  th e i r  agreements under S ection  21 (1 ) (b ) o f th e  A ct, a l ­
though they  have a ls o  been used in  J u s t i f ic a t io n  under th e  o ther "ga te­
ways". Section  21 (1 ) (b ) s h i f t s  the emphasis from th e  advantages of 
th e  r e s t r i c t io n  to  th e  consequences o f i t s  removal, i . e . ,  i f  th e  agree­
ment were removed th e  pub lic  would be denied " sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l  
b en e fits"  which have been conferred on i t  by th e  agreem ent.
The " sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its"  claimed by tra d e  assoc­
ia t io n s  have u su a lly  been p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y ,  p ro te c tio n  of q u a l i ty ,  pre­
se rv a tio n  o f adequate cap ac ity , th e  encouragement o f c a p i ta l  investm ent 
and re sea rc h , and th e  prevention  of monopoly. G enerally th e  c e n tra l 
purpose o f th e  schemes defended before th e  Court has r e la te d  to  some 
aspect o f p r ic e - f ix in g , u su a lly  to  s e t  minimum, maximum, o r  c a n o n  p r ic e s  
o r to  recommend p r ic e s , draw up s e ll in g  l i s t s  and co n d itio n s  o f s a le ,
5 S . R. Dennison, "The R e s tr ic t iv e  Trade P ra c tic e s  Court in  
A ction." Y orkshire B u lle tin  o f Economic and S ocia l Research.
(Dec. 19597,‘l ^ ' . -------------------------------------------------------------------
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4
i n te r e s t ,  Heath ju s t i f ia b ly  c r i t i c i z e s  the  Court fo r  i t s  statem ent
th a t  j
I f  p r ic e  s ta b i l i t y  could be obtained w ithout th e  s a c r i f ic e  o f 
a f re e  m arket, i t  would undoubtedly be a b e n e f i t ;  i f  i t  ean be
looked a t  in  i s o la t io n ,  i t  i3  no doubt a b en e fit
Heath remarks th a t  th e re  i s  no economic reason why b e n e f i ts  w i l l  
r e s u l t  from p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y  of in d iv id u a l commodities o r  groups o f comm­
o d it ie s  j "indeed , a changing r a t io  o f p r ic e s  between commodities i s  a 
c ru c ia l p a r t  o f th e  a l lo c a tio n  mechanism.
Q uality
The Tarn Spinners a lso  argued th a t  th e  p r ic e  agreement simply
11
d iv erted  com petition in to  th e  area  o f q u a li ty  and s e rv ic e . The Court 
considered com petition in  q u a li ty  to  be a b e n e f it  bu t considered th e  
removal of th e  agreement as u n lik e ly  to  a f f e c t  i t .  I t  was held  by th e  
Court th a t  a sp in n er should be f re e  to  choose w hether to  o f fe r  b e t te r  
q u a lity  a t  th e  same prioe o r th e  same q u a li ty  a t  a lower p r ic e  and th e  
removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n  would re tu rn  to  the  sp inner h is  freedom of 
choice.
Surplus C apacity
The b e n e f it  o f m ain tain ing  su rp lu s cap ac ity  was argued in  th re e
12of the  e a r ly  eases . The Court, w ith  d i f f e r e n t  reasons in  each, r e ­
fused to  accep t th e  contention  th a t  a p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n  was necessary  to
9 Ib id . .  p . 188.
10 J .  B. Heath, "The R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court on Com petition 
and P rice  R e s tr ic t io n ,"  M anchester School of Economic and S o c ia l S tu d ies . 
u m i ,  (Jan . I960), 11.
11 LR 1 RP. p . 188.
12 Tarn S p inners. .  lit 1 RP. pp. 184-86; B lankets.  LR 1 RP 255; 
^ a te rtu b e  Boilerm akers. LR 1 RP, pp. 336-37.
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capacity  in  a temporary recess io n .
The Xam Spinners claimed th a t  th e  maintenance o f su rp lu s c ap ac ity  
enauled the in d u stry  to  meet f lu c tu a tio n s  in  demand and provided th e  
pub lic  w ith  a udder v a r ie ty  of goods “in  tim es of n a tio n a l emergency
nlij.or when p a r t ic u la r  sources of supply a re  scarce . The Court agreed
th a t  “adequate re se rv e  capac ity  i s  d e s ira b le H^ b u t  d id  not b e liev e  th a t
concerted a c tio n  was needed to  a t t a in  i t  in  an in d u stry  tro u b led  w ith
excess cap ac ity . Furtherm ore, th e  agreement enabled h ig h -co st producers
to  be perpetuated  in  th e  in d u s try . The Court concluded
N evertheless, su b jec t to  th e  i n i t i a l  d is lo c a tio n  which must 
in e v ita b ly  fo llow  on th e  Abandonment of th e  scheme, we see 
no reason to  b e liev e  th a t  th e  in d u s try  w i l l  be l e f t  w ithout 
s u f f ic ie n t  cap ac ity  to  meet a l l  o rd inary  demands of th e  home 
m arket, and to  m ain ta in , i f  no t in c re a se , i t s  share o f th e  
export m arket.4°
The con ten tion  f a i le d  because in  th e  judgment o f the  Court in d u s try
f lu c tu a tio n s  were no t " so severe as to  cs.ll f o r  excep tional measures to
17c re a te  and m ain tain  reserv e  cap ac ity ."
In  th e  Blanket M anufacturers case th e  Court found "no evidence
of any unreasonable excess cap ac ity  among membera" and a lso  th a t  th e
ISin d u stry  was "extrem ely com petitive both in  q u a li ty  and p r ic e ." *
The p ric e  scheme was accepted as  a  "stop  lo s s  minimum p ric e"  which
13 J» B. Heath, 0£ . c i t # , p . 5.
14 LR i  RP. 185.
15 I b id . ,  p. 186.
16 Ib id . . p. 185.
1? Ib id . . p . 186.
18 Q uotations from th e  Blanket M anufacturers' ease r e f e r  to  
LR 1 RP 250-55. '
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was extrem ely low and even uneconomic; in d u s try  p r ic e s  never f e l l  so
low as  to  reach  i t .  The Blanket i*fanufacturers contended th a t  removal
of the  scheme would in  depressed tim es lead  to  the  debasement of
q u a li ty  and th e  red u ctio n  o f cap ac ity . From th e  C o u rt 's  p o in t of
view, th e  im portant question  to  be answered was
whether th e re  i s  l ik e ly  to  be a depression  so deep th a t  a p a r t
frcm th e  minimus p r ic e  scheme th e re  would be c u t- th ro a t
com petition  and a v i r tu a l  d is ru p tio n  of th e  in d u s try  ( fo r  th e  
disappearance of some o f th e  weaker members would n o t be a 
d isadvan tage).
The Court s ta te d  th a t  evidence showed th a t  in d u s try  f lu c tu a tio n s  
were g re a te r  than before  th e  war bu t a lso  th a t  they  were no t so p ro ­
longed. At any r a te  th e  minimus p r ic e  was hard ly  ever reached and i t  
was not be lieved  l ik e ly  ano ther depression  would be severe enough to  
"b ring  th e  scheme in to  o p era tio n .
The Court conceded th a t  th e  p r ic e  scheme was in  t h i s  case in ­
offensive  on th e  whole bu t s ta te d  th a t  t h i s  was in s u f f ic ie n t  grounds 
to  uphold th e  agreement. To meet th e  requirem ents of th e  1956 Act, 
agreements must conform to  th e  pub lic  i n te r e s t  requirem ents found in  
Section  ZL (1 ) ;  i t  i s  no t enough th a t  th e  agreement merely does no 
harm. The Blanket M anufacturers' con ten tion  th a t  th e  scheme was 
necessary  to  m ain tain  adequate cap ac ity  in  th e  in d u s try  was th e re fo re  
not upheld.
The 'Vatertube Boilermakers contended t h e i r  scheme was necessary  
to  p reserve cap ac ity  which "meant r e a l ly  re te n tio n  w ith in  th e  in d u s try  
of key p e rso n n e l."2® This argument was re je c te d , th e  Court s ta t in g  th a t  
s e l f - in te r e s t  d ic ta te d  th a t  " d ire c to rs  would no t tak e  th e  r is k  of
19 B. Heath, 0£ . o i t *. p . 4 .
20 Q uotations frcm th e  W atertube Boilerm akers' case r e f e r  to  l it  1 
RP, 336-37.
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d ia n iss in g  th e i r  key personnel*1 I f  they  wished to  remain in  b u sin ess . 
Members of th e  agreement were " lo n g -es tab lish ed  boilerm akers" and 
" f in a n c ia lly  w e ll-p laced " . "The d ire c to rs  r e a l i s e  p e r fe c tly  w e ll th a t  
i f  they  a re  to  remain in  b u sin ess , th ey  must r e ta in  th e se  personnel; 
they  w il l  do so ."  Thus th e  agreement was considered unnecessary to  main­
ta in  cap ac ity .
Investment and Research 
The w atertube Boilermakers m aintained th a t  in  th e  absence o f t h e i r  
scheme, both t h e i r  c o lle c tiv e  and in d iv id u a l research  departm ents would 
have to  c lo se . The Court found th a t  th e  amount spent on c o lle c t iv e  
research  was n e g lig ib le  in  r e la t io n  to  overhead expenditures} f u r th e r ,  
i f  th e  group d id  not consider i t  worth th e i r  w hile "they  w i l l  no doubt 
reduce o r  c lo se  down th e  research  departm ent." As to  in d iv id u a l r e ­
search departm ents, th e  Court considered " th e  companies w ell ab le  to  
m aintain" them over th e  expected sh o rt re ce ss io n .
The S c o ttish  Bakers claim ed a re la t io n s h ip  between t h e i r  minimum
p ric e  agreement and "an in c rease  in  both  research  and th e  r a te  o f
21te c h n ic a l p ro g ress ."  The Court was unconvinced of any " sp e c if ic  and 
su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its "  accru ing  to  th e  pub lic  from th e  s ta b i l i s a t io n  of 
p r ic e s  and thought th a t  th e  minimus p ric e  scheme might w ell be a g a in s t
th e  pub lic  in te r e s t  a s  i t  could "prevent o r re ta rd  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of
22progressive  methods in  in d u s try ."
In  th e  Tarn Spinners ease , th e  Court recognised  th a t  th e  minimum 
p ric e  f lo o r  was l ik e ly  to  provide a measure o f confidence and se c u rity
21 J .  B. Heath, 0£ . c i t . .  p . 8} LR 1 RP 377.
22 LR 1 RP 377.
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in  th e  fu tu re  thereby  encouraging m odernization of p la n t .  This b e n e f it  
was not considered " su b s ta n tia l"  as th e  e f f e c ts  on p r ic e s  were expected 
to  ue sm all and u n ce rta in  a s  to  when, i f  ev er, they  would be passed 
on to  th e  consumer.
The " sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l"  requirem ent in u reases  th e  d i f f ­
i c u l t i e s  in h e ren t in  the  balancing  o p era tio n . Even sh o rt-ru n  s t a t i c  
a n a ly s is  may f a i l  to  show where th e  pub lic  in te r e s t  l i e s .  Long un- 
dynamic a n a ly s is  compounds the  problems of th e  0002*1 by in c re a s in g  th e  
number o f v a r ia b le  f a c to r s .  The re la tio n s h ip  o f investm ent to  th e  
public  in te r e s t  i s  a long-run  problem which may be expected t o  produce 
some questionab le  d ec is io n s  by th e  C ourt. The Court accep ts  th a t  a
i
p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n  may encourage investm ent} th e  main problem a r i s e s
when attem pting  to  Judge w hether, on th e  balance of p r o b a b i l i t ie s ,
some b e n e fit which i s  u n certa in  a s  to  tim e, i s  to  be found " sp e c if ic
and s u b s ta n tia l" .  Heath s ta te s*
...T h e  cond itions in  which a  p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n  might have a 
marked impact on re sea rch  and investm ent do no t e x is t  u n less  
th e  r e s t r i c t io n  i s  e f f e c t iv e ,  but i f  i t  i s  e f fe c t iv e  then  th e  
p u b lic  may sim ultaneously be prevented o r in h ib ite d  from 
rece iv in g  some of th e  consequent b e n e f its .  To base p r ic e s  
on th e  c o s ts  o f  th e  more e f f ic ie n t  producers and t o  change 
them fre q u e n tly  w ith  those  c o s ts ,  so th a t  th e  p u b lic  b e n e f its  
w ithout d e lay , would give th e  argument a  g re a te r  chance o f  
su o o e ss .^
Prevention of Monopoly 
The S c o ttish  Bakers claimed t h e i r  r e s t r i c t io n s  b e n e f itte d  th e  
public  through avoidance of "undue concen tra tion  of production" and 
m onopolistic c o n tro l in  reg io n a l m arkets w hile p erm itting  s u f f ic ie n t
23 J .  B. Heath, Q£. c it . . .  pp. 8-9.
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concentration  f o r  sca le  purposes. The Court adduced fro *  th e  ev­
idence th a t  concen tra tion  was in c reasin g  in  th e  in d u stry  anyway and 
would continue to  do so w ith th e  raaoval o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n ;  i t  was 
ab le  then to  bypass th e  d i f f i c u l t  q u es tio n , a t  what p o in t does con­
c e n tra tio n  of production becone undue? The dangers o f m onopolistic  
co n tro l were recognized by th e  Court bu t the  q uestion  w ith  which th e  
Court was concerned was:
he ther th e  respondents can show th a t ,  by v ir tu e  o f  th e  r e ­
s t r i c t io n s  propounded by th e* , th e  disadvantages o f monopol­
i s t i c  c o n tro l in  p a r t ic u la r  d i s t r i c t s . . .a re  checked so a s  to  
confer a  sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  advantage on th e  consumer.
This was answered n eg a tiv e ly  by th e  Court which found th e  r is k  o f
undue concen tra tion  was not reduced a s  th e  recommended p r ic e  system was
operated by th e  la rg e  producers.
In  th e  Spinners case th e  Court disposed of th e  con ten tion  th a t
th e  scheme "prevents th e  estab lishm ent o f monopoly o r near-monopoly
conditions" in  one b r ie f  paragraph .25 Even in  th e  u n lik e ly  event th a t
"the  in d u stry  were reduced t o  th e  f iv e  la rg e  combines" t h i s  was no
guarantee th a t  com petition would be reduced. In  th e  C ourt1s view
"com petition could be a s  severe w ith  a ana 11 nwnber as  w ith  a  la rg e
number of f irm s"«^
B. S uccessfu l Arguments under S ection  21 (1 ) (b )
Clause (b ) of S ection  21 (1 ) has c le a r ly  emerged a s  th e  moot im­
p o rtan t of th e  "gateways" through which businessmen and tra d e  a s so c ia tio n s  
attem pt to  J u s t i fy  th e i r  agreem ents. What then a re  th e  " sp e c if ic  and
24 lk  1 RP, 363.
25 Q uotations from th e  Yarn S p inners1 case r e f e r  to  LR 1 RP, IBB.
26 J .  B. Heath, og. c i t . . p . 11.
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s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e fits"  which th e  Court has been w ill in g  to  aeeep t a s  
outweighing any d etrim en ts  to  th e  p u b lic  in te re s t?  These a re  to  be 
found i n  th e  d ec is io n s  handed down by th e  Court in  th e  f i r e  eases in  
which th e  agreements were su ccess fu lly  defended under S ection  21 (1 )
oo.27
Black B o lts  and Nuts 
The A ssociation  was made up of fo r ty - fo u r  members supplying about 
90 percent o f th e  goods under co n s id e ra tio n . The respondents p laced  
g re a te s t  emphasis on th e  a lleg ed  advantages o f p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y ,  claim ing 
i t  re su lte d  in  : (1 ) a uniform p r ic e  fo r  each product so ld  by Assoc­
i a t io n  members; ( 2 ) a v a r ia t io n  i n  th e  uniform p rio e s  based upon changes 
in  production and d is t r ib u t io n  c o s ts ;  (3 ) a reasonable uniform p r ic e .
I t  was claimed th e  u se r  b e n e f itte d  by th e  avoidance o f having to  "go 
28
shopping."
The Court accepted th e  claim  th a t  p r ic e s  were "reasonable in  th e  
absence of any com plaints frcm u se rs  o r con ten tion  by th e  R e g is tra r  th a t  
p rio e s  were o th e r  than  "reasonab le". A p r ic e -f ix in g  scheme had been in  
fo rce  in  th e  in d u stry  since  th e  mid 1930' s ;  in d u s t r ia l  u se rs  (who pur­
chased about th re e -q u a r te rs  o f a l l  su p p lie s  d ire c t  frcm th e  m anufactur­
e r s )  and stockholding m erchants (who handled th e  remaining o n e-q u arte r) 
expressed t h e i r  s a t is f a c t io n  w ith p r ic e s  under th e  scheme. The Court 
a lso  aocepted th a t  the  scheme con tribu ted  to  th e  exchange o f te c h n ic a l
27 Black Bolt and Nut A ssociation  Agreement. LR 2 RP 50;
Cement Makers* F edera tion  Ag reemen t .  LR 2 RP 241;
Permanent Magnet A ssociation  Agreement. LR 3 RP 119 4 392;
Standard M etal Windows Group Agreement. LR 3 HP 194;
Net Book Agre eme n t.  LR 5 RP 24o; agreements which were u n su ccessfu lly  
defended aim explained  in  th e  "Appendix", 19. 85-11A.
28 LR 2 RP, pp. 88-89.
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knowledge and helped m a i l e r  members to  improve e ff ic ie n c y !  th e  in ­
d u stry  a s  a whole was found to  operate e f f ic ie n t ly  and w ith  a moderate 
average r a te  o f  p r o f i t .
S tockholding m erchants and in d u s t r ia l  u se rs  were th e  two main cus­
tomers f o r  th e  in d u s try 's  product. The average s tockholder operated  
on a  p r o f i t  margin of 7*5 p e rcen t; th i s  the  Court found inadequate
to  cover th e  a d d itio n a l co s t involved in  'go ing  shopping' w hile 
th e  p r o f i t  margin a v a ila b le  on the  p resen t f ix e d  p r ic e s  leav es  
l i t t l e  room fo r  any appreeiab le  o v e ra ll  reduction  in  p r ic e s  
under f re e  com petition . 29
The only way in  which the  stockholding merchant o r  in d u s t r ia l  
u se r  could recoup "h ie  a d d itio n a l expenses o f 'go ing  shopping '" was by 
r a is in g  h is  own p r ic e s  t o  h is  p u rc h a se rs . ' The Court found th a t  in  
the  absence of th e  p r ic e -f ix in g  scheme, stockholders and in d u s t r ia l
u se rs  would be unable " to  operate  on a  margin of 7*5 p e rce n t, l e t  alone
315 p e rcen t."  and th e i r  p r ic e s  would have to  r i s e .  I t  concluded:
We do no t th in k  th a t  o v e ra ll  p r le ee  would have been lower had 
th e re  been f re e  com petition in  p r ic e ;  n o r do we th in k , i f  p r ic e s  
in  th e  fu tu re  a re  f ix e d  in  th e  same way a s  th ey  have been fix e d  
in  re ce n t y e a rs , they  w i l l  be h igher than  they would be under 
f re e  com petition ."32
On balance i t  was found th a t  th e  " sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  
b e n e fits"  o f th e  avoidance o f th e  need to  "go shopping" outweighed th e  
p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f  p r ic e  red u c tio n e  w ith  th e  re s to ra tio n  o f f re e  com­
p e t i t io n .  The " sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l"  b e n e f its  o f no t having to  
"go shopping" were a saving in  money, tim e and e f f o r t  from no t having 
to  a s c e r ta in  p r ic e s  from ca&peting souroes o f supply befo re  p lac in g
29 Ib id . .  p . 89.
30 Ib id . .  p . 90.
31 Ib id . .  p . 94.
32 Ib id . .  p . 95.
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o rd ers .
A ll p rice-fixL ng  agreemen ts  e lim in a te  th e  need to  "go chopping”
f o r  p r ic e  bargain* and to  th a t  ex ten t confer a b e n e f it  on th e  purchas-
33e r ;  they  a lso  e lim inate  p r ic e  com petition a t  th e  r e t a i l  l e r e l  and 
m aintain  h igher oost d is t r ib u to r s  In  b u sin ess .
G reat weight was p laced by th e  Court on th e  "reasonableness” o f 
th e  p r ic e s  f ix e d  by th e  A ssocia tion  and i t  was in flu en ced , p o ssib ly  un­
du ly , by the  evidence of buyers a s  to  th e i r  s a t is f a c t io n  w ith  p r io e s  
under th e  scheme. G* D. N. Worswick eosaen ts:
1 do n o t th in k  th a t  th e  absence of s p e c if ic  com plaints es­
ta b l is h e s  th e  reasonableness of p r ic e s . . .H ie  o rd inary  m an's 
usage o f th e  no tion  of being overcharged simply does no t 
apply  where th e re  i s ,  and has been f o r  some tim e , only ope 
p r ic e  a t  any moment f o r  a l l  th e  a l te rn a t iv e  f a s te n in g s .3*
The C o u rt's  f in d in g s  o f "reasonable” p r io e s  was bulwarked by th e
f a c t  th a t  " th e  average r a te  o f p r o f i t  earned by menbers o f th e  a sso e -
35ia t io n  was n o t high* The in fe ren ce  drawn from t h i s  by th e  Court was 
th a t  "on balance th e re  i s  very  l i t t l e  room f o r  any decrease  in  p r ic e s .” 
The "average" r a t e  of p r o f i t  in  th e  in d u s try , however, i s  n o t th e  re ­
lev an t c r i te r io n  upon which to  base such an in fe ren ce . Evidence pro­
duced before th e  Court showed th a t  a  wide spread at p r o f i t s  o f member 
f i m s  occurred in  v a rio u s  y e a r s ^  suggesting th a t ,  under co n d itio n s  o f
33 J. P. C airns, "B enefits  Proa R e s tr ic t iv e  Agreements”,  Canadian 
Journal of Economics and P o l i t i c a l  S cience. XXX, (May, 1964), 231.
34 G. D. N. Worswick, "On tfee B enefits o f Being Denied the 
Opportunity to  'Go Shopping'”, B ulletin  of the Oxford U niversity In­
stitu te  of S ta t is t ic s . XXHI, (Aug. 1961.77 2$L
35 B. S . Tamey, "The High C osts o f Buying a T r iv ia l  E lem ent,” 
kodern Law Review. XXIV, ( Ju ly , 1961), 489.
36 LR 2 RP., 72.
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f re e  e o n p e titio n , h ig h e r-co s t firm s would ev en tu a lly  be e lim inated  
from the  in d u s try . Firms w ith  h igher than "qverags p ro f i ts "  would be
ab le  to  rsduoe p r ic e s , survive and, Indeed, expand. There i s  no reason
VIwhy p r ic e  co m p etitio n .. . could not lead  to  s ig n if ic a n tly  lower p r ic e s .
In  r e la t io n  to  the uniform p ric e s  r e s u l t in g  frcm th e  agreement and
th e  c e n tra l p a r t  which such p rio es  p lay  in  doing away w ith  th e  need to
"go shopping", J .  P. C airns asks whether th e  p r ic e -f ix in g  agreement i s
u
necessary  fo r  uniform  p r ic e s . I t  can be argued th a t  com petition fo r
sa le s  o f a  standard ized  commodity would tend  to  r e s u l t  in  a uniform
p r ic e , negating  th e  need to  "go shopping" except in so fa r  a s  d if f e r e n t
se rv ice s  a re  provided by d if f e re n t  s e l l e r s .  I f  com petitive fo rc e s  d id
n o t b ring  about uniform p r ic e ,
might no t th e  p r o f i t s  o f p a r t ic u la r  f i r a s  o r on in d iv id u a l item s 
be la rg e  enough to  perm it s u b s ta n tia l  p r ic e  re d u c tio n s , and p r ic e  
v a r ia t io n s  to  make shopping a  worthwhile a c tiv ity ? ™
I f  p r ic e s  d id  remain uniform , buyers would soon f in d  th a t  i t  d id  
no t pay to  shop f o r  n o n -ex is ten t bargains and, assuming r a t io n a l  be­
haviour on th e i r  p a r t ,  would soon give i t  up.
Cement
The Cement Makers* F ederation  co n sis ted  of fo u r  groups of companies 
and f iv e  s in g le  companies of which th e  la r g e s t  member produced "62 per­
cen t of th e  t o t a l  q u a n tity  o f cement d e liv e red  in  th e  United Kingdom.
The F ederation  e f fe c t iv e ly  c o n tro lle d  th e  home market producing " a l l
but a  n e g lig ib le  p roportion  o f the  t o t a l  annual o u tp u t . . .o f  P o rtland
37 B. S . Tamey, lo c . c l t .
36 J* P . C airns, eg. o i t . ,  p . 232
39 Loc. c i t .
40 LR 2 RP, 246.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
4 1cement m anufactured in  th e  United Kingdom."
I t  was contended by th e  F ederation  th a t  th e  conraonprice agreement 
re su lte d  in  low er cement p r ic e s  " tak ing  purchasers throughout th e  coun-
i p
t r y  as a  whole” and th a t  i t  a ffo rded  se c u rity  to  producers* in v e s t­
ments making i t  p o ss ib le  to  accep t a lower re tu rn  (under 10 p e ro en t)
43on c a p i ta l  in v ested  in  new works* Free com petition, i t  was claim ed, 
would r e s u l t  i n  a h igher investm ent r i s k  re q u irin g  a h ig h er re tu rn  and 
higher prices*
A se lle rs*  market had e x is te d  s in ce  th e  war and was expected to  
continue in to  th e  fu tu re .  In  t h i s  atm osphere, th e  co u rt found th a t  cap­
a c i ty  had been expanded in  proper re la t io n s h ip  to  demand and p la n t lo -
I .L
c a tio n s  were economically j u s t i f i a b l e .  M anufacturers* p r o f i t  m argins 
were considered modest in  r e la t io n  to  o th e r in d u s tr ie s  and th e  Court was 
s a t i s f ie d
th a t  under the  fe d e ra tio n ’ s  common p r ic e  scheme th e  cement 
in d u s try  a s  a  whole has operated e f f i c ie n t ly ,  both a s  re sp e c ts  
co st o f p roduction  and c o s ts  o f  d e liv e ry , and th a t  th e  p r ic e s  
o v e ra ll have, in  f a c t ,  been reasonab le .45
The low er-than-ccrapetitive p r ic e  which th e  p u b lic  had enjoyed and 
would continue to  enjoy under th e  scheme was considered a " s p e c if ic  and 
s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i t” which outweighed any detrim en ts a r is in g  from th e  
agreement*
Cairns p o in ts  out th a t  th e  Federation*s claim  (which was accepted 
by th e  C ourt), th a t  in  th e  absence of th e  agreement, a  re tu rn  on in -
41 I b id . . 244.
42 I b id . . 275*
43 I b id . . 282.
44 I b id . . P. 277,
45 I b id . , P. 278,
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vestment of around 15 percen t would hare been requ ired  end could have
been obtained i f  investm ent was to  be m aintained , i s  n o t valid*  Only th e
p o s s ib i l i ty  of a h igher re tu rn  would have been necessary  to  in ­
duce investm ent. But t h i s  p o s s ib i l i ty  need no t have been 
re a lised }  the  amount o f investm ent might w ell have been enough 
to  keep th e  r a te  of re tu rn  a t  th e  10 percen t le v e l  cm th e  
average,*6
C airns continues th a t  a "goodness of h ea rt"  or"benevolent d ic ­
ta to rsh ip "  theory  would be requ ired  to  exp la in  why th e  F ederation  would 
accept 10 p e rcen t, i f  in  f a c t ,  i t  could g e t 15 p e rcen t. Even i f  such a 
l in e  of a c tio n  were follow ed th e  pub lic  b e n e f its  received  would be
th e  r e s u l t  o f a p r iv a te ly  imposed scheme of income r e d is t r ib u t io n  
from cement company p r o f i t s  to  cement purchasers. I t  would be o f 
in te r e s t  to  know how shareholders i n  cement companies (widows and 
orphans included?) reac ted  t o  th e  defence th e  fe d e ra tio n  o ffe red  
in  support of th e  agreement. '
The C ourt, in  t h i s  case , f a i le d  to  examine th e  most l ik e ly  con- 
sequences of abandoning th e  agreem ent. In  th e  absence o f th e  agree­
m ent, th e  market s tru c tu re  o f th e  in d u s try  ( th e  la rg e s t  firm  produced 
62 percent of t o t a l  home s a le s )  would l ik e ly  have re su lte d  i n  p r ic e  
lead ersh ip  accompanied by in form ation  agreements r e la t in g  t o  c o s ts ,  
p r ic e s , p r o f i t s ,  e t c .  Heath observes th a t  " t  hese a c t i v i t i e s  would
have a ffe c te d  th e  degree o f r i s k  in  th e  m arket, which was th e  main p o in t 
49a t  is s u e . i f  tuoh wore the  ease , i t  i s  l ik e ly  th a t  a  s i tu a t io n  would
46 J .  P . C a irn s, og. c i t . ,  p . 238; see a lso  A. Beaoham, "Some 
Thought* on th e  Cement Judgement", Economic Jo u rn a l, LXXH, (June, 
1962) and J .  R. Gould, "The Cement Makers" Agreement: Risk and 
P r ic e s" , The Modern Law Review. XXXV, (S ep t. 1961).
47 0g* c i t . ,  p . 239*
48 J .  B. Heath, "The Per Se Rule in  th e  L ight o f  B r i t is h  Ex­
p erien ce" , Northwestern U niversity  Law Review. LVI1, (1962), 170.
49 Ib id .
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e x is t  where producers would be s a t i s f ie d  w ith a r a te  o f re tu rn  on in ­
vestment of under 10 percen t and t h e i r  argument th a t  th e  degree o f r id e  
would in c rea se  in  th e  absence o f th e  agreement i s  fa lse*  In  t h i s  p a r t­
i c u la r  in d u s try , cond itions a re  no t l ik e ly  to  be markedly a l te r e d  whether 
th e  agreement e x is ts  c r no t and th e re  appears to  be l i t t l e  ju s t i f i c a t io n  
fo r  the  scheme.
Magnets
The Permanent Magnet A ssociation  was comprised of tw elve man­
u fa c tu re rs  of permanent magnets and two n o n-associa tion  members who 
p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  p r ic in g  scheme. Together they  produced some 75 p er­
cent of domestic production*
The A ssociation  contended th a t  i t s  research  and te c h n ic a l pooling
agreements conferred  " sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  to  th e  p u b lic  a s
50purchasers o r u se rs  o f magnets", th a t  th e  above agreements re su lte d  
from p rice  r e s t r i c t io n s  imposed by th e  A ssocia tion , th e  removal e f  which 
would b rin g  to  an end th e  research  and te c h n ic a l pooling agreem ents, 
thereby denying b e n e f i ts  to  the public*
The Court was h igh ly  im pressed w ith th e  re sea rch  c a rr ie d  out by 
the  A ssocia tion , th e  speed w ith  which such inform ation was d iffu sed  
amongst members of th e  group and th e  improved products made a v a ila b le  
to  th e  public* I t  d iscarded  the R e g is t r a r 's  con ten tion  th a t  te c h n ic a l 
c o llab o ra tio n  and research  were no t d i r e c t  r e s u l ts  of th e  p r ic e -f ix in g  
agreement, f in d in g  th a t  they  re su lte d  "by v ir tu e  o f arrangem ents o r 
operations r e s u l t in g  from th a t  agreem ent*^ P rio es  were found to  be 
"reasonable" and th e  " sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e fits"  r e s u l t in g  frcm
50 LR 3 RP 157.
51 Ib id . .  p . 163*
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th e  agreement were Judged to  outweigh any de trim en ts  in  th e  balancing  
process*
In  view of th e  f a e t  th a t  the  A ssociation  r e l ie d  cm th e  b e n e f its
r e s u lt in g  fra u  i t s  research  agreem ents, th e  complex problem fac in g  th e
(Jourt was th a t  o f  determ ining under what cond itions re sea rch  was l ik e ly
to  be maximised, i . e . ,  in d iv id u a lly  and com petitively  o r c o l le c t iv e ly .
The Court reasoned th a t  th e  te c h n ic a l pooling agreem ents s tim ulated
increased  resea rch  a c t iv i ty  by th e  in d iv id u a l firm s:
The te c h n ic a l pooling agreements enable in d iv id u a l members to  
know th a t  i f  they  spend tim e and money on a l in e  o f re sea rch  
which i s  f r u i t l e s s ,  they  w i l l  be ab le  to  b e n e f it  from more 
fo rtu n a te  experim ents by one o r o th e r o f th e i r  members o r by 
th e  c e n tra l  re search  la b o ra to ry .52
The Court’ s reasoning f a i le d  to  g a in  u n iv e rsa l acceptance.
I t  i s  not easy to  understand , however, why a  firm  should be in ­
duced to  expand research  expenditure by a  system in  which one’ s 
own resea rch  f in d in g s  a re  im m ediately o o a p e tit lv e ly  n e u tra lis e d  
by compulsory sh arin g , and i n  which b e n e f its  frcm th e  research  
of o th e r  firm s comes one’ s way in  any c a s e . 5 5
I t  i s  obviously d i f f i c u l t  to  ev a lu a te  w ith  any p rec isen ess  whether 
the  added se c u rity  which each firm  d e riv es  from p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  th e  
c o lle o tiv e  re sea rch  agreement w i l l  le a d  t o  more or l e s s  research  and 
o f a h igher or lower q u a li ty  than  would occur in  f re e  com petition , i . e . ,  
in  th e  absence of th e  agreem ent. I t  i s  q u ite  p roper to  ask th e  q u es tio n , 
a s  does Tamsy, would teo h n ica l co llab o ra tio n  and c o lle c tiv e  research  
a c tu a lly  cease c h i th e  ending of th e  p r ic e -f ix in g  agreements?^* The
52 I b id . . p . 163.
53 J .  P . C airns, op. c i t . . p . 236.
54 B. S . Tamqy, "Notes o f Cases: Re Permanent Magnet A sso c ia tio n ’ s 
Agreement," Modern Law Review. XXVI, (March, 1963), 167.
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h is to ry  of th e  scheme had shown i t  t o  be h igh ly  su ccessfu l and prod­
u c tiv e . " B ig  gains from te c h n ic a l co llab o ra tio n  a re  no t l ik e ly  to  
be s a c r if ic e d  u n le ss  th e re  i s  g rea t provocation ( in  th e  fo ra ,  h e re , o f 
in ten se  p ric e  com petition)."  The Court d id  not consider in  any d e ta i l  
how p r ic e  com petition would be a ffe c te d  by term ination  o f th e  agreem ent.
I f  p r ic e  com petition were no t in te n se , th e  te rm ination  of te c h n ic a l 
co llab o ra tio n  would be u n lik e ly . Tamey continuest
C ollaboration  on te c h n ic a l m a tte rs  may a lso  la y  th e  foundation 
f o r  n o n -re g ia trab le  arrangem ents such a s  p r ic e -re p o r tin g  o r  
open-price agreements which would moderate com petition , 
e sp e c ia lly  where th e  number o f com petitors i s  m aall.**
57The 1956 Act s e t the Court "the ta sk  o f fo rec a s tin g  th e  f u tu r e , '1 
The a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t su ccess fu lly  th e  course which an in d u s try  i s  l ik e ly  
to  fo llow  i s  an im portant p a r t of th e  Court* s work which i s  made more 
d i f f i c u l t  by th e  requirem ent th a t  the  b e n e f it must be " s p e c if ic  and sub­
s ta n t ia l"  to  pass through th e  "gateway," The re la t io n s h ip  of investm ent 
and research  to  th e  public in te r e s t  i s  c e r ta in ly  a long-run problem 
and i s  no t s im p lified  when attem pting  to  judge w hether, on th e  balance 
of p r o b a b i l i t ie s ,  some b e n e f it  which i s  u n ce rta in  a s  to  tim e , i s  to  be 
found " sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l .
In  defence o f th e  C o u rt 's  d ec is io n  in  th e  Magnet ea se , i t  would be 
possib le  to  argue th e  un like lihood  th a t  th e  agreement would have remained 
in  fo rce  i f ,  in  f a c t ,  a l l  o r some member firm s were a c tin g  in  th e  manner 
suggested by C airn s, i . e .  rece iv in g  a u n i la te ra l  b e n e f it o f th e  o th e r
56 C i t . ,  p . 100,
57 LR 3 HP, 160.
50 Vide sup ra , pp. 47-48.
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f irm s1 re sea rch . Zt i s  q u its  p o ssib le  th a t  in d iv id u a l firm s r e a l is #  
th a t  re sea rch , both  in d iv id u a lly  and c o lle c t iv e ly ,  can widen th e  m arket 
fo r  th e  p roducts o f the in d u s try  and may a ls o ,  i f  demand i s  e l a s t i c ,  
make po ssib le  a h igher re tu rn  i f  p r ic e s  can be lowered. Then, by 
raain tain ing  t h e i r  r e la t iv e  p o s itio n s  w ith in  th e  in d u s try , th e  in d iv id u a l 
firm s would s t i l l  b en e fit by rece iv in g  the  same r e la t iv e  share from th e  
now la rg e r  p ie .
Metal Windows
The in d u s try  s tru c tu re  was considered to  c o n s is t o f  th re e  p a r ts .  
G rit ta l l*  s was an independent m anufacturer w ith  by f a r  th e  la r g e s t  p a r t 
of the market (approxim ately 43 p e rc e n t) . The Standard M etal Window 
Group was comprised o f  21 members o f which 15 manufactured standard 
m etal windows only  occasio n a lly  o r in  s n a i l  q u a n t i t ie s .  These 15 mem­
bers  were concerned w ith  th e  p rov ision  in  the agreement f o r  in te r - t r a d in g  
between members. For most p r a c t ic a l  purposes the  members o f th e  Group 
consis ted  o f s ix  m anufacturing members who supplied  approxim ately 42 per­
cent o f th e  standard  m etal window m arket. The rem aining 15 p ercen t o f 
th e  market was supplied  by a number o f o th e r  independent m anufacturers.
The Group co llab o ra ted  i n  th e  exchange o f c o s tin g  and te c h n ic a l 
inform ation and contended th a t  th e  e f f e c t  o f th e  agreement was t o  main­
ta in  m anufacturing c o s ts  o f the  ^roup a t  a le v e l  s u b s ta n tia l ly  lower 
than they  otherw ise would have been, As a consequence, th e  p r ic e s  o f 
standard m etal windows, on th e  whole, were claimed to  be low er, q u a li ty  
h igher and serv io e  b e t te r .
The ‘•'ourt was not s a t is f ie d  th a t  th e  ^roup had e s ta b lish ed  h igher 
q u a li ty  and b e t te r  se rv ice  a s  " sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its"  and
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decided th a t  th e  case mast stand or f a l l  by re fe ren ce  t o  th e  f i r s t
59p o in t, i . e . ,  low er p r ic e s ,  on the  whole, f o r  etandard n a ta l  windows.
The agreem ent, th e  Court found, d id  r e s u l t  in  low er member c o s ts
and a low average p r o f i t  margin f o r  the  Group. I t  s ta te d <
Without the  g re a te r  e f f ic ie n c y , r e f le c te d  in  low er c o s ts ,  which 
th e  group scheme promotes, member firm s could no t have o ffe red  
th e  p r ic e s  they  have done and th e  tendency would have been fo r  
p r ic e s  o f a l l  windows (wood and m eta l)  to  be h ig h er.
In  i t s  fo re c a s tin g  ro le  th e  Court concurred w ith th e  Group th a t  
a m a te ria l le ssen in g  of co-operation  "w ith a re su lt in g  red u c tio n  in  th e  
fu tu re  savings of c o s ts  among members" would occur i f  th e  f lx e d -p r lc e  
agreement was abandoned. ^  The Court found th a t  th e  b e n e f i ts  o f low er 
p rioee  received  by th e  pub lic  a s  purchasers o f windows (both  wood and 
m eta l) outweighed any detrim en ts r e s u l t in g  frcm th e  agreement.
The main problem confronting  th e  Court in  t h i s  case was th e  
s tru c tu re  o f th e  standard  m etal window in d u s try . O r i t t a i l s ,  which was
not a member o f th e  Group, held  43 percen t o f  th e  market w hile th e  s ix
m anufacturing members o f th e  Group supplied  42 p e r c e n t .^  The Court saw 
th a t  i n  th e  absence of th e  agreement C r i t t a l l s  would au to m atica lly  be­
come th e  dominant firm  and possess s u f f ic ie n t  power to  ex o rc ise  p r ic e  
lead e rsh ip . In  f a c t ,  th e  agreement reduced the  number o f com petitors 
but re su lte d  in  more e f fe c tiv e  com petition.
Cairns has c r i t i c i s e d  th e  C ourt1s d ec is io n , perhaps u n fa ir ly ,  be­
cause "an in c re a se  in  ccm petitive e ffe c tiv e n e ss  was no t th e  s p e c if ic
59 I*  3 R? 234.
60 Ib id . .  p . 237.
61 Ib id . .  p . 238.
62 Ib id . . p . 239.
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63b e n e f it  claimed" by th e  Group. in  f a c t ,  th e  Court linked  th e
" sp e c if ic  end S u b s ta n tia l b en e fits"  o f low er p r ic e s  to  th e  maintenance
o f e f fe c t iv e  com petition . In  th e  C o u rt 's  d ec is io n , Megaw, J .  s ta ted }
We ho ld , th en , th a t  no s p e c if ic  o r s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i t  o r  
advantage has been shown on balance o f p ro b a b ili ty , to  be 
l o s t  to  th e  p u b lic  as  purchasers o r u s e rs , exeept th e  v i t a l  
one which we have a lread y  accep ted , namely, th e  b e n e f it  o f 
low er p r ic e s  from th e  maintenance of strong  and e f fe c t iv e  
competition.®*
Tamey*s c r i t ic is m  o f th e  C o u rt's  d ec is io n  i s  more p e n e tra tin g  and 
to  th e  p o in t.  ^  I t  had been agreed by th e  Court th a t  keen p r ic e  com­
p e t i t io n  e x is te d  in  th e  in d u s try  and was a ffe c te d  by the  a v a i l a b i l i ty  of 
s u b s t i tu te s  (wooden windows) which were a lso  com petitive ly  p ric ed . I t  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  understand , th e n , why th e  p r io e s  o f m etal windows should 
in c rease  in  th e  absence of th e  agreement "given th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f a l ­
te rn a tiv e  (and u n affec ted ) sources o f supply o f m etal windows and of 
c lo se  s u b s t i t u t e s . " ^  I t  i s  more reasonable  th a t  the  red u c tio n  in  
e f f ic ie n c y  and consequent h ig h er c o s ts ,  which th e  Group claimed would 
fo llow  term ination  of th e  agreem ent, would be re f le c te d  in  s s a l l e r  p r o f i t s .
Net Book Agreement 
P a r t ie s  to  th e  agreement were 360 members of th e  P u b lish e rs '
67A ssociation  rep re sen tin g  " v i r tu a l ly  th e  whole o f th e  pub lish ing  tra d e ."
The p u b lish e rs  agreed no t to  s e l l  t h e i r  n e t bodes to  th e  p u b lic  a t  le s s
63 J .  P. C airns, og. c i t . ,  p . 236*
64 IA 3 RP.
6$ B. S . Tamey, "Notes on Cases: Re Standard M etal Window Groups' 
Agreement," Modern Law Review. X I7I, (March, 1963), 189-91.
66 I b id . .  p . 189.
67 LR 3 RP 246.
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tlmn th e i r  n e t p r io e s  and any bodes which th e  p u b lish e r wished to  
designa te  a s  "net" bodes f e l l  in to  t h i s  category . Net books, however, 
accounted fo r  th re e -q u a r te rs  of members' turnover*
The respondents claimed th a t  th e  agreement re su lte d  in  lower u n i t  
co s ts  which were passed on to  th e  public  in  th e  form of lower p r ic e s  and 
a lso  in  a  g re a te r  v a r ie ty  and nuaber o f books being published* A th i r d  
b e n e f it  claimed to  r e s u l t  from th e  agreement was th a t  i t  prevented p r ic e -  
c u ttin g  o f th e  lo s s - le a d e r  type which would be l ik e ly  to  d r iv e  " leg itim a te "  
bookse lle rs  who performed va luab le  p u b lic  se rv ic e s  frcm th e  trade*
The Court was s a t i s f ie d  th a t  te rm in a tio n  of th e  agreement would re ­
duce the  number o f "legitim ate* ' o r stockholding b o o k se lle rs  because of th e
combined e f f e c t  o f p r ic e -c u tt in g  com petition and th e  lo s s  o r 
red u ctio n  of l ib r a r y  b u s in e s s .•• T hose so a ffe c te d  would no t 
by any means n e c e ssa r ily  be businesses which a re  in e f f ic ie n t ly
managed.66
The Court fu r th e r  found, in  accordance w ith  th e  p u b lish e rs ' con­
te n tio n s ,  th a t  th e  rem aining stockholding b o o k se lle rs  would i n  a l l  prob­
a b i l i t y  stock few er t i t l e s  which could be expected to
resu lt in  a marked reduction in  the number of subscription and 
stock orders received hy publishers.. • This would tend to  produce 
a more cautious policy  on the part o f the publishers, resu ltin g  
in  smaller printing orders which would. •• tend to  increase l i s t  
prices further*®9
In  considering  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f fewer t i t l e s  being pub lished , th e  
Court leaned heav ily  on th e  d e n ia l of a b e n e f it  o f l i t t l e  d i r e c t  economic 
s ig n ifican ce  but to  which i t  a ttach ed  g re a t c u l tu ra l  and p o l i t i c a l  Im­
portance, namely th a t  "works of probable l i t e r a r y  o r s c h o la s tic  value" 
wculd experience d i f f i c u l ty  in  f in d in g  a p u b lis h e r* ^
66 Ibid. .  p. 316.
69 Ib id ., p. 317.
70 I b id . ,  p . 322.
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The Court acceded to  th e  claim s of th e  p u b lish e rs , f in d in g  th a t
te rm ination  of th e  agreement would r e s u l t  i n  " (1 ) fewer and le s s -w e ll-
equipped stockholding bookshops, (2} more expensirs  books and (3 ) few er
published t i t l e s . " ^ 1 The aroidanoe of each was considered " sp e c if ic "
and of s u f f ic ie n t  degree to  q u a lify  a s  a " su b s ta n tia l"  b e n e f i t .
E a r l ie r  th e  R e g is tra r  had contended th a t  th e re  was
no a p r io r i  reason fo r  supposing th e  p resen t system o f d is t r ib u t in g  
bocfs to  be th e  b e s t. . .T h e  ex isten ce  o f th e  agreemen t i s  an o b s tac le  
in  th e  way of in n o ra tio n  and Improvement in  th e  means of d i s t r ib u t ­
ing  books.72
This i s  a  most im portan t p o in t a s  i t  has been in  th e  f i e ld  o f d is ­
t r ib u t io n  th a t  some of th e  moot s ig n if ic a n t improvements have been made 
in  recen t y e a rs . The d i f f i c u l t i e s  in h eren t in  th e  fo re c a s tin g  ro le  which 
th e  Court i s  req u ired  t o  assume become obvious in  a ease such a s  t h i s .
Some in d ic a tio n  o f th e  t re p id a tio n  w ith  which th e  ro le  was accepted may 
be found in  th e  C o u rt 's  exp lanation  of th e  e f fe o ts  on book p r ic e s  which 
determ ination  of th e  agreement would l ik e ly  have.
We have found t h i s  the  most d i f f i c u l t  p a r t  of th e  case , depending 
a s  i t  does on th e  commercial p o lic ie s  th a t  would be adopted by 
p u b lish e rs  and b o o k se lle rs  in  a s ta te  of a f f a i r s  o f which th e re  
has been no experience of p a r a l le l  in  t h i s  country  in  re c en t 
tim es. We a re  conscious th a t  o th e rs  might make a  d i f f e r e n t  
assessm ent o f what i s  l ik e ly .  But whether we a re  r ig h t  o r  wrong 
in  our view th a t  r e t a i l  p r ic e s  g en e ra lly  would r i s e ,  th e  evidence 
has c e r ta in ly  no t s a t i s f ie d  us th a t  on th e  balance of p ro b a b i l i t ie s  
r e t a i l  p r ic e s  g en era lly  would f a l l . 73
I t  would appear th a t  th e  Court d id  not wish to  u p se t th e  s ta tu s  
quo w ith in  th e  in d u s try  a s  i t  was u n ce rta in , "on the  balance of probab­
i l i t y "  th a t  th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t  would b e n e f it  from determ ination  of th e  
ajrreement. I t  accepted the p u b lish e rs ' con ten tion  th a t  p r ic e s  were
71 I b i d . . P. 323
72 I b id . . P. 307
73 I b id . . P. 323
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74com petitive and th a t  p r o f i t s  a t  a l l  le v e ls  were no t ex cessiv e .
The argument a s  to  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which works o f " l i t e r a r y  o r 
s c h o la s tic  value" would experience in  f in d in g  p u b lish e rs  undoubtedly in ­
fluenced  the  Court. This argument was co n tin g en t, o f course, upon th e  more 
cau tious a t t i tu d e  which i t  was expected p u b lish e rs  would adopt i f  th e  number 
of stockholding b o o k se lle rs  was reduced. This l in e  o f in d ire c tio n  le d  the  
Court to  the d ec is io n  th a t  "a c e r ta in  c la s s  of r e t a i l e r ,  th e  stockhold ing  
b o o k se lle r , deserved to  be preserved ra th e r  than  sub jec ted  to  p r ic e  com­
p e t i t i o n . " ^
The eeoncude a sp ec ts  o f t h i s  case were adm itted ly  complex and cloudy
as  to  fu tu re  even ts and were considerab ly  muddied by non-eeonomie value
judgements o f th e  Court. C airns asks:
Did the  Court go beyond i t s  proper sphere in  being impressed by th e  
type of book le s s  l ik e ly  to  f in d  a p u b lish e r , th a t  i s ,  bodes of 
' l i t e r a r y  and s c h o la s tic 1 v a lu e , a type o f bock i t  presumably 
f e l t  'su p erio r*  to  th e  type of book l ik e ly  to  have i t s  p r ic e  re ­
duced and thereby rece iv e  w ider d is tr ib u tio n ?  Would th e re  be 
general acceptance of i t s  im p lic i t  value judgement, th a t  th e  pub­
l is h in g  o f books o f a  c e r ta in  q u a li ty  was more worthy o f promo­
tio n  than  th e  wider d issem ination , a t  lower p r ic e s , o f bodes of 
a d if f e r e n t  q u a lity ? 76
The ap p ro p ria te  means to  encourage such a p o licy  i s  l e g is la t iv e  
ra th e r  than ju d ic ia l  and would p resusab ly  tak e  th e  form of a subsidy r a th e r  
than  a r e s t r i c t iv e  agreement whereby th e  su b sid is in g  i s  done by only p a r t­
i c u la r  members o f th e  p u b l i c .^
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  faced  by th e  Court in  i t s  fo re c a s tin g  ro le  were 
increased  in  t h i s  case by the  lack  of p a s t experience o f a  p a r a l l e l  n a tu re .
74 Ib id . .  p . 312.
75 J .  P. C a irn s, of>. c i t . ,  p . 237.
76 Loc. c i t .
77 Loc. c i t .
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In  judging the  e f f e c ts  on p r ic e  and volume which te rm in a tio n  of th e  agree­
ment was l ik e ly  to  have, th e  Court found th a t  t h i s  would be dependent on
th e  eanm ercial p o lic ie s  th a t  would be adopted by p u b lish e rs  and 
b o o k se lle rs  in  a s ta te  o f a f f a i r s  o f which th e re  has been no 
experience o f p a r a l le l  in  t h i s  country in  recen t tim es.
Heath e la b o ra te s  t h i s  p o in t, no t in  the  con tex t of th e  Net Bock Agree­
ment in  p a r t ic u la r ,  bu t of th e  B r i t is h  econaay in  g en e ra l. He has been d is ­
s a t i s f ie d  w ith  th e  economic a n a ly s is  o f th e  Court and "w ith i t s  ex p ec ta tio n s  
concerning even ts in  th e  absence o f th e  a g r e e m e n t . H e  a t t r ib u te s  t h i s  to
th e  n ec e ss ity  o f th e  Court to  engage in  "economic p red ic tio n  o f a  p a r t ic u l -
AOa r ly  d i f f i c u l t  k ind . A p a r a l le l  experience o f what would happen under
cond itions o f f re e  com petition in  th e  B r i t is h  market i s  confined u su a lly  to
81th e  pre-w ar depression  y ears  "when co n d itio n s  were very d i f f e r e n t .  Under 
th ese  circum stances the  Court has been forced  to  co n s tru c t i t s  own "model" 
to  which, i t  i s  hoped, economic performance and behaviour w il l  conform.
Heath s ta te s t
This i s  th e  a rea  in  which most p e c u l ia r i t ie s  a re  found. The Court 
c o n s tru c ts  h y p o th e tica l s i tu a t io n s  which i t  expects w i l l  fo llow  
th e  c a n c e lla tio n  of the  agreem ent, bu t th e se  s i tu a t io n s  do no t 
always seem p la u s ib le  in  th e  p a r t ic u la r  c ircum stances.. . I t  i s  
l i t t l e  wonder t h a t ,  i f  th e  Court compares the  a c tu a l s i tu a t io n  
w ith  a h y p o th e tica l one which i s  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  odd conclusions w i l l
emerge.82
The q u estio n s  could be asked in  each of th e  preceding oases which were 
su ccess fu lly  defended, (a )  i s  an enforcement agency o f t h i s  type capable
78 Vide supra, p . 63, n . 73.
79 J .  B. Heath, og. c i t . .  p . 169
80 Loc. c i t .
81 Loc. c i t .
82 Op. C i t . .  pp. 169-70.
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o f a sse ss in g  a l l  the  re le v a n t eooncmic f a c to rs  which a r is e  in  oases o f t h i s  
nature? (b) Has th e  Court been successfu l in  d iscovering  th ese  few re ­
s t r i c t i v e  agreements which a re  no t co n tra ry  to  the  p u b lic  in te re s t?
The b r ie f  a n a ly s is  o f th e  agreements which have been Judged w ith in  th e  
pub lic  i n t e r e s t  by th e  Court lends l i t t l e  support to  an a ff irm a tiv e  answer. 
An attem pt has been made to  show th a t ,  on s t r i c t l y  economic grounds, none 
of th e  preceding su ccessfu l agreements should have been found w ith in  the  
public  in t e r e s t .
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CHAPTER VI 
EVALUATION OF THE 1956 ACT
A. E f fe c ts  o f the  1956 Act
Since th e  p o licy  o f th e  1956 Act i s  to  encourage com petition a s  a 
stim ulus to  productive e f f ic ie n c y , i t s  success may be measured by th e  ex­
te n t  to  which i t  has succeeded in  promoting a more com petitive economy. 
With regard fo r  the  leng thy  h is to ry  of c o llu s iv e  agreements in  B r i t is h  
in d u s try , an im portant co n sid e ra tio n  to  ensure the  long-run  success o f 
a com petitive p o lic y , was th e  need to  promote a favourable  c lim ate  of 
public  opinion to  b o ls te r  th e  le g is la t iv e  sanc tio n s  ag a in s t r e s t r i c t iv e  
p ra c tic e s .
P r io r  to  th e  1956 Act req u irin g  r e g is t r a t io n  of sp e c ifie d  r e s t r i c t ­
iv e  agreem ents, r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  had been commonplace in  B r i t is h  
in d u stry  and in  many q u a r te rs  they  were considered conducive to  e f f ic ie n c y . 
The e f fe c t  of such agreements was to  remove la rg e  a re a s  o f in d u s try  from 
the  com petitive sphere. The need to  re s to re  a com petitive atmosphere 
was w ell recognized and th e  government in  1946 enacted le g is la t io n  
d ire c te d  towards t h i s  end.
The p u b lica tio n  of th e  re p o rts  o f  th e  Monopolies Commission made 
a v a ilab le  to  th e  pub lic  inform ation on th e  ex te n t and e f fe c ts  o f  re ­
s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  in  th e  in d u s tr ie s  in v e s tig a te d . T his in fo rm ation - 
perform ing se rv ice  was Improved by th e  1953 amendment to  th e  1946 Act 
by which th e  membership of th e  Commission was enlarged and th e  number o f 
re p o rts  in c reased . P ub lic  awareness was fu r th e r  in creased  w ith  th e
67
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p u b lica tio n  of th e  Commission’ s Report on C o llec tiv e  Piscrlroin& t1on.
T his was a study of r e s t r i c t iv e  arrangements which had long been pre­
v a le n t in  B r i t is h  in d u s try  and s e t  th e  stage fo r  th e  1956 Act which 
requ ired  c e r ta in  agreements to  be en tered  on a r e g i s te r  open to  th e  
pu b lic . The p r in c ip le  o f o f f i c i a l  r e g is t r a t io n  has been commended a s
perhaps th e  most s ig n if ic a n t  c o n s tru c tiv e  c o n tr ib u tio n  made by 
those co u n trie s  which, s ince  th e  l a s t  World War, have s e r io u s ly -  
ta ck led  the  a n t i - t r u s t  problem.1
The ta sk  o f c re a tin g  a clim ate  o f pub lic  opinion which i s  con­
ducive to  th e  acceptance of more com petitive p r in c ip le s  i s  obviously  a 
long-run  problem and remains f a r  from completed. B r i t i s h  in d u s try  took 
nany y ea rs  to  reach  the  moribund s ta te  in  which i t  found i t s e l f  i n  th e  
mid 1940 's and i t  would be u n r e a l i s t ic  to  expect le g is la t io n  in  a demo­
c r a t ic  country to  r e s u l t  In  any overn ight changes in  in d u s t r ia l  organ­
iz a t io n  and business moves. The main im portance of th e  1956 Act may be 
In  d is tu rb in g  th e  complacency of th e  B r i t is h  businessman and making 
com petition re sp e c ta b le . Heath s ta te s t
I  do no t b e liev e  th a t  amendment to  th e  1956 Act would be l ik e ly  to  
r e s u l t  in  any r e a l ly  im portant c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  th e  p rogressiveness 
of the  B r i t is h  economy, o r would g re a tly  a c c e le ra te  i t s  r a te  o f 
growth, although undoubtedly some b e n e f its  to  th e  pub lic  would 
resu lt...A m ending  th e  " ru le s  o f  th e  game", whether o r no t t h i s  
invo lves th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  Trade P ra c tic e s  A ct, can improve business  
perform ance; but th e  e f f e c t  would be much g re a te r  i f  a t t i tu d e s  
changed, i f  th e re  were a g re a te r  sense o f e n te rp r is e  and enthusiam s. 
A f irm er committment to  promote com petition may help  to  change th ese  
a t t i tu d e s ,  bu t th e  r e a l  problem i s  much deeper.
A ttitu d e s  toward business e n te rp r is e  a re  in  p a r t  a product o f our 
educational sy stem ... I  f  th e re  were l e s s  wastage of t a le n t  in  our 
schoo ls, i f  managers were drawn from a w ider so c ia l base and were 
b e t te r  tra in e d  in  business schools o r elsew here, com petition  would 
be a much more e f fe c t iv e  stim ulus to  e f f ic ie n c y  than  i t  i s .  
Competition i s  a necessary  bu t no s u f f ic ie n t  con d itio n  fo r  
p rog ressiveness. There must be a s u f f ic ie n t  number o f  managers
1 W. Friedmann in  A nti-T rust Laws, p . 548.
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who know how to  be p ro g re s s iv e ...  ? hose in  which e n te rp r is e  can 
be developed must not be in h ib ite d  by th e  o u t-o f-d a te  id eas  of 
the  r e s t .*
This leng thy  quo ta tio n  c le a r ly  emphasizes th a t  le g is la t io n  alone i s
u n lik e ly  to  succeed in  making com petition re sp ec ta b le ; a change in  th e
a t t i tu d e  of businessmen and p o ssib ly  in  th e  so c ia l s tru c tu re  o f th e  country
laay be req u ired . I t  may not be u n t i l  a younger generation  o f businessmen
w ith  f re sh  id eas  and a g re a te r  ap p rec ia tio n  of com petitive p r in c ip le s
i n f i l t r a t e  th e  boardrooms o f B r i t is h  in d u s try  th a t  any g re a t changes in
com petitive a b i l i t y  become apparen t.
Although th e  long run e f f e c ts  of the  1956 Act a re  l ik e ly  to  be o f
g re a te r  importance than  any immediate g a in s , some sh o rt run b e n e f i ts ,
though l ik e ly  o f a minor n a tu re , have been re a liz e d  a lread y . In  an
a r t i c l e  a s  e a r ly  a s  Hay, 1961, Heath was ab le  to  s ta te  on th e  b a s is  o f
a q u estio n n a ire -ty p e  study
I t  i s  c e r ta in  th a t  some consumers have b e n e f itte d  a lre a d y , and 
may continue to  b e n e f i t ,  p r in c ip a lly  through lower p r ic e s ;  in  
th e  long run g re a te r  stim ulus to  e f f ic ie n c y  which increased  
com petition , w i l l  b rin g  fu r th e r  b e n e f its .  On th e  whole, th e  
d isadvantages to  the pub lic  in  th e  sh o rt run seen r a th e r  s m a l l . ^
Thus to  th e  p resen t tim e, th e  e f f e c t  o f th e  1956 Act on both
public  opinion and com petition appears to  have been r a th e r  e u a l l .^  The
longer run changes, however, which a re  hoped fo r  in  pub lic  opin ion ,
should r e s u l t  in  a g re a te r  acceptance of com petitive p r in c ip le s  which
j>n tu rn  may be expected to  s tim u la te  productive e f f ic ie n c y .
2 J . B. Heath in  S t i l l  Not Enough Com petition, pp. 42-43.
3 J .  B. Heath, "R e s tr ic tiv e  P ra c tic e s  and A fte r" , M anchester School 
Economic and S o c ia l S tu d ie s . XXIX, (May, 1961), 202.
4 See R. Stevens in  the  Tale Law Jo u rn a l. LXX, (1961), 888-89.
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3. A Middle Way
In  North America and p a r t ic u la r ly  in  Canada, th e  m odified per ee 
approach to  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  enforcement has re su lte d  in  an excess­
iv e ly  l e g a l i s t i c  a t t i tu d e  to  a problem which i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  economic in  
nature* In  t h i s  v e in , Friedmann remarksj
The Canadian co u rts , w ith  f a r  g re a te r  unanim ity than  th e  American 
c o u r ts , have re fu sed  to  consider th e  economic im p lica tio n s  of 
th e i r  Judgements, o r even th e  is s u e s  underly ing them, on th e  
ground th a t  i t  i s  no t th e  Judges ta sk  " to  ad ju d ica te  between 
c o n f lic tin g  th e o r ie s  of p o l i t i c a l  economy."5
I t  w il l  be r e c a l le d  th a t  Canadian combines le g is la t io n  re q u ire s  th e  Court 
to  determ ine a t  what p o in t com petition  becomes "unduly" le ssen ed . When 
t h i s  po in t has been reached th e  combine i s  per se i l l e g a l  w ith  no con­
s id e ra tio n  of th e  economic consequences. E a r l ie r  i t  was s ta te d  th a t  the  
"undue" p o in t was reached when a " su b s ta n tia l p a r t  o f the  market" o r a 
"preponderance of the  industry"  was involved . This p o in t appears to  have 
t>een s h if te d  somewhat fu r th e r  by C artw righ t, J .  of th e  Supreme Court o f 
Canada in  Howard Smith Paper M ills  L td . e t  a l  v . The Queen. 1957, S.C.R.
403 where he s ta te s i
...A n  agreement to  prevent o r le sse n  co m p etitio n .. .becomes crim inal 
when the  prevention  or le ssen in g  agreed upon reaches th e  p o in t a t  
which th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  th e  agreement become f re e  to  ca rry  on those  
a c t i v i t i e s  v i r tu a l ly  unaffec ted  by th e  in flu en c e  of c o m p e ti t io n .. .°
5 W. Friedmann, Canadian Bar Review. XXXIII, (1955), 136; see a lso  
in  re la t io n  to  excessive legal!am  in  Canada, V. W. Bladen and 3 . S ty k o lt 
in  A nti-T rust Laws where th e  Canadian a u th o r i t ie s  a re  accused of being 
overly  concerned w ith  th e  form of com petition ra th e r  th an  the  e f f e c ts ;
see a lso  "The Law and Mergers" in  Boonomicst Canada, a t  p . 90 where MeRuer,
C. J .  quote8 C artw righ t, J ' s  words in  Howard Smith Paper M ills . L td . . e t  
a.l v . The Queen. 1957, S.C.R. 403. "The re le v a n t q u es tio n  th u s  becomes 
th e  ex ten t to  which th e  p reven tion  and l im ita tio n  of com petition a re  
agreed to  be c a rr ie d  and no t th e  economic e f f e c t  of the  ca rry in g  out of 
the  agreem ent."
6 Pp. 426-27.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
ilcfcuer, C. J .  i n  Rerim, v .  Canadian Breweries L td . ,  1 2 6 , C.C.C. 133*
in terp reted  Cartwright, J ' s  language to  mean:
I f  th e  agreem ent i n  q u e s tio n , uhen c a r r ie d  in t o  e f f e c t ,  v o u ld  give 
the  p a r t ie s  to  i t  the  power to  c a rry  on th e i r  business v i r tu a l ly  
w ith o u t c o m p e tit io n , th e  agreem ent w ould be an agreem ent to  unduly 
le s se n  com petition ,?
The above views of C artw righ t, J .  and McRuer, C. J .  were n o t agreed 
w ith  by Batshaw, J .  in  Regina v . A b itib l Power and Paper Co. l t d , e t  a l  
(I9 6 0 ), 131 C.C.C. 201, who d id  not b e liev e  th a t  a v i r tu a l  e lim in a tio n  
of com petition was necessary  to  c o n s ti tu te  an undue preventing  o r l e s s ­
ening of com petition , C artw righ t, J ' s  words, quoted above, cannot be 
considered a s  n e c e ssa r ily  b inding a s  th ey  were contained in  a m in o rity  
judgement. Thus, our e a r l i e r  in te rp re ta t io n  th a t  an agreement w i l l  be 
construed as an "undue" p reven ting  o r le ssen in g  of com petition when a 
1 s u b s ta n tia l  p a r t  of th e  market" o r a preponderance of th e  in d u stry ” i s  
involved s t i l l  appears th e  most reasonab le .
The su b jec tio n  of r e g is t r a b le  agreem ents to  ad ju d ic a tio n  by a court 
of law b rin g s  th e  United Kingdom system o f enforcement somewhat c lo se r  to  
th e  North American per se approach.
I f  th e  f i r s t  cases taken  to  th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  C o u rt were 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d is tin g u is h  from a la rg e  number o f o th e r oases, th e  
C o u rt 's  d ec is io n  would have th e  e f f e c t  o f something approaching 
th e  development o f a per se r u le .  I f  th e  eases depended on t h e i r  
p e c u lia r  f a c t s ,  th e  d ec is io n  would be sp e c ia l and no t of general 
app lica tion .®
In  f a c t ,  th e  f i r s t  eases se lec ted  by the  R e g is tra r  f o r  p re se n ta tio n  to  the  
Court were chosen because o f t h e i r  lik e n e ss  to  a la rg e  number o f s im ila r
7 P. 139
8 Proceedings. In te rn a tio n a l Conference on th e  C ontrol o f R e s tr ic t iv e  
Business P ra c t ic e s ,  p . 196j see a lso  V. Friedmann in  A nti-T ru s t Laws,
p . 549.
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Qagreement*.
Heath s ta te s  th a t  ** t  he 1956 A c t.. .narked a s ig n if ic a n t  s h i f t  
in  opinion towards a per se ru le "  w ith the  presumption th a t  r e g is t r a b le  
agreements were c o n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t  u n less  c e r ta in  sp e c ifie d  
cond itions were met and by p lac in g  th e  onus on th e  p a r t ie s  t o  th e  agree* 
ment to  prove th a t  th e  cond itions were met.*®
Aside from a movement towards a p e r  se approach in  th e  s tru c tu re  of 
th e  Court i t s e l f ,  C airns claim s th a t  something rem arkably s im ila r  to  a per 
se approach has developed in  th e  th in k in g  o f th e  Court. From th e  Court* s 
d ec is io n s  in  th e  Permanent Magnets and Linoleum cases, he draws th e  Im­
p lic a t io n  th a t
i t  i s  per se  co n trary  to  th e  pub lic  I n te r e s t  to  operate  a  r e ­
s t r i c t i v e  agreement th a t  produces unreasonably high p r ic e s ,  in  
th a t  th e  f in d in g  o f such unreasonable fe a tu re s  i s  s u f f ic ie n t  to  
condemn th e  agreement as co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t . ^
I t  i s  s ig n if ic a n t  in  t h i s  re sp e c t th a t  in  a l l  cases where agreements 
were found to  be no t co n tra ry  to  the pub lic  in te r e s t  th e  reasonab leness o f 
p r ic e s  and p r o f i t s  was always emphasised and th e  s tip u la t io n  was made by 
th e  Court th a t  i f  p r ic e s  in  th e  fu tu re  became unreasonable, t h i s  would 
c o n s ti tu te  a m a te r ia l change in  th e  re lev an t circum stances e n t i t l i n g  th e  
R e g is tra r  to  apply to  th e  Court under S ection  22 of th e  Act whereby th e  
C o u rt's  previous d e c la ra tio n  in  re sp ec t of th e  r e s t r i c t io n  could be 
changed.
I t  would appear th a t  th e  B r i t is h  l e g i s la to r s  have a ttem pted , in  th e
9 Vide supra, p. 36.
10 J .  B. Heath in  Sorthw estem  U n iv ersity  Law Review. LVII (1962), 
162-3.
11 J .  P. C a im s, "The R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court and Reasonable 
P r ic e s” , Jou rnal of In d u s tr ia l  Economics. X II, (Mar. 1964), 135*
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1956 Act, to  combine th e  d e s ira b le  fe a tu re s  o f a par se approach w ith
th e  f l e x ib i l i t y  which i s  o rd in a r i ly  found in  th e  ad hoc d e te m in a tio n s
o f an ad m in is tra tiv e  t r ib u n a l .  The l e g a l i s t i c  approach which i s  ev iden t
:Ln Canada and d e riv e s  from th e  major ro le s  played by th e  Judge and law yer
in  our system of enforcement has been sub jected  to  m oderating in flu en c es
in  th e  United Kingdom. As P ro fesso r Gosse has poin ted  o u t, th e se  d e riv e
in  p a r t from conscious p o lic ie s  s e t  down by th e  Court and in  p a r t  from th e
le g is la t io n  i t s e l f :
The court has consciously  adopted c e r ta in  a t t r ib u te s  of a t r ib u n a l  
w ith regard  to  evidence and proceedings. There i s  l e s s  fo rm a lity  
in  th e se  r e s p e c ts .  A lso, th e  Act re q u ire s  th a t  th e  Court inc lude
more la y  members than  judges. T his should help to  avoid a  to o  le g a l ­
i s t i c  a p p ro a c h .^
I t  i s  l ik e ly  a lso  th a t  th e  low er standard  of proof req u ired  in  c i v i l  
proceedings, i . e .  th e  balance o f p ro b a b ility  r a th e r  than  beyond a  reason­
ab le  doubt, r e s u l t s  in  le s s  r ig id i ty .
In  p r in c ip le ,  t h i s  approach would appear su p erio r to  e i th e r  per se 
ru le s  o r ad hoc ad m in is tra tiv e  procedure, combining as  i t  does th e  b e t te r  
p o in ts  o f both methods o f enforcem ent. The qu estio n  restains, how has i t  
vrorked in  p rac tic e ?  Has i t  proven in f e r io r  o r  su p erio r to  th e  longer 
e s ta b lish e d  North American means o f enforcement?
C. Conclusion
In  each case which was su c c e ss fu lly  defended befo re  th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  
P ra c tic e s  C ourt, th e re  can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  a " s u b s ta n tia l  p a r t  o f th e  
market" o r a "preponderance of th e  industry"  was involved. In  Blade B o lts  
and N uts, a s so c ia tio n  members supplied  about 90 percen t o f th e  goods under
12 R. Qosse in  The Canadian Bar Review. XX2VIII, (I9 6 0 ), 194.
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c o n s id e ra tio n } ^  in  th e  Cement Makers' agreem ent, th e  fe d e ra tio n  e f f e c t ­
iv e ly  co n tro lled  th e  hone market "producing a l l  bu t a n e g lib le  pro­
p o rtio n  o f  th e  t o t a l  annual o u tp u t . . .o f  P o rtlan d  cement m anufactured in
14the  United Kingdom"} the  respondents in  th e  Permanent Magnet agreement
15produced some 75 percen t o f domestic production} th e  S tandard M etal
Window Group supplied  approxim ately 42 percen t o f th e  standard  m etal window
m ark e t} ^  members o f th e  Net Book agreement rep resen ted  " v i r tu a l ly  th e
whole of th e  pub lish ing  tra d e .
Only in  th e  M etal Windows oase was l e s s  than  "a preponderance of
th e  in d u stry "  involved in  th e  agreement and here th e re  can be l i t t l e  doubt
th a t  42 percen t o f th e  re lev an t market rep re sen ts  a " su b s ta n tia l  p a r t ."
I t  would be l ik e ly ,  th e n , were a Canadian co u rt ad ju d ica tin g  th e se  oases
su b jec t to  th e  p ro v is io n s  of th e  combines l e g is la t io n ,  th a t  eaeh agreement
>rhich was found no t con trary  to  th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t  by th e  R e s tr ic t iv e
P ra c tic e s  Court would have been found p er se i l l e g a l  by th e  Canadian c o u rt.
The economic co s t o f t h i s  would have been the  value o f th e  b e n e f its
which would be denied th e  pub lic  in  th e  absence of th e  agreement. However,
in  each case we have seen th a t  th e  economic a n a ly s is  provided by th e  Court
has been questionable} " a 11 to o  o f te n , t h e i r  a n a ly s is  seemed ju s t  p la in  
18wrong." Thus i t  i s  doub tfu l th a t  a  per se r u le ,  ap p lied  in  th ese  oases.
13 Vide supra. p. 50.
14 Vide supra. p. 53^54.
15 Vide supra. p. 56,
16 If supra , p . 59.
17 Vide supra. p. 61.
18 J .  B,, Heath , og. o l t . . p . 169
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
would hay* involved any lo s s  a t  a l l .  In  th ree  o f th e  eases (Gcment;
Magnets; M etal Windows) i t  was shown th a t  te rm ination  of th e  agremaents 
would be u n lik e ly  to  a f f e c t  s ig n if ic a n t ly  long  e s ta b lish e d  in d u s try  
p ra c tic e s . In  Black B o lts  and Nuts th e  pub lic  a s  purchasers were denied 
the opportun ity  o f lower p r ic e s  which fligh t be expected from com petition 
in  exchange f o r  th e  doub tfu l b e n e f its  o f no t having to  "go shopping".
In Net Books th e  pub lic  was denied th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f purchasing c e r ta in  
books a t  lower p r ic e s . Purchasers o f bocks which would f a l l  in  t h i s  
category , in  e f f e c t ,  were made to  su b sid ise  bocks of c e r ta in  l i t e r a r y  and 
p o l i t i c a l  value which, in  the  Court1s op in ion , would only w ith  d i f f i c u l ty  
f in d  p u b lish e rs .
A nalysis o f th e  above eases lead s  to  th e  conclusion th a t  th e  econom- 
ic a l ly  o rien ted  approach adopted by th e  United Kingdom, which cm th e o r e t ic a l  
grounds appears su p erio r to  th e  per se approach, does no t le a d  to  economic 
r e s u l t s  of a su p erio r n a tu re . T his conclusion does no t c o n s ti tu te  a con­
demnation o f th e  B r i t is h  method o f enforcing  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c t ic e s  l e g i s ­
la t io n .  On the  c o n tra ry , considering  th e  leng thy  h is to ry  of c o lla b o ra tio n  
in  B r i t is h  in d u s try , th e  approach adopted by th e  government o f g rad u a lly  
try in g  to  in c u lc a te  th e  m e rits  o f com petition upon th e  B r i t is h  business­
man seems th a t  most l ik e ly  o f success. In  Canada, however, such an 
approach might be to  a la rg e  ex ten t unnecessary as  a  p o licy  of f r e e  com­
p e t i t io n  has been in  ex is ten ce  fo r  sev en ty -fiv e  y ea rs ; here a ls o  th e
medium o f p u b lic i ty  has been used to  f o s te r  a favourable c lim ate  o f pub lic  
19opinion. The ty p ic a l  North American businessman, w hile d es iro u s  o f
19 R e s tr ic t iv e  p ra c t ic e s ,  when uncovered, u su a lly  rece iv e  adverse 
preds coverage. Such p ra c tic e s  a re  a lso  p u b lic ised  by House o f Commons 
debates and re p o r ts  of th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  Trade P ra c tic e s  Commission.
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p ro te c tio n  fo r  h is  own in te r e s t* ,  i s  n ev erth e less  aware of th e  p r in c ip le s  
of com petition and the  esteem in  which th ey  a re  held by th e  p u b lic . The 
" ru le s  of th e  game" a s  expressed by Heath a re  much d if f e r e n t  in  Canada 
from what they a re  in  th e  United Kingdom. The B r it is h  need to  c re a te  a 
favourable  c lim ate  o f pub lic  opinion to  a s s i s t  in  th e  enforcement o f re ­
s t r i c t iv e  p ra c tic e s  le g is la t io n  i s  no t a f a c to r  of paramount im portance 
in  Canada. There i s  l i t t l e  doubt in  the  w r i te r 's  mind th a t  t h i s  i s  th e  
most im portant problem confron ting  B r i t is h  le g i s la to r s  a t  t h i s  tim e; i t  i s  
a lso  in  th e  area  o f pub lic  awareness th a t  th e  1956 Act has th u s  f a r  been most 
su ccess fu l. C e rta in ly  any economic trium phs have been n e g lig ib le .
The laws o f a country must be made to  conform to  th e  c u l tu ra l  and
20p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t io n s  of where they  a re  t o  be ap p lied . R e g is tra tio n  of 
r e s t r i c t iv e  agreements i s  no doubt o f g re a te r  value in  a  country such a s  
th e  United Kingdom where a n t i - t r u s t  p o l ic ie s  a re  in  t h e i r  in fancy  than  
would be th e  case in  Canada which has a leng thy  h is to ry  o f r e s t r i c t iv e  
p ra c tic e s  enforcem ent. S im ila rly  a body such a s  th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  
Court which provides an opportun ity  f o r  a i r in g  th e  economic a sp ec ts  o f 
cases may be th e  most e ff ic a c io u s  means a v a ila b le  in  th a t  eouhtry to  en­
lig h te n  th e  pub lic  on th e  d e trim en ta l e f f e c ts  o f r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c t ic e s .
The economic r e s u l t s ,  however, o f  t h i s  Court which has been assigned  
th e  sp e c if ic  ta sk  o f ev a lu a tin g  th e  economic s ig n ifican ce  o f r e s t r i c t iv e  
agreements a re  f a r  from overwhelming and by no means prov ides convincing 
proof th a t  such an econom ically o r ien ted  approach to  r e s t r i c t iv e  p ra c t ic e s  
enforcement i s  su p erio r to  th e  p e r se method of enforcement employed in  
Canada. On th e  b a s is  o f  B r i t is h  experience to  d a te , th e re  i s  l i t t l e  reason
20 Proceedings. In te rn a tio n a l Conference on th e  C ontrol o f 
R e s tr ic t iv e  Business P ra c t ic e s ,  p . l3lT
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
MONOPOLIES COMMISSION: R eports completed and
new re fe ren ces  subm itted by th e  Board of Trade.
For th e  
Tear Ended
Reports
Completed
New
R eferences
Dec. 31, 1954 2 1
1955 5 6
1956 4 re p o rts  completed p r io r 3
to  Aug. 2, 1956, a t  which
date  th e  1956 Aet came
in to  fo rce .
3 more re p o rts  completed
before y e a r 's  end. These
had been re fe r re d  p r io r  to
1956 A et.
1957 0 2
1958 1 0
1959 1 0
I960 0 1
1961 1 1
1962 0 0
1963 1 2
Source: Annual R eports by th e  Board of Trade
London: Her M ajesty 's  S ta tio n e ry  O ffice
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TABLE I I
TOTAL EXPENDITURES OF MONOPOLIES COMMISSION 
(excluding  c o s ts  o f c e r ta in  common se rv ices  
such a s  accommodations and s ta tio n e ry )
Tear
1952-53
1953-54
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63
59,639
76,354
106,751
106,363
63,894
59,624
61,686
56,474
57,114
64,615
67,544
Source: Annual R eports by th e  Board of Trade
London: Her M ajesty 's  S ta tio n e ry  O ffice .
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TABLE I I I  80
Cases C ontested Before th e  R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tic e s  Court 
To Determine Whether Agreements were Contrary to  the  P ublic  In te r e s t
Name of Agreement Type o f R e s tr ic tio n Gateway Used Judgement a s  to  P ublic  I n te r e s t
Chemists1 F ederation  
Agreement. LR 1 RP 75
Scheme to  r e s t r i c t  th e  
sa le  o f p ro p rie ta ry  
m edicines manufactured 
by members to  q u a lif ie d  
chem ists.
S (21) (1 ) (a )  (b) Contrary Nov. 3 , 1958
Tarn S pinners ' 
Agreement. LR 1 RP 118
Minimum p ric e s  
C onditions of s a le .
S (21) (1 )  (b ) (e; C ontrary Jan . 26, 1959
Blanket Manufacturers* 
Agreement. LR 1 RP 208
Minimum p r ic e s  
C onditions o f Sale 
Minimum q u a li ty .
S (21) (1 ) (b ) (gi C ontrary Mar. 23, 1959 
The minimum q u a li ty  r e s t r i c t io n  
was found no t co n tra ry  to  th e  
p u b lic  in t e r e s t .
S c o ttish  Bakers' 
Agreement. LR 1 RP 347
Recoomended p r ic e s  and 
w holesale d isco u n ts .
S (21) (1 ) (b ) ( g; Contrary Ju ly  23,1959
Watertube Boilerm akers' 
Agreement. LR 1 RP 285
P rice  Tendering. S (21) (1 ) (b ) (d
( f
Not Contrary Ju ly  31,1959
F ederation  of Wholesale 
and M ultip le  Bakers 
Agreement. LR 1 RP 387
Maximum p r ic e s . S (21) (1 ) (b) C ontrary Dec. 16,1959
For a  more d e ta i le d  account o f th e  " sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f its"  claimed by th e  respondents under 
S ec tio n  (21) (1 ) (b ) and th e  C o u rt 's  d isp o s it io n  o f th e n , see Appendix 2.
Sources: Various Reports o f th e  R e g is tra r  o f R e s tr ic t iv e  Trading Agrccncnts and LR, R P 'e.
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Name of Agreement Type of R e s tr ic tio n Gateway Used Judgement as  to  Public I n te r e s t
F ederation  of B r i t is h  
Carpet M anufacturers' 
Agreement and th e  
cousaon fo ra  agreement 
between the F ederation  
and numerous ca rp e t 
w ho lesalers. LR 1 RP 472
Fixed p r ic e s . 
S e llin g  l i s t s .  
Conditions o f S a le .
S (21) (1 ) (b )
( f )
C ontrary
Phenol P roducers' 
Agreement. LR 2 RP 1
Fixed p r ic e s . 
Conditions of sa le
C (21) (1 ) (b ) Contrary Apr. 7,1960
Black Bolt and Hut 
A ssociation  Agreement.
LR 2 RP 50.
Fixed p r ic e s . 
Conditions of s a le .
s ( a )  ( l )  (b)
(g )
Not Contrary Ju ly  15, I960
Doncaster and R etford 
C o-operative S o c ie tie s  
Agreement. LR 2 RP 105
Market l im ita tio n s . S (21) (1 ) (b ) Contrary O ct. 31, I960
Wholesale Confectioners* 
A lliance  Agreement*
LR 2 RP 135 A 231
Fixed p r ic e s . S (21) (1 ) (b ) Contrary Dec, 9 , I960
Motor V ehicle D is tr ib u ­
t io n  Sehame Agreement 
LR 2 RP 173
D is tr ib u tio n  scheme S (21) (1 )  (a )  
(b )
Contrary Dec. 21, I960
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Name o f Agreement Type of R e s tr ic tio n Gateway Used Judgement as to  P ub lic  In te re s t
A ssociated Transformer 
M anufacturers* Agree­
ment. LR 2 RP 295
Minimum p r ic e s . S (21) (1 ) (b ) 
(d )
( f )
(g )
Contrary Mar. 24, 1961
Cement Makers* Federa­
t io n  Agreement. LR 2 
RP 241
Fixed p r ic e s . S (21) (1 ) (b ) 
(g )
Not Contrary Mar. 16, 1961
Claes B o ttle  Manufactur­
ers* Agreement, lit 2 
RP 345
Minimum p r ic e s . 
Conditions o f sa le .
S (21) (1 ) (b ) C ontrary Mar. 24, 1961
Linoleum Manufacturers* 
A ssocia tion  Agreement 
LR 2 RP 395
Minimum p r ic e s . S (21) (1 ) (b )
i t )
(« )
Contrary June 22, 1961
Agreement between News­
paper P roprietors*  
A sso c ia tio n , L td .,  and 
N ational F ederation  of 
F .e ta il Newsagents, 
B ooksellers and S ta tio n ­
e r s .  lit  2 RP 453
R e s tr ic t io n  of Entry S (21) (1 ) (b ) C ontrary Ju ly  27, 1961
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Name of Agreement Type of R e s tr ic tio n Gateway Used Judgement as  to  Public I n te re s t
Permanent Magnet 
A ssociation Agree-- 
a en t LR 3 RP 119 & 392
Minimum p r ic e s .
V >  « '
S (21) (1 ) (b )
( f )
(g )
Not Contrary June 7 , 1962
Standard M etal Windows 
Group Agreement 
LR 3 RP 198
D elivered p r ic e s . S (21) (1 ) (b ) Not Contrary Ju ly  17, 1962
Net Book Agreement 
LR 3 RP 246
R e ta il p r ic e  maintenance S (21) (1 ) (b )
( f )
Not Contrary Oct. 30, 1962
Agreement of th e  Birming­
ham A ssociation  of 
B uilding Trades 
Employers. LR 4 RP 54
Standard c o n tra c ts . 
Tendering procedures. 
P ric in g  schedules. 
Daywork ten d erin g .
s  (a )  (l) (b) Contrary Apr. 10, 1963 
P ro v isio n s fo r  daywork ten d er­
in g  were considered u l t r a  v ire s  
th e  C ourt’ s ju r is d ic t io n  under 
S (6 ) .
Ju te  Goods Agreement 
(Not y e t repo rted  in  
LR, RP’ s . )
Fixed p r ic e s . 
Conditions o f s a le
S (21) (1 ) (e ) C ontrary Mar. 26, 1963
Tyre Trade R eg is te r 
Agreement; S ta ffo rd ­
sh ire  Motor Tyre Co. L td . 
Agreement. LR 3 RP 404
R e s tr ic tio n  of en try S (21) (1 ) (a )  
(g )
Contrary Mar. 15, 1963
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Name o f Agreement Type o f R e s tr ic tio n Gateway Used Judgement as  to  P ublic  I n te re s t
B r i t is h  Paper and 
Board Makers* Assoc­
ia t io n  Agreement.
LR 4 RP 1
Minimum p r ic e s . S (21) (1 ) (b ) Contrary Apr. 29, 1963
B r it is h  Waste Paper 
A ssociation  Agreement 
LR 4 RP 29
Minimum and maximum 
p r ic e s ;  standard  
d e sc r ip tio n s .
S (21) (1 ) (b ) 
S (6 ) (1 )  (b )
Contrary Apr. 29, 1963 
No r e s t r i c t io n s  w ith in  S (6 )
(1 ) c f  Act.
N ational Sulphuric Acid 
A ssocia tion  Agreement. 
LR 4 RP 169
Common p r ic e s . 
Common cond itions 
o f purchase
S (21) (1 )  (d) Not Contrary Ju ly  12, 1963
85
Chemists* Federation Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (a )
The paramount purpose o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  was to  r e s t r i c t  th e  sa le
o f p ro p rie to ry  m edicines manufactured by members to  r e t a i l  chem ists o r
pharm acists. The F ederation  claimed the  r e s t r i c t io n s  were reasonably
necessary  to  p ro te c t the p u b lic  f ro a  in ju ry .
The r e s t r i c t io n s  were found by th e  co u rt to  be u n n ecessa rily  wide
in  scope; many o f th e  products could not p o ssib ly  have re su lte d  in  in ju ry
to  the  p u b lic  even i f  vended w ithout th e  b e n e f it  of p ro fe ss io n a l advice*
I f  th e  r is k  of in ju ry  was g re a te r  than  th e  co u rt be lieved  i t  to  b e , th e
r e s t r i c t io n s  were l ik e ly  to  a f fo rd  th e  pub lic  l i t t l e  p ro tection*
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f its  claimed
(1) the  r e s t r i c t io n s  affo rded  chem ists the  opportun ity  o f g iv in g  b e n e f ic ia l  
advice to  th e  p u b lic  as  purchasers;
(2 ) in  th e  absence of th e  agreement exaggerated claim s were l ik e ly  to  be 
made fo r  some m edicines; the r e s t r i c t io n s  enabled th e  standards comm­
i t t e e  o f th e  F ederation  the  opportun ity  to  prevent t h i s ;
( 3 )  te rm ination  of th e  agreement would fo rce  many chem ists in  country 
d i s t r i c t s  out o f b u sin ess , thereby denying to  those re s id e n ts  b e n e f its  
of the N ational Health S erv ice ;
(4 ) r e t a i l  chem ists possess b e t te r  f a c i l i t i e s  than o th e r tradesmen fo r  th e  
sto rage of m edicines.
The court foundi-
(1 ) th a t  the  general b e n e f its  of chemists* advice was n e g lig ib le  and had 
been d e a lt  w ith  under Section  (21) ( l )  ( a ) .
(2) th a t  th e  p u b lic  received  no s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  from th e  work of th e  
standards committee. Other bodies ex is te d  which s a t i s f a c to r i ly  co n tro lle d
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th e  advertisem ent o f m edicines w ithout imposing r e s t r i c t io n s  on t h e i r
sa le .
(3 ) th a t  th e re  was no s a tis fa c to ry  evidence as  to  th e  number o f chem ists 
whom i t  would be in  the  pub lic  in t e r e s t  to  p reserve in  business* The 
F ederation  f a i le d  to  l i f t  t h i s  p o in t from the realm of sp ecu la tio n .
(4) th a t  th e re  was nothing in  t h i s  p o in t.
The cou rt declared  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  co n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t .
Yarn S p inners’ Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b)
S p e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f its  claim ed: -
(1 ) the  scheme guarded a g a in s t c u t- th ro a t  com petition which through i t s  
long-run  e f fe c ts  in  reducing cap ac ity  was d e trim en ta l to  th e  p u b lic  in ­
t e r e s t .  The cap ac ity  reduction  would r e s u l t  in  an excess o f demand over 
supply and consequent h igher p r ic e s  when demand re tu rned  to  normal* In  
th e  long run th e  pub lic  b e n e f its  frost th e  steady supply and s ta b le  p r ic e s  
which a re  assured  by th e  minimum p ric e  scheme.
( 2 ) the  scheme encouraged research  and p la n t m odernisation, th u s  b e n e f l t t -  
ing  the  p u b lic  in  th e  form of cheaper o r b e t te r  goods.
( 3) q u a lity  and se rv ice  were b e t te r  in  the absence of p ric e  com petition , 
(a )  the  scheme prevented the  estab lishm ent of monopoly o r near-monopoly 
cond itions as  in  i t s  absence many producers would be e lim inated .
(5 ) p r ie s  s t a b i l i t y  re s u lt in g  from the  minimum p ric e  scheme was claimed 
as a b e n e f it .
The court found :-
(ly  the scheme re ta rd ed  th e  e lim in a tio n  of excess cap ac ity  by m ain ta in ing  
higher than com petitive p ric e s  which perm itted  le s s  e f f ic ie n t  e n te rp r is e s
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
to  continue o p era tio n s . The in d u stry  could and ought to  be made sm aller 
and more compact.
(2 ) th a t  the  scheme d id  I n s t i l l  confidence and induce m odernisation but 
concluded th a t  p r ic e  and q u a li ty  b e n e f its  to  th e  pub lic  were u n c e rta in  
and u n lik e ly  to  be s u b s ta n tia l .
(3 )  th a t  com petition in  q u a lity  and se rv ice  would be m aintained in  th e  
absence of th e  r e s t r i c t io n s .
(4 ) th a t  a red u c tio n  in  capacity  and in d u s try  s is e  d id  not lead  in e v ita b ly  
to  le s s  com petition.
(5 ) th a t  any minimum p ric e  scheme c o n tr ib u te s  to  p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y .  P rice  
s ta b i l i s a t io n  was, in  i s o la t io n ,  a b e n e f it  but here i t  had to  be Judged 
a g a in s t the  a l te rn a t iv e  of a f re e  m arket. In  t h i s  case , th e  opportun ity  
f o r  p ric e  red u c tio n s  under cond itions o f f re e  com petition was a g re a te r  
b e n e f it than  p r ic e  s ta b i l i ty .
S (21) (1 ) (e )
The Spinners claimed th a t  removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  would l ik e ly  
have a se rio u s  and p e rs is te n t adverse e f fe c t  on th e  general le v e l  o f un­
employment in  th e  area  in  which a su b s ta n tia l  p a r t o f th e  tra d e  o r in ­
d u stry  was s itu a te d . This con ten tion  was accepted by th e  co u rt necess­
i t a t in g  th e  balancing  process to  come in to  op era tio n .
The court observed th a t  yarn  p r ic e s  were higher under th e  scheme 
than  would be th e  case under f re e  com petition . Also, export business 
was lo s t  because sp inners were unable to  make p ric e  concessions and 
n a tio n a l re so u rces , in  th e  form of excess cap ac ity , were wasted. On 
balance the court found th a t  th e  wastage of n a tio n a l reso u rces outweighed 
the  avoidance of lo c a lis e d  unemployment and th e  scheme was dec la red  con­
t r a r y  to  th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t .
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Blanket R aiufacturera' Agreement
S (2 1 )  ( 1 )  (b )
S p ec ific  and s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  claimed
(1) th e  agreement promoted confidence w ith in  th e  in d u s try  th u s  encouraging 
m odernisation; t h i s  re su lte d  in  th e  long-run b e n e f its  o f lower p r ic e s  and 
higher q u a li ty .
(2 ) th e  minimum substance requirem ent p reren ted  debasement o f q u a l i ty .
(3 ) the  terms o f tra d e  r e s t r i c t io n s  discouraged unreasonable consumer 
demands which would cause in creased  c o s ts  and h igher p r ic e s .
The court found th a t s -
(1 ) no detrim ent re  s tilted  frao  th e  minimum p ric e  scheme since v i r tu a l ly  
no s a le s  were made a t  th a t  p r ic e . I t  was in s u f f ic ie n t ,  however, to  show 
th a t  a r e s t r i c t io n  was harm less to  succeed under S (21) (1 ) (b ) .  Any 
b e n e f its  which might r e s u l t  from promoting confidence w ith in  th e  in d u stry  
were u n lik e ly  to  be " sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l ."
( 2 )  th e  minimum substance r e s t r i c t io n  conferred  sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l  
b e n e f its  on th e  pub lic  which outweighed any de trim en ts  which m ight r e s u l t  
f r a a  th e  r e s t r i c t io n .  The minimum substance r e s t r i c t io n ,  however, could 
continue in  th e  absence of th e  p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n s .
(3 ) the  term s of tra d e  were, on th e  whole, reasonable and f a i r  bu t con­
fe rre d  no s p e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  on th e  p u b lic .
3 (21) (1 ) (g)
I t  was unnecessary to  consider any r e s t r i c t io n s  under paragraph (g ) ,  
i . e . ,  as being reasonably  necessary  to  support the  main r e s t r i c t io n s ,  as  
the  minimum p r ic e  scheme was unable to  q u a lify  under "gateway" (b ) .
i l l  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s ,  w ith th e  exeeptanee of th e  minimum substance 
arrangem ent, were declared  co n tra ry  to  th e  public  in t e r e s t .
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S c o tt ish  Bakers' Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b)
S p ec ific  and s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i ts  claimed:**
(1 ) p rice  s t a b i l i t y  fo r  standard bread.
( 2) th e  sa le  of bread a t  the  low est p r ic e s  econom ically p o ss ib le .
( 3 )  cvoidance of th e  danger o f undue concen tra tion  and m onopolistic  c o n tro l.
(4 ) b e t te r  q u a li ty  and se rv ic e .
(5 ) h igher volume o f research  and r a te  of te c h n ic a l p rogress.
The co u rt found :-
(1 ) th a t  the  in d u stry  s tru c tu re  mr.de fo r  n a tu ra l  s ta b i l i t y  o f p r ic e s ;  
a lso  p ric e  s t a b i l i t y  by i t s e l f  wae no t a b e n e f it .
( 2) th a t  i t  was not proved th a t  recommended p r ic e s  were lower than  they  
would be under f re e  com petition.
( 3 )  th a t  th e  r is k  of undue concen tra tion  was no t reduced a s  th e  reccmnended 
p ric e  system was operated by th e  la rg e  producers.
(4 ) th a t  p r ic e  com petition does not n ec e ssa rily  reduce q u a li ty  and se rv ice .
(5 ) the respondents conceded th a t  th e  claim in  re sp ec t o f re sea rch  could 
not be su b s ta n tia te d . They then claimed th a t  th e  r e s t r i c t io n  fo s te re d
a degree of co -operation  in  th e  in d u stry  which re su lte d  in  s u b s ta n tia l  
b e n e f its .  This claim  was both nebulous and sp ecu la tiv e  and th e re  was no 
reason why a l e s s e r  degree of co -operation  should tak e  p iece in  th e  absence 
of the agreement.
S (21) (1) (g)
As the  r e s t r i c t io n s  did  not q u a lify  under S (21) (1) (b ) i t  was un­
necessary  fo r  th e  court t c  consider any r e s t r i c t io n s  which were claimed 
to  be a n c i l la ry  t c  the  c e n tra l scheme.
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Watertube Boilermakers1 Agreement
S (21) (1) (b )
S p ec if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  claimed
(1) the  agreement m aintained capacity  in  th e  in d u stry  which would be 
needed when th e  temporary recess io n  ended.
( 2 ) in  th e  absence of th e  agreement, research  expenditures would decrease
and
(3 ) q u a lity  would d e te r io ra te .
(4 ) th a t  th e  agreement tended to  keep su b -con trac ting  among members.
The co u rt found t h a t : -
(1 ) boilerm akers who wished to  remain in  business would p reserve oap ac ity .
(2 ) research  would be m aintained a s  th e  respondents were a l l  f in a n c ia l ly  
w e ll-p la ced .
(3 ) the argument on q u a li ty  was in v a lid  a s  expert advice was re a d ily  
a v a ila b le  to  purchasers.
(4 ) the  tendency to  keep sub -co n trac tin g  among members was a detrim en t 
to  th e  p u b lic .
S (21) (1 ) (d )
The A ssociation  claimed th a t  th e  arrangements were necessary  to  
p ro te c t them selves a g a in s t a preponderant buyer, th e  C en tra l E le c t r ic i ty  
Generating Board. The court agreed but d isallow ed th e  r e s t r i c t io n  as  
being too  wide as  i t  ap p lied  a lso  to  a l l  o th e r customers o f th e  members,
3 (21) (1 ) ( f )
The court upheld th e  A sso c ia tio n 's  claim  th a t  removal o f th e  
arrangements would l ik e ly  r e s u l t  in  a reduction  in  th e  volume o r earn ings 
of th e  export business which could be considered s u b s ta n tia l .  In  th e  
balancing process th e  n a tio n a l b e n e f it  r e s u l t in g  from th e  maintenance 
of exports was deemed to  outweigh any de trim en ts  r e s u l t in g  from th e
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agreement. The r e s t r ic t io n *  were dec lared  no t co n trary  to  th e  pub lic  
in te r e s t .
F ederation  of Wholesale and M ultip le  Bakers1 Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  claim edi-
(1 ) removal o f th e  maximum p rice  recommendations would l ik e ly  r e s u l t  in
p r ic e  in c rea se s  both by members and non-members.
The co u rt founds-
(1 ) th a t  since  v i r tu a l ly  no s a le s  took p lace  below th e  recommended max­
imum p r ic e , th e  agreement operated a s  a fix ed  p r ic e . Removal o f th e  re ­
s t r ic t io n s  were u n lik e ly  to  lead  to  h igher p r ic e s ;  r a th e r  in  an in d u s try  
where demand was d e c lin in g  and productive capacity  was both e f f ic ie n t  and 
ample, f re e  com petition could be expected to  lead  to  p r ic e  red u c tio n s .
The r e s t r i c t io n s  were declared  co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  in te r e s t .
F ederation  of B r i t is h  Carpet M anufacturers' Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  cla im edi-
(1 ) pub lic  confidence in  standard  q u a li ty  a t  proper and reasonable p r ic e s .
(2 ) p r ic e  s ta b i l i t y .
(3 ) cheap and e f f i c i e n t  system o f d is t r ib u t io n .
(4 ) maintenance of promotional c o s ts  a t  a low le v e l .
The co u rt found th a tJ -
(1 ) th e  general pub lic  was no t aware o f the  ex is ten ce  or s ig n if ic a n c e  of
th e  q u a li ty  stan d ard s. I t  was no t be lieved  th a t  q u a l i ty  would be debased
in  the  absence o f th e  agreement. The fix e d  p r ic e s  were c r i t i c i s e d  as  
a r b i t r a r y ,  not being based on any recognized co stin g s  system.
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(2 ) p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y  was not i n  I t s e l f  a b e n e f it  and i t  was u n lik e ly  
th a t  undue in s t a b i l i t y  would fo llow  removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s .
(3 ) th e  approved l i s t  of w holesalers deprived th e  p u b lic  and r e t a i l e r s  
o f an adequate w holesale serv ice} fu r th e r  removal o f w h o lesa le rs ' f ix e d  
d iscoun ts would not n e c e ssa r ily  r e s u l t  in  h igher p r ic e s .
(4 ) th e  jo in t  a d v e r tis in g  arrangem ents were no t dependent on th e  o th er 
r e s t r i c t io n s  and could continue in  t h e i r  absence.
S (21) (1 ) ( f )
As th e  export tra d e  had been s te a d ily  d ec lin in g  d e sp ite  th e  re ­
s t r i c t io n s ,  th e  court found th a t  te rm ination  o f th e  scheme was u n lik e ly  
to  r e s u l t  in  a su b s ta n tia l  red u c tio n  in  th e  export t r a d e . The r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  were dec lared  con trary  to  th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t .
Phenol Producers' Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  claim ed2-
(1 ) the  maintenance of adequate cap ac ity  and lower p r ic e s  when demand
was high . The A ssocia tion  contended th a t  supply exceeded demand and
removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  would cause a  severe decrease in  p r ic e s .
This would d iv e r t  resou rces away from th e  in d u s try . When demand In creased ,
as  expected* su p p lie s  would be sh o rt and th e  agreement would hold  p r ic e s
below th e  f re e  market le v e l .
The co u rt found th a t  2-
(1 ) th e  fix e d  p r ic e  was s u b s ta n tia l ly  above th e  com petitive p r ic e ,  th e
fixed  p r ic e  was a rb i tr a ry  and no t r e la te d  t o  any c o s tin g s  form ula. The
r ig id i ty  in troduced  by th e  scheme was a lso  c r i t i c i s e d  a s  low er p r ic e s
might generate  new demand in  both  fo re ig n  and domestic m arkets.
The r e s t r i c t io n s  were dec la red  co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t .
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Black B olt and Nut A ssoc ia tion s' Agreement
3 (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  claim ed: -
(1 ) the  avoidance of th e  n ec e ss ity  fo r  buyers to  "go shopping"; "shopping" 
would in c rease  ad m in is tra tiv e  c o s ts .
(2 ) g re a te r  c a p i ta l  investm ent in  th e  in d u s try .
(3 ) th e  maintenance of high q u a li ty .
(4 ) th e  exchange o f te c h n ic a l Inform ation and resea rch .
(5 ) in te r - t r a d in g  m aintained sm all m anufacturers in  b u sin ess .
The court found t h a t i -
(1 ) the ad m in is tra tiv e  savings re s u l t in g  from not having to  "go shopping" 
were s p e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l  and would be lo s t  in  th e  absence o f th e  
agreem ent. This s a t i s f ie d  th e  requirem ents o f S (21) (1 ) (b ) .
(2 ) i t  was doubtfu l th a t  c a p i ta l  investm ent would decrease  in  th e  absence 
of th e  agreement.
(3 ) i t  was u n lik e ly  th a t  q u a li ty  would decrease s u b s ta n tia l ly  in  i t s  
absence.
(4 ) i t  was u n lik e ly  th a t  re search  and te c h n ic a l c o llab o ra tio n  would be 
s ig n if ic a n tly  reduced in  i t s  absence.
(5 ) th e  advantages o f in te r - t r a d in g ,  a s id e  from th e  b e n e f i ts  o f not 
having to  "go shopping", were to o  vague and sp ecu la tiv e  to  q u a lify  a s  
sp e c if ic .
S (21) (1 ) (g )
The standard  co n d itio n s  o f sa le  were found reasonably  necessary  
fo r  th e  maintenance o f th e  p r ic e  scheme and th e i r  removal would r e s u l t  
in  having to  "go shopping".
In  th e  balancing  procedure, th e  co u rt judged th e  b e n e f its  r e s u l t -
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in g  from not haring  t o  "go shopping” g re a te r  than  th e  d e trim en ts  o f 
h igher p r ic e s  r e s u l t in g  from th e  fix e d  p r ic e  schone. The p r ic e  re ­
s t r i c t io n s  and standard  cond itions o f sa le  were dec lared  n o t co n tra ry  
to  th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t .
D oncaster and R etford  Co-Operative S o c ie tie s  Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i ts  claimed
(1) in  th e  absence of the agreement uneconomic com petition would cause 
lower tra d in g  p r o f i t s  and d iv idends, meaning a h igher r e a l  p r ic e  to  
members.
(2 ) in  th e  absence o f th e  agreement u n p ro fitab le  se rv ic e s  to  members in  
boundary a reas  could no t be m aintained.
The court found t h a t t -
(1 ) i t  was u n lik e ly  th a t  such uneconomic com petition would tak e  p lace  a s  
both S o c ie tie s  were members o f th e  C o-operative Union whioh a r b i tr a te d  
such boundary d isp u te s .
(2 ) th e  impairment o f se rv ice s  to  m arginal a re a s  would not be s ig n if ic a n t  
and lacked a f a c tu a l  b a s is .
The r e s t r i c t io n s  were d ec la red  co n trary  to  th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t .
Wholesale C onfectioners' A lliance  Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b)
S p ec ific  and s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i ts  claimed
(1 ) in  th e  absence o f th e  agreement d is t r ib u t io n  c o s ts  would be h ig h er 
causing h igher p r ic e s  to  customers in  sp a rse ly  populated a re a s .
(2 ) w ithout th e  sca le  o f r e s e l l in g  p r ic e s  matched ag a in s t buying p r ic e s  
m anufacturers would be unable to  make more than  t r i v i a l  in c rea se s  in  
w holesale p r ic e s  w ithout in c re a s in g  r e t a i l  p r ic e s .
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(3 ) p ric e  l i s t s  made i t  unnecessary fo r  sm all r e t a i l e r s  to  "go shopping" 
and assured them o f reasonable p r ic e s .
(4 ) th e  p r ic e  l i s t s  stopped d isp u te s  between r e t a i l e r s  and w ho lesa lers  
over the  d iv is io n  o f th e  d iffe re n c e  between m anufacturers ' p r ic e  and 
r e t a i l  p r ic e .
The court found t h a t i -
(1 ) th e re  was s u f f ic ie n t  e l a s t i c i t y  in  th e  p r o f i t s  o f m anufacturers, 
w holesalers and r e t a i l e r s  to  ensure the  supply o f con fec tionery  a t  
t ic k e te d  p r ic e s  in  sp a rse ly  populated a re a s . Too many w ho lesalers 
ex is ted  and th e  system of d is t r ib u t io n  would be Improved by th e  elim ­
in a tio n  of in e f f ic ie n t  ones.
(2) t ic k e te d  p r ic e s  to  consumers would in c re a se  only i f  w ho lesalers in ­
creased  th e i r  r e s e l l in g  p r ic e s  to  r e t a i l e r s  by th e  same amount a s  th e  
m anufacturers ' in c rease  p lu s  a percentage p r o f i t  upon th e  in c re a se .
T his was considered u n lik e ly  in  a buyers ' m arket.
(3 ) a n a ll r e t a i l e r s  were capable o f comparing p r ic e s  to  f in d  them selves 
b arg a in s, the  b e n e f it  o f no t having to  "go shopping” was not s u b s ta n tia l  
in  t h i s  ease .
(4 ) th e  avoidance o f bargain ing  d isp u te s  between w ho lesalers and r e t a i l ­
e r s  was ne t a b e n e f it  a s  bargain ing  was l ik e ly  to  In crease  th e  p r o f i t s  
of one or th e  o th e r.
Motor V ehicle D is tr ib u tio n  Scheme Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i ts  claimed
(1 ) th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  ensured a nationw ide d is t r ib u t io n  network o f capable
d e a le rs  from idiom th e  pub lic  could purchase ea rs  o f any make, whether o r
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no t th e  d ea le r held  a fran ch ise  fo r  th e  sake chosen.
The oourt found t h a t i -
(1 ) the  r e s t r i c t io n s  made i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  put a new ea r  on th e  market 
u n less  th e  maker c rea ted  h is  own d is t r ib u t io n  network of fran ch ised  
d e a le rs . The court was not s a t i s f ie d  th a t  the  "Big F ire"  m anufacturers 
would re fu se  to  allow  t h e i r  fran ch ised  d e a le rs  to  s e l l  any make of c a r .
The evidence f a i le d  to  s a t is fy  th e  court th a t  removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  
would r e s u l t  in  th e  d e n ia l o f s p e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  to  th e  
p u b lic .
S (21) (1 ) (a )
The payment o f a 5 percent c e m iss io n  to  re g is te re d  r e p a ire r s  on 
th e  sa le  of a  v eh ic le  to  a purchaser in troduced by th e  r e p a ire r  was sought 
to  be j u s t i f i e d  a s  an inducement to  r e p a ire r s  to  meet th e  standards 
necessary  to  q u a lify  fo r  r e g is t r a t io n .  These s tandards were claim ed to  
be reasonably  necessary  to  p ro te c t th e  pub lic  ag a in s t in ju ry  from in ­
e f f ic ie n t  re p a ir s .  The court was no t s a t i s f ie d  th a t  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  
improved e ff ic ie n c y  in  r e p a irs  and th e  r e s t r i c t io n s ,  having f a i le d  under 
both (a )  and (b ) were declared  co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .
A ssociated Transform er M anufacturers1 Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and s u b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i ts  c laim edt-
( 1 ) removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  would cause lower p r ic e s  and p r o f i t s  re ­
s u ltin g  in  a red u c tio n  in  research  expenditure which would r e ta rd  te c h ­
n ic a l  advances.
( 2 ) q u a lity  would d e te r io ra te .
(3 ) co llab o ra tio n  on te c h n ica l m a tte rs  and co s tin g s  would cease in  th e  
absence o f th e  agreem ent; such c o llab o ra tio n  had re su lte d  in  low er c o s ts .
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The co u rt found t h a t : -
( 1 ) th e  evidence f a i le d  to  show th a t  in  th e  absence o f th e  agreement 
research  expenditu res would decrease and
(2 ) q u a lity  d e te r io ra te .  Purchasers were w e ll q u a lif ie d  to  recognise 
q u a li ty  and keen com petition would sake i t  e s s e n t ia l  th a t  i t  be a a in -  
ta in e d .
(3 ) the  lack  o f c o llab o ra tio n  l ik e ly  to  occur w ith  th e  te rm in a tio n  o f th e  
scheme was not su b s ta n tia l  a s  only lim ite d  c o llab o ra tio n  took p lace  w ith 
th e  agreement in  o p era tio n . Id le  cap ac ity  ex is ted  and low er p r ic e s  were 
l ik e ly  in  th e  absence o f th e  r e s t r i c t ! o n s .
S (21) (1 ) (d )
The A ssociation  claimed th e  r e s t r i c t io n  was necessary  to  secure 
f a i r  p r ic e s  from a la rg e  buyer, th e  C en tra l E le c tr ic i ty  G enerating Board. 
The court was not s a t i s f ie d  th a t  removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n  would r e s u l t  
in  o th e r than  f a i r  term s. (F a ir  t e n s  were those  a t  which e f f ic ie n t  
m anufacturers could supply th e  goods a t  a reasonable p r o f i t ) .
S (21) (1 ) ( f )
The A ssocia tion  a lso  claimed th a t  removal of th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  would 
r e s u l t  in  lower p r ic e s , p r o f i t s ,  re sea rch  expenditu res and q u a li ty  and 
would th u s  hare an adverse e f fe c t  on ex p o rts . The cou rt d id  not expeot 
re search  expenditu res o r q u a li ty  to  f a l l  f a r  enough to  s ig n if ic a n t ly  
e f fe c t  export ea rn in g s. The exchange of te c h n ic a l and commercial i n ­
form ation which took p lace tinder th e  export agreement f a i le d  to  im press 
th e  court which was of th e  opinion th a t  th e  le v e l  ten d erin g  which r e ­
su lted  from th e  export agreement tended in  i t s e l f  t o  reduce export earn­
in g s .
The r e s t r i c t io n s ,  having f a i le d  under (b ) ,  (d ) and ( f )  were dec lared
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con trary  to  th e  public  in te r e s t .
Cement Workers' Federation Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f its  claimed
( 1 ) p r ic e s  throughout th e  country a s  a whole were low er-than-com petitive .
( 2) capacity  was expanded in  s te p  w ith  demand.
(3 ) capacity  was e f f ic ie n t ly  used.
( 4 ) tra n sp o r ta tio n  was e f f i c ie n t ly  used.
The court found th a t J -
(1 ) th e  in d u s try  was e f f ic ie n t ly  operated and enjoyed only a modest p r o f i t  
m argin; th e  pub lic  enjoyed and would l ik e ly  continue to  enjoy th e  sp e c if ic  
and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f it  o f low er p r ic e s  re s u l t in g  from th e  r e s t r i c t io n s .
( 2) capacity  had been expanded in  proper re la t io n s h ip  to  demand.
( 3 ) capacity  was e f f ic ie n t ly  employed.
( 4 ) th e  tra n sp o r t subsidy element in  th e  p ric e  s tru c tu re  reduced th e  un­
economical use o f t ra n sp o r t .
In  i t s  balancing procedure th e  cou rt found th a t  th e  b e n e f its  o f over­
a l l  lower cement p r ic e s  outweighed th e  doub tfu l p o s s ib i l i ty  o f low er p r ic e s  
which might occur under f re e  com petition in  d e liv e ry  a rea s  d o s e  to  cement 
works. The court d id  not pronounce on th e  general q uestion  whether o r not 
f re ig h t  averaging schemes involv ing  tra n sp o r t su b sid ies  were d e trim en ta l 
to  th e  p u b lic .
S ( 2 1 )  ( 1 )  ( g )
The p ro v is io n s  fo r  m erchants' m argins were found to  be a necessary  
ad junct t o  th e  p r ic e -f ix in g  scheme w hile term s and cond itions o f s a le  
were a lso  considered a n c il la ry  to  th e  main r e s t r i c t io n s .  As such, they  
su ccess fu lly  passed through (g ) .
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Aggregated re b a te s  on purchases from F ederation  a m b e rs  du ring  
th e  course o f th e  y ear were held  to  have no econanic j u s t i f i c a t io n  and 
created  a p riv ileg ed  c la s s  o f purchaser* They a lso  d iscouraged buying 
from non-Federation u m b ers  and impeded en try  to  th e  industry*  The 
aggregated re b a te s  were dec lared  con trary  to  th e  p u b lic  in te re s t}  th e  
main p r ic e - f ix in g  agreement to g e th e r w ith  a n c i l la ry  arrangem ents accepted 
by th e  co u rt under (g ) were dec la red  not co n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t .
Glass B o ttle  M anufacturers’ Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f its  o la is e d t-
( 1 ) in  th e  absence of th e  agreement p r ic e s  would f lu c tu a te  sh a rp ly .
( 2) q u a li ty  would d e te r io ra te  in  term s o f low deuand o r severe p r ic e  
com petition.
( 3 ) in  th e  absence o f th e  agreement c o lla b o ra tio n  on re sea rch  and de­
sign  would end and w ith i t  th e  b e n e f its  o f h igher q u a l i ty  and low er p r ic e s .
(4 ) production fo r  stock would be d iscon tinued  in  term s o f low demand in  
th e  absence of th e  agreement.
( 5) la rg e  buyers could o b ta in  unreasonably low p r ic e s  w hile o th e r buyers 
would have to  pay h igher p r ic e s  in  i t s  absence*
( 6 ) prompt d e liv e ry  on sh o rt n o tic e  would no longer be p o ss ib le  a f t e r  
d iscontinuance o f  th e  agreement.
( 7 ) a m onopolistic  s i tu a t io n  w ith  accompanying higher p r ic e s  was l ik e ly  
to  develop in  th e  absence of th e  agreement.
The co u rt found t h a t 2-
(1 ) p r ic e  un iform ity  was no t a s u f f ic ie n t  b e n e f it  t o  outweigh th e  lo s s  
of a f re e  m arket.
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(2 ) th e re  would be no d e te r io ra tio n  In  q u a li ty  as la rg e  buyers would 
i n s i s t  on maintenance of proper s tandards and m anufacturers ccnld  i l l -  
a ffo rd  to  r is k  lo s in g  business by low ering q u a li ty .
(3 ) th e  lo s s  in  co -opera tive  research  and design , which might r e s u l t  
from th e  in tro d u c tio n  of p rie e  com petition would no t be s u b s ta n tia l .
(4 ) & (6) th e  in d u s try  customs of u t i l i z in g  capacity  f o r  stock prod­
u c tio n  during  seasonal low demand and advance o rdering  by custom ers 
to  ensure prcmpt d e liv e ry  would not be app reciab ly  changed.
(5 ) purchasers must be considered a s  a whole. There was no evidence to  
in d ic a te  th a t  th e  in c rea se  in  p r ic e s  to  sm aller buyers exceeded in  th e  
aggregate th e  savings to  la rg e r  buyers.
( 7) even i f  th e  number of m anufacturers was reduced by th e  in tro d u c tio n  
o f p ric e  com petition , th e re  was no n e ce ss ity  th a t  p r ic e s  would be h ig h er 
o r th a t  a m onopolistic  s i tu a t io n  would develop.
A ll th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  were dec lared  con trary  to  th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t .
Linoleum M anufacturers’ A ssocia tion  Agreement
s ( 21) ( 1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  claim edt-
(1 ) th e  p u b lic  was assured  of high q u a li ty  standards and a w ider choice 
of p a tte rn s .
( 2) p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y  ensured th e  maintenance of adequate stocks by whole­
s a le r s  and r e t a i l e r s .
( 3 ) p r ic e s  were lower when demand was high than  they  would be under 
cond itions o f f re e  competition*
The co u rt found t h a t t -
( 1 ) p r ie e  com petition was u n lik e ly  to  r e s u l t  in  q u a li ty  d e te r io ra t io n .
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I t  was a lso  u n lik s ly  to  r e s u l t  in  a s u f f ic ie n t  narrowing of consumer 
choice to  amount to  the d en ia l o f a s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f i t .
(2 ) p r ic e  com petition was u n lik e ly  to  a l t e r  s u b s ta n tia l ly  the  stock­
holding h a b its  o f w holesalers and r e t a i l e r s .
(3) th e  evidence in  th e  p as t o f p r ic e s  being re s tra in e d  by th e  agree­
ment in  tim es of high demand was not s tro n g . The demand fo r  lin o le tm  
was steady and th e re  was nothing to  suggest th a t  in  th e  p resen t o r in  
th e  fo reseeab le  fu tu re  demand was l ik e ly  to  be high.
S (21) (1 ) ( f )
The A ssociation  contended th a t  removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  would 
r e s u l t  in  te rm in a tio n  o f t h e i r  Convention which was an arrangement 
between th e  Export Group of th e  A ssociation  and th e  p r in c ip a l Con­
t in e n ta l  linoleum  m anufacturers by which c a n o n  s e l l in g  p r ic e s  and 
terms fo r  a l l  m arkets ou tsid e  th e  United Kingdom, th e  United S ta te s  
and Germany were observed. Term ination of th e  Convention, i t  was claim ed, 
would lead  to  a s u b s ta n tia l  reduction  in  th e  volume and earn ings o f th e  
export business o f members. I t  was fu r th e r  claimed th a t  p r ic e s  in  
Commonwealth m arkets must be s u b s ta n tia l ly  th e  same a s  Home P r ic e s .  A 
d ec lin e  in  Home P ric e s  from a p ric e  war would r e s u l t  in  low er p r ic e s  in  
Commonwealth m arkets and a red u c tio n  in  export ea rn in g s.
The cou rt f e l t  th a t  th e  A ssociation  considered th e  Convention 
arrangem ents to  be o f g rea t im portance and so would tak e  care no t to  
d is ru p t them. C ontinen tal m anufacturers a ls o  regarded th e  Convention 
as  im portan t; they  would end i t  only i f  th e  p r ic e -f ix in g  system could 
no longer operate  because of c u t-p r ic e  ex p o rts . The court considered 
i t  u n lik e ly  th a t  p r ic e  com petition in  th e  Heme Market would le a d  to  
s u b s ta n tia l exports  a t  cu t p r ic e s . I t  be lieved  th a t  th e  Convention
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could operate in  th e  absence of th e  minimal p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n s  in  th e  
Home Market and th a t  th e  volume of earn ings o f th e  export b u sin ess  
could continue s u b s ta n tia lly  unaffected*
I t  was unnecessary to  consider th e  remaining r e s t r i c t io n s  under 
(g ) a s  th e  A ssociation  f a i le d  to  make i t s  ease under (b ) o r ( f ) .  A ll 
r e s t r i c t io n s  were declared  co n tra ry  to  th e  public  in te re s t*
Agreement Between Newspaper P ro p r ie to rs ' A ssocia tion ,
L td .,  and N ational F ederation  of R e ta il  Newsagents, Book­
s e l le r s  and S ta tio n e rs
a ( 21) (1 ) (b )
S p e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i ts  elaim edt-
(1 ) th e  A ssociation contended th a t  in  th e  absence of th e  agreem ent, th e  
F ederation  would l ik e ly  be ab le  to  in flu en c e  w holesalers to  r e s t r i c t  
e n try  to  th e  r e t a i l  t ra d e  to  fewer than  were adm itted under th e  agree­
ment. The r e s u l t  would be fewer o u t le ts  and reduced c ir c u la t io n . I f ,  
con trary  to  ex p ec ta tio n s , th e  number o f o u t le ts  increased  in  th e  absence 
o f the  scheme, th e  expense and tim e of d e liv e ry  would in c re a se ; h ig h er 
d is tr ib u t io n  c o s ts  would r a is e  newspaper p r ic e s .
(2 ) th e  F ederation  contended th a t  in  th e  absence of th e  agreem ent, un­
r e s t r ic te d  e n try  would in c rease  th e  number of o u tle te  to  such an ex ten t 
th a t  d e liv e ry  se rv ice  would in  same a reas  become u n p ro fita b le  and would 
be d iscontinued  by newsagents. The r is k  of unsold goods would a lso  
cause newsagents to  reduce s tocks.
The court found t h a t i -  
(1 ) L ( 2) an in c rea se  in  th e  number o f o u t le ts  would su b jec t news­
agents to  th e  spur o f g re a te r  com petition. I t  remained unconcerned 
th a t  delivexy  se rv ice  would d e te r io ra te  o r th a t  s tocks would be reduced*
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mThe A ssociation*s f i r s t  con ten tion  th a t  en try  would be f u r th e r  
r e s t r i c te d  in  th e  absence o f th e  agreement was u nsuccessfu l. I f  th e  
p resen t scheme was unable to  s a t i s f y  th e  public  in te r e s t  requ irem en ts, 
any agreement which was more r e s t r i c t iv e  would a lso  f a i l  t o  q u a lify  
under S ection  21.
A ll th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  were declared  con trary  to  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .
Permanent Magnet A sso c ia tio n s ' Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  claim eds-
(1 ) in  the absenee of th e  agreement, th e  research  and te c h n ic a l pooling 
arrangements would be term inated  denying to  th e  p u b lic  th e  b e n e f i ts  of 
new and improved products and low er p r ic e s .
The co u rt found th a t s -
(1 ) th e  re sea rch  and te c h n ic a l poo ling  agreements had b e n e f itte d  th e  
public  in  th e  manner claimed and prevented any member f re e  u s in g  monopoly 
power to  ob tain  h igher p r ic e s . C o llaboration  in  t h i s  in d u stry  was found 
of g re a te r  p u b lic  b e n e f it than  in d iv id u a l com petitive re se a rch . Co­
opera tive  re search  enabled members to  be com petitive w ith  la rg e r  and 
more powerful overseas com petito rs. The con ten tion  th a t  th e  re search  
and te c h n ic a l pooling arrangem ents would no t e x is t  w ithout th e  p r ic e  
r e s t r i c t io n s  was accepted  by th e  co u rt.
I t  was common ground th a t  th e  public  would no t be denied any of 
th e  b e n e f its  o f p ast re sea rch  i f  th e  p r ic e  r e s t r i c t io n s  were te rm in a ted , 
but f u r th e r  advances were considered l ik e ly  in  t h i s  in d u s try  in  th e  
fo reseeab le  fu tu re . In  view of th e  A sso c ia tio n 's  p as t record  o f passing  
th ese  b e n e f its  on to  th e  p u b lic , they would be l ik e ly  t o  enjoy sp e c if ic
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and s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  of th e  sane nature in  th e  fu tu re  as  th ey  had 
in  the p a s t.  The agreements th u s  q u a lif ie d  under paragraph (b ) .
S (21)  (1 ) (£ )
The A ssociation  claimed th a t  te rm in a tio n  of th e  agreement would 
cause a su b s ta n tia l  red u c tio n  in  export earn ings as e f f ic ie n c y  and eom- 
p e t i t iv e  a b i l i t y  would be reduced. The court considered i t  l ik e ly  th a t  
in  the long-run  exports  would be adversely  e f fe c te d , bu t in form ation  
was in s u f f ic ie n t  to  f in d  th a t  th e  e f f e c ts  would amount to  a  s u b s ta n tia l 
reduction  in  export earn ings.
S (21) (1 ) (g )
The agreement to  w ithhold new m agnetic m a te r ia ls  from th e  market 
su b jec t to  agreed term s and cond itions and arrangem ents fo r  p r ie e  d i f f ­
e r e n t ia ls  were not considered by th e  cou rt to  be e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  main­
tenance of th e  minimum p r ic e - f ix in g  scheme and were dec lared  co n tra ry  
to  the pub lic  in te r e s t .
In  i t s  balancing  procedure, th e  court noted th a t  p r ic e s  and p r o f i t s  
were not unreasonable and considered th e  in d u stry  e f f i c ie n t ly  ru n . The 
minimum p ric e  r e s t r i c t io n s  and th e  t e c h n i c a l  pooling arrangem ents were 
declared  not co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  in te r e s t .
Standard Metal Window Croup Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  c la im ed :-
( 1 ) lower p r ic e s  f o r  standard  m etal windows.
( 2) b e t te r  q u a l i ty  and se rv ice .
(3 ) a w ider choioe of su p p lies .
The court found th a t s -
( 2) & (3 ) th e  b e n e f its  o f b e t te r  q u a li ty  and serv ice  and a w ider choice 
o f su p p lie rs  were not e s ta b lish e d  and th e  ease would stand o r f a l l  by
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reference  to  lower p r ic e s .
(1 ) s tro n g  com petition e x is te d  in  th e  in d u stry  and tended to  keep p r ic e s  
down. The c o lla b o ra tio n  on th e  exchange of c o s ts  and te c h n ic a l inform­
a tio n  between members of tn e  Group had re su lte d  in  s ig n if ic a n t  co st 
red u c tio n s , g re a te r  than  would l ik e ly  have occurred under f re e  com­
p e t i t io n .  Lower c o s ts  enabled members to  compete more e f fe c t iv e ly  
and re s u lte d  in  lower p r ic e s .
The cou rt found th a t  te rm in a tio n  of th e  p r ic e -f ix in g  r e s t r i c t io n s  
would end th e  exchange of c o s ts  and "know-how" amongst members and con­
cluded th a t  com petition would be le ssen ed , thereby  denying th e  p u b lic  
th e  b e n e f it  o f lower c o s ts .
In  th e  balancing  procedure, th e  b e n e f its  o f low er p r ic e s  were 
judged to  outweigh any de trim en ts  a r is in g  from th e  agreement and th e  
r e s t r i c t io n s  were declared  not con trary  t o  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .
Net Bock Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  claim edt-
( 1 ) in  th e  absence of th e  agreement th e re  would be few er stockholding 
b o o k se lle rs  and se rv ice  would be r e s t r i c te d .
( 2 ) p r ic e s  o v e ra ll would be h igher in  i t s  absence and
( 3) th e re  would be fewer and l e s s  v a ried  t i t l e s  published .
The co u rt found t h a t j -
( 1 ) i t  was u n lik e ly , i f  th e  p u b lish e rs  ceased r e t a i l  p r ic e  m aintenance, 
th a t  any g re a t p roportion  o f t i t l e s  would be used a s  lo s s - le a d e rs  o r 
sold a t  p r ic e s  g iv ing  th e  s e l l e r  l e s s  than  th e  normal m argin. But, 
because of th e  r is k  o f not knowing which types of books would be used
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
in  t h i s  manner, book se lle rs  would reduce s tocks d e sp ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  
th i s  would fu r th e r  h u rt book s a le s .
S p e c ia l is t  l ib r a r y  su p p lie rs  (who gen era lly  hare lower overhead 
expenses than  bookshops) could , in  th e  absence of th e  agreem ent, econ­
om ically quote lower p r ic e s  f o r  l ib r a r y  requirem ents than  bookshops.
The average stockholding bookshop tra n sa c ted  12 .5  percen t o f i t s  tra d e  
w ith  p u b lic  l i b r a r i e s .  The co u rt concluded th a t  th e  combined e f f e c ts  
of p r ic e -c u tt in g  com petition and th e  lo s s  o r reduction  o f l ib r a r y  
business would d riv e  many stockholding book s e l le r s  out o f b u sin ess .
The l ik e ly  decrease in  the  number o f stockholding b o o k se lle rs  
and the  p rov ision  o f a more r e s t r i c t e d  se rv ice  were considered to  be 
th e  d en a il o f a sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f it  t o  th e  p u b lic .
( 2) fewer b o o k se lle rs  holding reduced stocks under th e  circum stances 
o u tlin ed  above would l ik e ly  lead  to  sm aller p r in tin g  o rd e rs  and h igher 
production c o s ts .  Higher p r ic e s  would r e s u l t  in  fewer s a le s  and s t i l l  
m a i le r  p r in t in g  o rd ers .
In  order to  secure a t t r a c t iv e  business o p p o rtu n itie s , rem aining 
book se lle rs  would p ress  fo r  la rg e r  d iscount m argins. T h is would r a is e  
the  p u b lis h e r 's  marked r e t a i l  p r ic e  of most t i t l e s .  The avoidance of 
higher o v e ra ll  p r ic e s  was considered to  be a sp e c if ic  and s u b s ta n tia l 
b e n e f i t .
( 3 ) th e  red u ctio n  in  th e  number o f b o o k se lle rs  and th e  co n tra c tio n  in  
sa le s  due to  h igher p r ic e s  would d e te r  th e  publish ing  o f m arginal works. 
The e f fe c ts  of fewer t i t l e s  being published would be more s tro n g ly  f e l t  
in  th e  h igher reaches o f l i t e r a tu r e  and sch o la rsh ip . This was con­
sidered  th e  d en ia l of a sp e c if ic  and su b s ta n tia l  b e n e f i t .
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The court wsb not s a t i s f ie d  th a t  re m o v a l  of th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  and 
the  expected h igher p r ic e s  would s u b s ta n tia l ly  e f f e c t  th e  a b i l i t y  o f 
United Kingdom p u b lish e rs  to  compete in  overseas m arkets.
In  i t s  balancing  procedure, th e  court noted th a t  th e  p ub lish ing  
tra d e  was very  com petitive and provided an in cen tiv e  t o  keep c o s ts  downj 
p r o f i t s  were a ls o  modest. The o v e ra ll  b e n e f its  r e s u l t in g  from th e  agree­
ment were Judged to  outweigh i t s  de trim en ts  and i t  was dec lared  not 
co n tra ry  t o  th e  pub lic  in te r e s t .
Agreement of th e  Birmingham A ssociation  of 
B uilding Trade Employers
S ( 21) (1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f its  claimed*-
( 1 ) th e  recommendations or ru le s  r e la t in g  to  ten  standard  forms o f con­
d i t io n s ,  m iin ly  o f b u ild in g  c o n tra c ts , b e n e f itte d  th e  p u b lic  a s  b u ild in g  
owners because they  were f a i r  and w e ll known to  b u ild e rs . T his kep t 
tender p r ic e s  down as  b u ild e rs  who tendered  under u n fam ilia r  co n d itio n s  
were a p t to  r a is e  th e i r  ten d e rs  to  cover unknown c o n tra c tu a l co n tin ­
gencies. The use o f well-known forms saved time and money by le ssen in g  
the  lik e lih o o d  of d isp u tes  which would otherw ise a r i s e .
(2 ) th e  N ational Q u a n titie s  Rule (which forbade members in  c e r ta in  eases 
to  ten d e r in  can p e t i t io n  fo r  co n tra c ts  exceeding a t  th e  d a te  o f re ­
ference 4( 000 and from Hay 2 , 1962, 8 ,000 in  v a lu e , u n le ss  B i l l s  o f 
Q u an titie s  were p rov ided), provided th e  b u ild e r  w ith an accu ra te  com­
p u ta tio n  of th e  work involved. T his was conducive to  lower ten d e rs
as  th e  b u ild e r  d id  no t have to  add to  h is  p r ic e  to  p ro te c t h im self from 
u n c e r ta in t ie s .
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 8
B u ild e rs  w ould have to  provide t h e i r  own b i l l s  o f  q u a n t i t ie s  i f  
they w ere not inc luded . This would in c rease  overhead* and r a i s e  b u ild ­
in g  p r ic e s .
( 3 )  th e  F ed era tio n  dio not attem pt to  ju s t i f y  a  ru le  fo rb id d in g  th e  sub­
m is s io n  o f p r ic e d  schedules w ith  ten d e rs  w ithout th e  p r io r  consent of 
th e  F ederation . I t  denied th a t  the  ru le  gave r i s e  t o  any re le v a n t 
r e s t r ic t io n s  under S ection  C of th e  Act.
(4 ) the  F ederation  did  no t attem pt to  j u s t i f y  i t s  recommendations t o  
members r e la t in g  to  tw idering  in  com petition i n  re sp ec t o f  daywork 
a r is in g  under b u ild ing  c o n tra c ts  and fo r  daywork charges on b u ild in g  
work of a jobbing or maintenance c h a ra c te r .
Changes were made in  th e se  recommendations during th e  proceed­
in g s . The F ederation  then  contended th a t  in  t h e i r  re v ise d  form th e  
recommendations d id  not f a l l  w ith in  S ection  C o f th e  Act. The rev ised  
recommendation was to  th e  e f fe c t  th a t  th e  N ational Schedules (which had 
been th e  su b jec t o f th e  e a r l i e r  recommendation) be used in  th e  absence 
of any agreement between b u ild e r  and c l ie n t  a s  to  daywork charges f o r  
general b u ild in g  work. Members were f r e e ,  however, to  quote such r a te s  
as  they thought f i t  i f  in v ite d  to  quote. I f ,  con trary  t o  th e  F e d e ra tio n 's  
b e l ie f ,  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  came w ith in  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  of th e  A ct, they  
were to  be defended under S ection  (21) (1 ) (b ) .
The court found t h a t : -
(1 ) n e ith e r  th e  u se fu ln ess  nor th e  use o f th e  standard forms depended 
upon th e  r e s t r i c t io n s .  Standard forms were no t needed to  ensure b u ild ­
ing  owners of a su ita b le  co n trac t -  b u ild in g  owners such as  government 
departm ents and lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  had t h e i r  own expert adv iso ry  s ta f f s
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ana most p r iv a te  owners r e l ie d  on th e  advice o f th e i r  a r c h i te c ts .  The 
public was not denied any b e n e f its  by removal of th e  r e s t r i c t io n s .
(2 ) th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  a r is in g  from th e  N ational Q u a n titie s  Rule were 
con trary  to  the  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .  In  most ca ses , where B i l l s  of 
Q u an titie s  were ap p ro p ria te , they  would s t i l l  be provided in  th e  ab­
sence of th e  Rule.
(3 ) t h i s  ru le  gave r i s e  to  r e s t r i c t io n s  w ith in  Section  ( 6 ) (1 ) (e )  o f  
the  Act. In  th e  absence of any attem pt t o  ju s t i f y  i t ,  th e  ru le  was 
con trary  to  th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t .
( 4 ) th e  rev ised  recommendation did  not give r i s e  to  any r e s t r i c t io n s  
w ith in  S ection  6 o f th e  Act. I f  th e  recommendations were found by a 
court of appeal to  come w ith in  th e  A ct, th e  r e s t r i c t io n s ,  a r is in g  
therefrom ,would be declared  co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  i n t e r e s t .
Recommendations r e la t in g  to  (1 ) ,  (2 ) and (3 ) were dec lared  con­
t r a ry  to  th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t .
Ju te  Goods Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (e )
The respondents claimed th a t  removal o f th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  would 
have a se rio u s  and p e r s is te n t  adverse e f fe c t  on th e  genera l le v e l  of 
employment in  th e  Dundee a re a , which was th e  cen tre  o f th e  ju te  y arn - 
sp inning , cloth-w eaving, and bag-sewing in d u s tr ie s  in  th e  United Kingdom.
The cou rt declared  the  agreement co n tra ry  to  th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t .  
The in d u s try  had long been p ro tec ted  from severe fo re ign  com petition 
by th e  Board o f Trade operating  through th e  J u te  C ontro l. The r e s -  
ondents claimed th a t  th i s  method o f p ro te c tio n  would be in e f fe c t iv e  
in  th e  absence o f th e i r  agreement.
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The Ju te  Control imported Ind ian  and P ak is tan i ju te  goods, 
moat o f which comprised only a m a l l  p a r t o f Dundee p roduction . There 
was, th u s , only a m a l l  a rea  in  which th e  Ju te  C ontrol and th e  r e s ­
pondents were engaged in  com petition. Dundee c lo th  was sold "ex 
works Dundee" w hile th e  Ju te  C o n tro l 's  p r ic e  included  d e liv e ry . The 
p r ic e  d i f f e r e n t ia l  amounted to  only 3 percen t o f th e  s e l l in g  p r ic e ;  
the  court considered t h i s  u n lik e ly  to  a f f e c t  th e  le v e l  o f  a c t iv i ty  in  
th e  in d u s try .
The respondents a lso  claimed th a t  in  th e  absence o f t h e i r  p r ic e -  
f ix in g  agreem ent, th e re  would be no p r ic e s  to  which th e  J u te  C ontrol 
could equate import p r ic e s .  Then, i f  any Dundee producer were to  under­
s e l l  th e  C on tro l, th e  Control world lower i t s  p r ic e s  and w ith  i t  th e  
le v e l  of p ro te c tio n  affo rd ed . The court a lso  re je c te d  t h i s  c laim .
In  the  f i r s t  in stan ce  i t  held th a t  th e  C ontro l could determ ine f a i r  
p r ic e s  by having regard  to  th e  c o s ts  o f e f f ic ie n t  Dundee products. 
Secondly, th e  court considered i t  unreasonable to  in f e r  th a t  is o la te d  
o r impermanent cases of u n d e rse llin g  would r e s u l t  in  th e  le v e l o f 
p ro tec tio n  affo rded  th e  in d u s try  being lowered. Such a c tio n  would be 
r e la te d  t o  more permanent co n sid e ra tio n s .
A ll th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  were dec la red  co n tra ry  t o  th e  p u b lic  I n te r e s t .
Tyre Trade R eg is te r  Agreement 
S ta ffo rd sh ire  Motor Tyre Co. L td 's .  Agreement
S ( 21) ( 1 ) (a )
The r e s t r i c t io n s  were claimed to  be reasonably  necessary  to  p ro te c t 
the  pub lic  a g a in s t road a cc id en ts . I f  ty re s  were wrongly o r bad ly  f i t t e d ,  
a se rio u s  acciden t was l ik e ly  to  occur. In  th e  absence o f th e  agree­
ment, u n q u a lified  persons could e n te r  th e  business thereby endangering
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th e  pub lic  sa fe ty . I t  was a lso  claimed th a t  th e  R e g is te r  provided a 
valuable  channel fo r th e  dissem ination  of te c h n ic a l in form ation  amongst 
members.
I t  w*s not e s tab lish ed  to  th e  c o u r t 's  s a t is fa c t io n  th a t  f a u l ty  
f i t t i n g  was a more common cause of ty re  f a i lu r e  than  poor maintenance 
by u se rs . The market was h ig h ly  com petitive ensuring  f re e  and adequate 
f i t t i n g  se rv ice s  to  the  public  in  th e  absence of th e  agreement. The 
court considered i t  u n lik e ly  th a t  th e  p u b lic  sa fe ty  would be endangered 
by th e  te rm in a tio n  of th e  r e s t r i c t io n s .
The d issem ination  of te c h n ic a l inform ation amongst members had 
been n e g lig ib le  in  th e  p a s t.  At any r a te  th e  R eg is te r was unnecessary 
a s  a means of communication a s  ty re  m anufacturers would f in d  i t  in  
th e i r  own I n te r e s t s  to  see th a t  such inform ation was made a v a ila b le  to  
the  tra d e .
A ll th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  were dec la red  con trary  to  th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t .
B r i t is h  Paper and Board Makers' A ssociation  Agreement
3 (21) (1 ) (b)
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f its  claimed
(1 ) th e  minimum p ric e  guaranteed to  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  who supplied  baled  
mixed waste paper re su lte d  in  a lower p ric e  to  the  p u b lic  as  purchasers 
of those types o f paper and board in  which th e  waste paper was an in ­
g red ien t.
The A sso c ia tio n 's  reasoning  was th a t  in  th e  absence of th e  ag ree­
ment, lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  would abandon waste paper salvage in  periods 
of surp lus supply a s  th e  operation  would become uneconomic. When demand 
in c reased , th e  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  would be unw illing  to  in cu r c a p i ta l  
expenditu res on an e n te rp r is e  which they  regarded a s  hazardous. M ills
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would then  be fo rced  to  use more expensive s u b s t i tu te s .  The h igher 
m anufacturing co s ts  would then  cause higher p ric e s  fo r  th e  end p roducts.
The court found th a t  
( l )  th e  A ssociation f a i le d  to  show th a t  abandonment o f th e  agreement 
would l ik e ly  lead  to  a s u b s ta n tia l red u ctio n  in  th e  q u a n tity  o f w aste 
paper supplied  by lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s .  The co u rt d id  not consider i t  
necessary  to  examine o th er arguments a s  th e  A ssociation  had f a i le d  to  
e s ta b lis h  t h i s  e s s e n t ia l  element in  i t s  case . The r e s t r i c t io n  was de­
c lared  co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  in te r e s t .
B r i t is h  Waste Paper A sso c ia tio n s ' Agreement 
The p rice  r e s t r i c t io n s  were abandoned fo llow ing re fe ren ce  of th e  
agreement to  th e  co u rt. N either A ssociation  sought t o  ju s t i f y  th e se  re ­
s t r ic t io n s  under S ection  (21) (1) (b ) and they  were dec lared  co n tra ry  
t o  th e  pub lic  in t e r e s t .
The R e g is tra r  contended th a t  r e s t r i c t io n s  were a lso  accepted in  
r e la t io n  to  th e  d e sc rip tio n s  of waste paper. The c o u r t, however, found 
th a t  they  were not r e s t r ic t io n s  w ith in  Section  ( 6 ) (1 ) o f th e  Act.
The A ssociation  had contended th a t  i f  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  had come w ith in  
th e  Act, they  would have been ju s t i f i e d  under S ection  (21) (1 )  (b ) .
5 ( 21) ( 1 ) (b )
S p ec ific  and su b s ta n tia l b e n e f i ts  clalm eds-
(1 ) th e  p u b lic , as  purchasers and u se rs  o f paper and board con ta in ing
waste paper, b e n e f itte d  from lower p r ic e s  which would no lo n g er e x is t
i f  the  r e s t r i c t io n s  were removed. The agreement kept m anufacturing
c o s ts  and p r ic e s  down.
The court found t h a t : -
(1 ) i f  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  had come w ith in  Section  C o f th e  Act th ey  would
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have been dec lared  co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  in te r  co t. There waa fierce 
evidence in d ic a tin g  th a t  m anufacturing co s ts  would r i s e  in  th e  absence 
of th e  agreem ent, but the ex ten t vms unknown. Evidence of any sub­
s ta n t ia l  p r ic e  in crease  was lack ing  and i t  was not shown to  th e  court*s 
s a tis fa c tio n  how many m ills  weu_ld be forced out o f business due to  fewer 
sa le s  a t  h igher p r ic e s .
N ational Sulphuric Acid A ssocia tion  Agreement
S (21) (1 ) (d)
The respondents sought to  ju s t i f y  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  a s  reasonably  
necessary  to  enable su lphuric  ac id  m anufacturers in  th e  United Kingdom 
to  n eg o tia te  f a i r  term s fo r  th e  a c q u is it io n  of sulphur from a person 
not p a rty  to  th e  agreement who c o n tro ls  a preponderant p a r t  of th e  tra d e  
or business o f supplying su lphur. The su p p lie r  in  question  was an 
American corpo ra tion  which supplied  the  whole of th e  United S ta te s  
ex p o rts .
The court found th a t  th e  fo re ig n  corporation  d id  c o n tro l and would 
l ik e ly  continue to  co n tro l a preponderant p a r t  o f th e  supply. This 
su p p lie r  had p rev iously  exercised  i t s  commercial power to  t r y  to  o b ta in  
more favourable term s than i t  would command in  th e  absence o f t h i s  power. 
I f  another attem pt were to  be made in  th e  fu tu re  i t  would be more l ik e ly  
to  succeed in  th e  absence of a ccmmon buying agreement among United 
Kingdom m anufacturers.
R e s tr ic t io n s  on the  a c q u is itio n  o f sulphur from o u ts id e  th e  Sulphur 
Pool were considered ju s t i f i a b le  by th e  co u rt. Without th ese  r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  a d m in is tra tiv e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were l ik e ly  to  a r is e  and th e  probab­
i l i t y  o f susp icion  between members would l ik e ly  lead  to  th e  weakening 
or d is in te g ra tio n  of th e  Pool.
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S (21) (1 ) (* )
R e s tr ic t io n s  on th e  re s a le  of sulphur to  anyone ou ta id s th e  Pool 
were accepted by th e  court a s  reasonably necessary  fo r  purposes conn­
ected  w ith  th e  maintenance of the  main r e s t r i c t io n s .
In  i t s  balancing  procedure, th e  court observed th a t  p r ic e s  had 
been fix ed  w ith  reasonable regard  to  co s ts  and was assured th a t  p r ic e s  
would continue to  be fix e d  in  th a t  manner in  th e  fu tu re .
The r e s t r i c t io n s  were dec lared  not co n tra ry  to  th e  pub lic  
I n te r e s t .
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